DAVID E. WILLIAMSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
September 18, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1996-CA-002335-MR
DAVID E. WILLIAMSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF,JUDGE
ACTION NO. 86-CR-1722
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; ABRAMSON and COMBS, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
David Eugene Williamson (Williamson) appeals pro
se from the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court,
entered August 1, 1996, which denied his motion to set aside
judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Williamson argues that: he was
subjected to double jeopardy, received ineffective assistance of
counsel, and was improperly denied an evidentiary hearing.
Finding no merit in the appellant's contentions, we affirm the
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Williamson was convicted by a jury of complicity to
commit murder; he was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison
on February 26, 1988.
On March 7, 1988, Williamson filed a
motion for a new trial and a Judgment Not Withstanding the
Verdict, which was subsequently denied by the court.
The Final
Judgment and Sentence of Imprisonment was entered on April 1,
1988.
On April 5, 1988, Williamson filed a notice of appeal.
On
October 3, 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
On December 18, 1995, Williamson filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant
to RCr 11.42, a motion for appointment of counsel, and a motion
for an evidentiary hearing.
On August 1, 1996, the Jefferson
Circuit Court issued an order denying Williamson's motion to set
aside judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On August 21, 1996, the
court issued an order sustaining Williamson's motion to proceed
in forma pauperis, but overruling his motion for appointment of
counsel on appeal.
This appeal followed.
Williamson first argues that the trial court subjected
him to double jeopardy by trying him for murder and for
complicity to commit murder arising from a single course of
conduct.
A double jeopardy claim should be raised on direct
appeal and is not appropriate for RCr 11.42 relief.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 865 (1986).
Brewster v.
In order for a
defendant to invoke RCr 11.42 relief, there must exist: (1) a
violation of a constitutional right; (2) a lack of jurisdiction;
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or (3) such violation of a statute as to make the judgment void
and, therefore, subject to collateral attack.
Tipton v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 376 S.W.2d 290 (1964).
While a RCr 11.42
motion provides the appellant with the opportunity to attack an
erroneous judgment on grounds not available by direct appeal
(Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 856 (1983)), it is not
intended to give defendant a vehicle for pursuing what is in
essence an alternate appeal or for indirectly seeking review of
trial errors that should have been raised upon direct appeal.
Williamson's argument as to the issue of double jeopardy fails as
he has failed to demonstrate any of the three pertinent grounds
available pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Williamson also argues that he was denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
Williamson alleges that his counsel: failed to raise appropriate
defenses, did not adequately investigate, and did not adequately
represent him.
The two-pronged test adopted by the Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), governs this case.
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.
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Strickland v. Washington, supra at 687.
Williamson has failed to meet the first prong of the
Strickland test by being unable to demonstrate that his counsel's
performance was deficient.
According to RCr 11.42 (2), the
motion "shall state specifically the grounds on which the
sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant
relies..." (emphasis added).
Williamson alleges that his counsel
neglected to raise appropriate defenses and that he did not
adequately investigate.
However, these bare allegations are
wholly unsupported by specific facts.
Without a factual basis,
the motion must be summarily overruled.
See Stanford v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
The second prong of the Strickland test -- whether the
appellant's counsel was so deficient as to prejudice the defense
-- is a moot point.
Williamson has failed to show any deficiency
at all -- much less that of the egregious degree amounting to
deprivation of a fair trial and the probability that, but for
counsel's alleged deficiency, the final outcome of his case would
have been different.
Therefore, Williamson's claim of
insufficiency of counsel must fail.
Williamson next argues that the trial court erred in
overruling his motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to RCr
11.42 (5).
When the trial court denies a motion for an
evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion, our review is limited
to whether the motion "on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would
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invalidate the conviction."
S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967).
Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 411
A review of the record before us
substantiates that Williamson's allegations are meritless.
Since
his allegations are refuted by the record as a whole, we hold
that the trial court was not required to conduct an evidentiary
hearing.
Hopewell v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 687 S.W.2d 153
(1985).
Finally, Williamson contends that the trial court erred
in overruling his motion for appointment of counsel.
In
Commonwealth v. Ivey, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 456 (1980), the Supreme
Court interpreted KRS 31.110 and RCr 11.42 as providing for the
appointment of counsel on all RCr 11.42 motions where the movant
so requests.
However, in Commonwealth v. Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d
336 (1984), the Court held that the failure of the trial court to
grant a movant's request for counsel in a RCr 11.42 proceeding
constituted harmless error as the record revealed that
application for relief under the rule amounted to no more than an
exercise in futility.
Having examined the record, we find that
the circumstances of this case dictate that such an "exercise in
futility" exists and that, therefore, the court's failure to
appoint counsel was harmless error.
In summary, we find that Williamson's claims are
unfounded.
A double jeopardy claim can not be properly raised
before this court pursuant to a RCr 11.42 motion.
Williamson
failed to state a meritous claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and the court was correct in overruling Williamson's
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motion to set aside judgment without either appointing an
attorney or conducting an evidentiary hearing.
affirm the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Therefore, we
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Eugene Williamson
Burgin, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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