ROGER MORRISON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
March 13, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2994-MR
ROGER MORRISON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 96-CR-000720
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; EMBERTON and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Appellant, Roger Morrison (Morrison), appeals
from a final judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered by the
Fayette Circuit Court on October 29, 1996.
After a trial by
jury, Morrison was found guilty of an amended charge of
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (KRS 514.100), as well as,
resisting arrest (KRS 520.090), driving under the influence,
second offense (KRS 189.010), operating on a suspended license
(KRS 186.620), and assault, fourth degree (KRS 508.030) and
sentenced to twelve months in the county jail.
denied by the trial judge.
Probation was
Appellant argues that the trial court
erred by denying his motions for a directed verdict.
and, hence, affirm.
We disagree
On June 3, 1996, Morrison came upon a 1978 Chevrolet
truck parked at the entrance of the Radisson Hotel parking garage
with keys in the ignition.
The truck belonged to Richard Roy,
who, along with Steven Coleman, was repairing a fire extinguisher
box in the garage.
Roy and Coleman were not far from the vehicle
when they heard it start up and pull forward and strike a parked
vehicle.
Roy and Coleman ran to the vehicle and found Morrison
sitting in the driver's seat.
Appellant subsequently exited the
truck and was detained by the two.
While awaiting the arrival of
the Lexington police, Morrison attempted to leave the scene,
threatened the witnesses, struck Coleman in the throat and had to
be physically restrained by hotel security.
Eventually, Officer Steven Davis, of the Lexington
Division of Police, arrived and placed Morrison under arrest for
theft by unlawful taking over $300 (KRS 514.030), a felony and
the several misdemeanor offenses noted above.
Officer Davis also
testified that appellant was screaming and yelling and resisting
arrest by attempting to kick the officer, as well as, by
threatening him.
Officer Davis was unable to give Morrison any
field sobriety tests because appellant was "totally intoxicated."
At trial before a jury, Coleman, Roy and Officer Davis
testified as to what transpired on June 3, 1996, at the Radisson
Hotel.
Cindy Dudley, a Department of Transportation records
custodian, testified, without objection, that Morrison's driving
privileges were suspended on that date in question.
Appellant
took the witness stand and testified that he had a serious
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alcohol problem, that he had been drinking, that he "blacked
out," and that he does not remember everything that happened that
day.
Morrison appeals his conviction contending that his
motions for directed verdict should have been granted.
Appellant
moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the
Commonwealth's case and again at the conclusion of all the
evidence.
Both motions for directed verdict were general in
nature and based upon the insufficiency of the evidence.
Additionally, appellant specifically moved for a directed vedict
on the operating on the suspended license charge claiming that he
was not on a public highway as required by statute.
On motion for a directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991); Yarnell
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 834 (1992); Farler v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 880 S.W.2d (1994).
"On appellate review,
the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt,
only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal."
Benham at 187.
A reviewing court does not have to
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reevaluate the proof because its only function is to consider the
decision of the trial court in light of the evidence presented at
trial.
Bussell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111 (1994).
A
careful review of the record, including the video tape of the
jury trial, makes it clear that there was more than sufficient
evidence to overcome a motion for a directed verdict based on the
sufficiency of the evidence.
Appellant next argues his motion for directed verdict
on the suspended license charge.
It is clear from the evidence
that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof and appellant was
not entitled to a directed verdict.
At trial, Coleman testified
that he heard the engine of the truck start, then saw Morrison
attempting to leave the parking garage in the vehicle but was
thwarted when he struck a parked vehicle.
Both Coleman and Roy
observed appellant behind the driver's wheel with the engine
still running.
Officer Davis testified, without objection, that
he was advised over the radio that Morrison's license was
suspended.
Ms. Dudley concluded the Commonwealth's evidence by
referring to appellant's certified driver's record and testifying
that the record indicated Morrison's license was suspended on
June 3, 1996.
"[I]n prosecuting a suspended license charge, it
is not necessary to prove a prior conviction.
Rather, it is only
necessary that the Commonwealth prove that the individual was
operating a vehicle while his or her license was suspended."
Commonwealth v. Duncan, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 336 (1997).
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The issue to be considered then is not whether his
license was, in fact, suspended but rather, was Morrison
operating a vehicle on a highway at the time of the violation?
Appellant argues that since he was in a parking garage that he
was not operating a vehicle on a highway as required under the
suspended license statute.
KRS 186.620(2) states:
No person who has not applied for an
operator's license or whose operator's
license has been denied, canceled, suspended
or revoked, or whose privileges to operate a
motor vehicle has been withdrawn, shall
operate any motor vehicle upon the highways
while the license is denied, canceled,
suspended, or revoked or his privilege to
operate a motor vehicle is withdrawn, or the
license has not been applied for.
In the case sub judice, the court instructed the jury
that in order to find the appellant guilty of operating on a
suspended license the jury must find that Morrison was operating
a motor vehicle on a highway and that his license had been
suspended.
The instructions pursuant to 1 Cooper, Kentucky
Instructions to Juries (Criminal) ยง 8.14 (1993), defined highway
as:
"Highway - Means every way or place of whatever nature when
any part of it is open to the use of the public, as a matter of
right, license, or privilege, for the purpose of vehicular
traffic."
definition.
Appellant did not object to the instruction or the
Under the definition used, the Radisson Hotel
parking garage would be included in the definition of highway.
It is open to the public and guests, as well as, others who pay
to use the parking facility.
A review of the evidence presented
in this case clearly indicates that the trial court correctly
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determined that a reasonable juror could fairly find guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The motion for a directed verdict was
properly denied and the case properly presented to the jury for
determination on all issues.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sally Wasielewski
Fayette County Legal Aid, Inc.
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Courtney A. Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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