MICHAEL KERR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
March 27, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2676-MR
MICHAEL KERR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-0322
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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***
***
GUIDUGLI, KNOX, and MILLER, Judges.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Michael Kerr (Kerr) brings this appeal from a
September 17, 1996 judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
The facts are these:
Kerr and Kim Adkins (Adkins)
dated from November 1995 through February 1996.
1996, the couple attended a party.
On February 16,
At approximately 11:00 p.m.,
Kerr became angry at Adkins and left the party without her.
About an hour later, Adkins went to Kerr's apartment to retrieve
her belongings.
As she was packing, Kerr struck her on the head,
back, and neck with a "mag" flashlight.
The emergency squad was
called, and Adkins was taken to the hospital for treatment.
Subsequently, Kerr was indicted on one count of assault
in the second degree (Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 508.020) and one count
of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (KRS 509.020).
A
jury trial was held on August 1, 1996, wherein Kerr was found
guilty of assault in the second degree and unlawful imprisonment.
He was sentenced concurrently to five years' imprisonment on the
first count and one year on the second count.
This appeal
followed.
Kerr argues that he was denied due process of law when
the trial court overruled his motions for a directed verdict
during trial.
Specifically, he maintains that the Commonwealth
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 1) that a dangerous
instrument was used in the assault and 2) that Adkins suffered a
serious physical injury as a result of the assault.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Benham,
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991), held that "[o]n appellate
review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find
guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal."
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court opined:
[T]his inquiry does not require a court to
"ask itself whether it believes that the
evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation omitted.]
Instead, the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational
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trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt [emphasis added].
Pursuant to KRS 508.020, a person is guilty of assault
in the second degree when:
a)
He intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person; or
b)
He intentionally causes physical
injury to another person by means of
a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
c)
He wantonly causes serious physical
injury to another person by means of
a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
Whether an object is considered a dangerous instrument
is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.
Potts, Ky., 884 S.W.2d 654 (1994).
Commonwealth v.
The term dangerous instrument
is defined in KRS 500.080 as
. . . any instrument, including parts of the
human body when a serious physical injury is
a direct result of the use of that part of
the human body, article, or substance which,
under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used, or threatened to be
used, is readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury.
We believe the Commonwealth presented ample evidence to
support the jury's finding that Kerr inflicted physical injury to
Adkins by means of a dangerous instrument.
Adkins testified that
Kerr beat her about the head, neck and shoulders with a mag
flashlight.
Medical evidence was presented that confirmed Adkins
was hit with a blunt instrument.
Furthermore, the flashlight
used in the assault was introduced into evidence, and a serolo-
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gist testified that blood had been found on it.
Viewing the
evidence as a whole, we are of the opinion that it was not
"unreasonable" for a jury to believe that the flashlight was used
in the assault and that, under the circumstances in which it was
used, it was readily capable of causing death or serious physical
injury.
As such, we cannot say that the circuit court erred on
this issue.
Likewise, we believe Kerr's argument pertaining to the
Commonwealth's failure to prove serious physical injury is
without merit.
We note that proof of "serious" physical injury
is required under KRS 508.020(1)(a).
In the instant case,
however, the Commonwealth proceeded under Subsection (1)(b),
which requires proof of "physical" injury.
The jury was given
the following assault instruction:
a)
that in this County on or about February
17, 1996, the defendant inflicted an
injury upon Kim Adkins by striking her
with a metal flashlight;
b)
that the flashlight was a dangerous instrument as defined under instruction no.
8; and
c)
that in so doing the defendant intentionally caused physical injury to
Kim Adkins [emphasis added].
As the jury was not required to believe that Adkins suffered
serious physical injury to find Kerr guilty of second-degree
assault, the Commonwealth was under no burden to present proof of
same.
As such, we believe the circuit court committed no error.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ann T. Eblen
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
-andWilliam L. Daniel II
Assistant Att'y Gen'l
Frankfort, KY
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