BILL R. THOMAS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: June 12, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2666-MR
BILL R. THOMAS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-000014
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOX, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Bill R. Thomas appeals from his conviction of three
counts of burglary.
He was sentenced to three years imprisonment
on each of the three burglary counts, and those sentences were
directed by the trial court to run consecutively for a total of
nine years.
In March 1996, a Mason Circuit Court grand jury
returned two indictments charging appellant and others with three
counts of third-degree burglary involving England's Food Market
(England's) in Mays Lick, Kentucky.
Indictment 96-CR-014 charged
appellant with burglarizing England's on February 15, 1996.
Indictment 96-CR-015 charged appellant with two counts of
burglary involving England's.
Count 1 charged appellant with
burglarizing England's on February 13, 1996, and count 2 charged
appellant with burglarizing England's on February 15, 1996.
Thus, appellant was charged with one count of burglary involving
England's on February 13, 1996, and two counts of burglary
involving that same store on February 15, 1996.
On February 13, 1996, England's was burglarized, and a
substantial quantity of alcohol, cigarettes, work gloves, and
other items totaling $1,130.39 in value were stolen.
On February
15, 1996, England's was again burglarized, and again a
substantial quantity of beer, cigarettes, cigarette lighters,
work gloves, and other food items having a total value of
$2,725.75 were taken.
Appellant was indicted along with Orville
Allen Doyle (Doyle) and Jeff Pilosky (Pilosky).
Pilosky
subsequently pleaded guilty and testified at the joint trial of
Doyle and appellant.
At trial, Pilosky testified that, on February 13, 1996,
he, Doyle and appellant burglarized England's and stole a
quantity of goods from that store.
He testified that he, Doyle
and appellant returned to the store on February 15th and again
broke into it.
He testified that they removed items from the
store and drove them to Doyle's trailer.
He testified that they
then returned to the store, again entered it, and removed more
items.
2
Appellant raises two arguments for reversal: (1) his
conviction of two counts of burglary resulting from the February
15, 1996 break-in of England's violated the prohibition against
double jeopardy; and, (2) during the penalty phase of the trial,
appellant should have been permitted to tell the jury that he had
received a plea offer from the Commonwealth and to explain why he
did not accept that plea offer.
First, we do not agree that appellant was placed in
double jeopardy.
Here, he was not charged with the violation of
two separate statutory offenses.
Rather, he was charged with two
violations of the same statutory offense on the same night.
While this issue has not been preserved, it may be raised for the
first time on direct appeal.
Sherley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 558
S.W.2d 615 (1977); Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 922 S.W.2d 371
(1996).
Appellant argues that all of the facts alleged in each
of the burglary counts charged in indictment 96-CR-014 and count
2 of indictment 96-CR-015 are charges related to a single
burglary on February 15th.
However, we do not agree.
Rather, we
believe the evidence demonstrates two distinct burglaries of
England's.
This is not a case where multiple trips were made for
the purpose of loading goods into a vehicle.
Here, the burglars
broke in, loaded a vehicle with goods, and transported the goods
to Doyle's trailer.
Thereafter, they left the trailer, returned
to the store, re-entered, and removed more goods.
In our
opinion, each entry constituted a separate and completed offense.
3
Phillips v. Commonwealth, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 235 (1984).
We do not
believe the prohibition against double jeopardy was violated in
this instance.
Next, appellant argues the trial court erred in ruling
that, during the sentencing phase of the trial, he could not
discuss the Commonwealth's plea offer to him.
Appellant argues
that, even though evidence of offers to compromise are ordinarily
not admissible, such evidence may be admissible when it is
offered in mitigation.
Appellant notes that, during the guilt-
innocence phase of the trial, the jury learned that Pilosky had
entered a plea of guilty.
Appellant appears to argue that he
should have been permitted to explain to the jury why he had not
also accepted the Commonwealth's offer.
However, we disagree.
KRS 532.055(2)(b) reads:
The defendant may introduce evidence in
mitigation. For purposes of this section,
mitigating evidence means evidence that the
accused has no significant history of
criminal activity which may qualify him for
leniency. This section shall not preclude
the introduction of evidence which negates
any evidence introduced by the
Commonwealth[.]
We do not see how testimony that appellant refused to accept the
Commonwealth's plea offer has any relevance as mitigating
evidence.
The record does not tell us what information appellant
sought to impart to the jury as to why he refused to accept the
plea offer.
Since we are not shown the relevance of any such
testimony, we conclude that this argument lacks merit.
4
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Mason
Circuit Court.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur in part and dissent in part.
I am of the opinion
that conviction upon two counts of burglary for the February 15,
1996 break-in constitutes double punishment.
I would remand for
resentencing reflecting a conviction upon a single count for the
February 16, 1996 entry.
5
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael M. Losavio
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.