JUDY PONDER v. JANET PHILPOT AND JUDY PONDER v. NORTHWOOD EAST HOMEOWNERS COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING
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RENDERED: November 25, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-002300-MR
JUDY PONDER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000222
JANET PHILPOT
APPELLEE
AND
NO.
1996-CA-002946-MR
JUDY PONDER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000222
NORTHWOOD EAST HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.; OLDHAM
COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING
COMMISSION; JANET PHILPOT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, DYCHE, and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE1:
Judy Ponder, an Oldham County property owner,
appeals pro se from July 19, 1996, and August 22, 1996, judgments
and orders of Oldham Circuit Court dismissing her complaint
against the Northwood East Homeowners Association, Inc. (the
Association), of which she is a member; against fellow
Association member and fellow Northwood East subdivision resident
Janet Philpot; and against the Oldham County Planning and Zoning
Commission.
Ponder’s complaint alleged that Philpot was building
a fence and tack shed that violated various restrictive covenants
applicable throughout the subdivision and further alleged that
the Association and Zoning Commission had breached duties to
enforce and uphold those covenants.
Philpot responded to the
complaint by moving, in effect, for summary judgment, and, when
Ponder failed to respond to Philpot’s motion, the trial count
summarily dismissed the complaint against Philpot with prejudice.
Ponder then moved to have the summary judgment reconsidered.
Following a full hearing on the motion to reconsider, the trial
court reasserted its former judgment and dismissed the complaint
against the other defendants as well.
On appeal, Ponder
maintains that the trial court erred initially by dismissing her
complaint and then abused its discretion by refusing to vacate
1
This opinion was prepared and concurred in prior to the
departure of Judge Abramson from the Court on November 22, 1998.
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the erroneous judgment.
Finding neither error nor abuse of
discretion, we affirm.
At bottom, Ponder’s complaint concerns improvements
Philpot undertook on her 2.9 acre lot in preparation for keeping
a horse, a use expressly permitted by the deed restrictions.
Philpot fenced about a third of her lot for the horse, but did so
in a manner which Ponder believes violates a deed restriction
against “dividing” lots.
Philpot also constructed a tack
shed/stable which Ponder insists violates a deed restriction
requiring that outbuildings “be neat and attractive in appearance
and similar in design to the residence.”
As noted above, the
trial court did not fully reach the merits of Ponder’s claims in
light of procedural lapses by Ponder’s counsel.
Ponder now
contends that counsel’s errors were not so egregious as to
preclude the full development of her case.
We agree with Ponder
that in general summary disposition “is not to be used as a
sanctioning tool of the trial courts.”
App., 809 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1991).
Ward v. Housman, Ky.
We further agree that summary
judgments are to be cautiously applied, not as a substitute for
trial, but only when there is no genuine issue of material fact
so that judgment may be entered as a matter of law.
Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476
(1991).
Our review of these matters is de novo.
Steelvest,
supra.
Ponder filed her complaint on May 7, 1996.
At that
time, apparently, Philpot had begun but had not completed the
fence and shed at issue.
Accordingly, Ponder’s complaint sought
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to enjoin further construction until Philpot’s alleged noncompliance with the restrictive covenants could be ruled upon.
Her request for temporary injunctive relief, however, did not
comply with the requirements of CR 65.04, and so was allowed to
abate.
In the meantime Philpot completed the improvements to her
property.
On May 30, 1996, Philpot moved to dismiss Ponder’s
complaint pursuant to CR 12.02 on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
She
attached to the motion an affidavit in which she asserted that
prior to her construction of the fence and shed she had obtained
the written approval of both the Zoning Commission and the
Association.
her motion.
Philpot also attached copies of these approvals to
This affidavit, upon which the trial court relied,
converted Philpot’s motion to one for summary judgment under CR
56.
McCray v. City of Lake Louisvilla, Ky., 332 S.W.2d 837
(1960).
By order entered June 3, 1996, the trial court gave
Ponder 20 days in which to respond to Philpot’s motion.
On July
19, 1996, no response having been filed, the trial court granted
summary judgment to Philpot.
Not surprisingly, the dismissal of his client’s case
prompted a flurry of activity by Ponder’s counsel.
On July 22,
1996, he belatedly filed a motion for extra time in which to
respond to the motion to dismiss.
On July 29, 1996, at the
eleventh hour, he tendered via the night depository a CR 59.05
motion to vacate the dismissal.
On August 5, having learned that
his CR 59.05 motion had not been received by the clerk and had
not been filed, he filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02, again
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seeking to have the July 19 judgment set aside.
Attached to that
motion was a copy of the allegedly tendered CR 59.05 motion.
On August 8, 1996, the trial court convened a hearing
to consider the issues raised by Ponder’s post-judgment motions.
At the hearing, counsel claimed that he had not received notice
of the court’s twenty-day response deadline, and indeed the
court’s letter giving such notice had been returned as
undeliverable.
Counsel acknowledged, however, that the court had
correctly used the mailing address counsel had provided and that
counsel had failed to apprise the court of potential problems
with that address or to supply an alternative.
Counsel affirmed
that he had seasonably tendered his CR 59.05 motion, but he
acknowledged that the motion had not found its way to the clerk.
Correctly, we believe, the trial court opined that counsel’s
problems were of his own making and did not present a case of
excusable neglect.
Nevertheless, mindful that Ponder would bear
the brunt of counsel’s omissions and that she did not appear to
share responsibility for his conduct, the trial court looked to
the substance of Ponder’s claims and allowed her an opportunity
to bolster her allegations.
Without actually ruling on the
merits of contentions not raised prior to its summary judgment,
the trial court undertook to assess the likelihood of Ponder’s
success were her complaint to be reinstated.
Under Ward v.
Housman, supra, and CR 59.052, this was an appropriate inquiry.
2
The trial court did not state whether it was reconsidering
its judgment pursuant to CR 59.05 or CR 60.02. Apparently it did
both. We note that CR 60.02 does not provide a substitute for CR
59.05 should the relief provided by that rule be waived or
neglected. Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983).
(continued...)
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Philpot’s new fence extends across the entire depth of
her lot from front to back.
Ponder maintains that such a fence
violates a deed restriction providing that no lot “shall be
divided or diminished in size unless the same shall be used with
an adjacent lot for purpose of constructing one dwelling
thereon.”
The trial court understood this restriction as most
probably referring to a division of the lot by transfer of
ownership, not to the sort of merely superficial division Philpot
has made.
It deemed Ponder’s interpretation of the restriction
unlikely to be adopted by a court.
We agree.
On its face the
restriction is concerned with assuring that no additional
residences be squeezed into the development and that each
residence be on a suitably spacious lot.
The restriction does
not seem to address the individual lot owner’s use of his or her
land, and Ponder has suggested no reason to conclude otherwise.
Ponder’s other claim concerns Philpot’s tack
shed/stable, which Ponder alleges is so unlike Philpot’s
residence as to violate the subdivision’s uniformity requirement.
She objects to the fact that the shed’s walls were finished in
plywood although the residence has a brick exterior, and she
complains that the shed simply looks different from the
residence.
Ponder concedes, however, that Philpot obtained
approval for her project from the Association, and she apparently
does not dispute that the Association has authority to screen
2
(...continued)
The court’s finding that counsel’s tardiness was not excusable
foreclosed any relief under CR 60.02. It is only under CR 59.05
that the trial court’s more extensive review of Ponder’s claims
was warranted.
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building projects for compliance with the deed restrictions.
She
concedes that the colors and roof lines of the shed and residence
are recognizably similar.
She also concedes that the restriction
at issue, which requires that outbuildings be “neat and
attractive in appearance and similar in design to the residence,”
is so vague that it necessarily invests the Association with
broad discretion in its application.
She contends, nevertheless,
that the Association misapplied the restriction in this case and
that its approval of Philpot’s project is subject to judicial
review along with the project itself.
In LaVielle v. Seay, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 587 (1967), our
highest Court upheld the enforceability of a similarly vague deed
restriction, the application of which had been assigned to a
homeowners association.
The Court qualified its approval of such
covenants, however, by noting that any such restriction must
further a clearly legitimate purpose of the property owners and
that any application of the restriction must be reasonable and in
good faith.
We thus agree with Ponder that the Association’s
approval of Philpot’s project is subject to judicial review, but,
as the trial court noted, the scope of that review is more
limited than Ponder suggests.
We (and the trial court) are
concerned not with whether the Association’s decision could be
deemed “incorrect” or whether a different reviewer might have
reached a different decision, but instead with whether the
Association acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.
Cf. Raintree
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Bleiman, 342 N.C. 159, 463 S.E.2d
72 (1995) (holding that lack of evidence of the homeowners
Association’s bad faith or arbitrariness entitled the Association
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to a directed verdict against a challenge to its application of
an architectural uniformity covenant).
Ponder has alleged nothing which could be construed as
evidence of the Association’s bad faith or its arbitrariness.
Although the Association’s review of Philpot’s plans appears to
have been somewhat informal, Ponder does not allege that no
review took place, that the Association’s review procedure
violated covenant requirements, or that the approval of Philpot’s
project is strikingly at odds either with the terms and intent of
the restrictions or with the Association’s review of other
projects.
We thus agree with the trial court that even in light
of Ponder’s belatedly urged allegations, were her complaint to be
reinstated there is very little chance that it would survive a
renewed motion for summary judgment.
The trial court did not
err, therefore, or abuse its discretion by refusing to vacate its
July 19, 1996, dismissal of Ponder’s complaint against Philpot.
Nor did the trial court err by dismissing Ponder’s
complaint against Northwood East Homeowners Association, Inc.,
and the Oldham County Zoning Commission.
Philpot would be an
indispensable party in Ponder’s action against either of the
remaining defendants, so that Philpot’s dismissal renders the
other actions improper.
CR 19.02.
Furthermore, Ponder failed to
allege a breach of duty by either the Association or the Zoning
Commission.
As noted above, Ponder did not allege that the
Association had acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in reviewing
and approving Philpot’s improvements.
And while it is generally
true that zoning ordinances do not override restrictive
covenants, Osborne v. Hewitt, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 2 (1960), this does
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not imply that zoning officials have a duty to enforce such
covenants3.
Meyer v. Stein, 284 Ky. 497, 145 S.W.2d 105 (1940).
On the contrary, generally only those persons with an interest in
the affected land may seek enforcement of deed restrictions.
Annotation:
See
“Comment Note.--Who may enforce restrictive covenant
or agreement as to use of real property,” 51 A.L.R. 3rd 556
(1973).
Ponder has suggested no reason to think that the Oldham
County Zoning Commission might be subject to an exception to this
rule, nor has she identified any source of the Zoning
Commission’s alleged duty.
For these reasons, we affirm the July 19, 1996, and
August 22, 1996, judgments and orders of Oldham Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, NORTHWOOD
EAST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC.:
Judy L. Ponder
Crestwood, Kentucky
James F. Williamson
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, OLDHAM
COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING
COMMISSION:
John R. Fendley
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JANET
PHILPOT:
Roy Kimberly Snell
LaGrange, Kentucky
3
The Oldham County Zoning Ordinances incorporate this rule:
In the case of any conflict between this ordinance, or
part thereof, and the whole or part of any existing or
future private covenants or deed, the most restrictive
shall apply . . .
Article XV, Section 1501, paragraph 3.
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