ORDERED NOT TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE KY SUPREME COURT September 15, 1999; 98-SC-1088-D ALLAN KEITH YOUNG1 v. ALMON SULLIVAN, JR., INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF ADAIR COUNTY SCHOOLS
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RENDERED: November 25, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED NOT TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE KY SUPREME COURT
September 15, 1999; 98-SC-1088-D
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS.
1996-CA-002283-MR & 1997-CA-000874-MR
ALLAN KEITH YOUNG1
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM M. HALL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00087
v.
ALMON SULLIVAN, JR.,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SUPERINTENDENT OF ADAIR
COUNTY SCHOOLS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON2, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Allan Keith Young (Young) has appealed from the
partial summary judgment of the Adair Circuit Court entered on
August 8, 1996, which dismissed his claims against Almon
Sullivan, Jr. (Sullivan), the Superintendent of Adair County
Schools, concerning his right to be hired as head boys’
basketball coach under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 160.345
and KRS 161.760(3).
Young has also appealed from the final
1
In the Notices of Appeal, the appellant’s first name is
spelled “Allen” in one and “Allan” in the other. Hereafter, we
shall use “Allan” in our Opinion.
2
Judge Abramson concurred in this opinion prior to leaving
the Court on November 22, 1998.
judgment entered on March 11, 1997, after a jury trial, in which
the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Sullivan
on Young’s defamation claim.
We affirm as to the defamation
claim and reverse as to the hiring claim.
From 1982 until 1995, Young served as the head coach of
the boys' basketball team at Adair County High School.
In 1984,
Young was hired as the Assistant Principal at that school, a
position he continues to hold.
On March 29, 1995, Young was
notified by Sullivan that his position as head basketball coach
would be terminated at the end of the 1994-95 school year.3
Sullivan's action created a vacancy for which Young applied when
it was posted.
Adair County High School had elected, pursuant to KRS
160.345, to be governed by a school-based decision making council
(the school council).
Under the procedure established in KRS
160.345(2)(h), George Critz (Critz), the principal of Adair
County High School, requested the applications for the coaching
vacancy from the superintendent for consideration by the school
council.
Sullivan forwarded all the applications to Critz except
that of Young's.
the applications.
Critz then requested that Sullivan send him all
On May 31, 1995, Sullivan forwarded Young's
application with a memo which stated that Young was not
"endorsed" because he was "under State Police investigation for
3
Sullivan's letter of notification to Young enumerated eight
reasons for the action taken to remove Young as coach, including,
insubordination, decline in public support for the team, keeping
the team in the locker room an hour after losing a game to
Russell County to berate the players, and an allegation that
Young attempted to bribe the head football coach to recommend
hiring Young's son as an assistant.
-2-
misconduct[.]"
Despite this admonition, on June 7, 1995, Critz
recommended to Sullivan that Young be hired as the boys'
basketball head coach for the 1995-96 school year.
On June 8, 1995, Young filed a complaint in the Adair
Circuit Court against the Board of Education of Adair County (the
Board) and Sullivan, individually, and in his official capacity
as Superintendent of the Adair County Schools.
Young alleged (1)
that the reasons cited by Sullivan for his removal in the notice
required by KRS 160.760(3) were "not the true and actual reasons
for said action," thereby rendering the notice "defective, void
and of no effect," (2) that his removal was done "to punish him
for, his political affiliations, views and associations in
relation to school board races" in violation of KRS 161.164 and §
1983 of Title 42, U.S.C., and (3) that his removal was "taken
without any legitimate purpose or reason commensurate with the
proper administration of the Adair County schools in violation of
Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution[.]"
Young asked that the
Board and Sullivan be enjoined from removing him as head coach
and for monetary damages to compensate him for the reduction in
his salary, mental anguish and emotional distress, and for his
attorney's fees.
In his answer, Sullivan stated that "there existed
overwhelming bases for having taken such action and for having
previously disciplined [Young] for such conduct which conduct was
reasonably believed to have amounted to a violation of KRS
161.164(3) and perhaps other statutory provisions, both civil and
-3-
criminal."
The Board, pursuant to CR 12.02, moved the trial
court to dismiss it as a party.
On August 21, 1995, Sullivan rejected Critz's
recommendation to hire Young as head coach for the upcoming
school year.4
Thus, on September 18, 1995, Young moved the trial
court for leave to file an amended complaint in which he alleged
that Sullivan's refusal to hire him constituted "deliberate and
intentional” interference with the school council in violation of
KRS 160.345(9).
Also on that date, Young moved the trial court
for the issuance of a temporary injunction requiring the Board
and Sullivan to immediately reinstate him as the head coach.
On
October 18, 1995, the trial court granted the Board's motion to
dismiss it as a party.
It also granted Young's motion to amend
his complaint vis-a-vis Sullivan, but denied his motion for a
temporary injunction.
On April 17, 1996, Young moved the trial court for
leave to file a second amended complaint which asserted a claim
against Sullivan for defamation.
On May 31, 1996, he moved the
trial court for a partial summary judgment on his first amended
complaint.
Young argued that, based upon Critz's recommendation,
he was entitled to be restored to the position of head coach.
On
June 18, 1996, Sullivan filed a response to the motion for
partial summary judgment and his own motion for partial summary
4
The vacancy was again posted. Young's wife, Juanita Young,
a middle school teacher in Adair County, applied for and was
selected for the position by Critz, after he consulted with the
school council. Sullivan completed the hiring process on this
occasion, but ordered Juanita Young not to have any contact with
her husband during team practices and games.
-4-
judgment.
He urged that the construction of KRS 160.345(2)(h)
proffered by Young "would totally negate [his] authority . . .
under KRS 161.760(3) to determine who would not be the boys'
basketball coach at Adair County High School for the 1995-96
school year" (emphasis in original).
He further contended that
the school council and principal could choose any other qualified
applicant, but should not be allowed "to 'trump' [his]
statutorily-authorized act."
He insisted that it was "patently
absurd" to interpret the statute to allow the principal and the
school council to "undo what the superintendent has done."
On August 16, 1996, the trial court entered an opinion
and partial summary judgment essentially parroting the arguments
advanced by Sullivan.
In granting Sullivan's motion for summary
judgment and dismissing Young's claims predicated on KRS 160.345,
the trial court reasoned as follows:
Clearly, it would be unreasonable for
a Superintendent to be able to exercise
his clear statutory authority to reduce
a teacher's extra duty assignment, and
then to allow the school Principal and
site based council to totally negate
what the superintendent has done.
Allowing the principal to take such
action would permit him to do indirectly
that which he is directly prohibited
from doing under KRS 160.345(2)(f), that
is, exercise any discretion with respect
for [sic] dismissals at the school. In
this particular case, allowing the
Principal to hire [Young] for a coaching
position for the 1995-96 year, after
[Young] had been dismissed by the
Superintendent for the 1995-96 year,
would clearly thwart the
Superintendent's statutory authority.
A trial was conducted on February 19 and 20, 1997, on
Young's claim that Sullivan stripped him of his head coaching job
-5-
in retaliation for his political affiliations and his tort claim
for defamation.
At the close of Young's evidence, the trial
court directed a verdict in favor of Sullivan on the defamation
claim.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Sullivan on
Young's constitutional claims.
Young's appeal from the partial
summary judgment and his appeal from the final judgment have been
consolidated for this Court's review.
DEFAMATION--APPEAL NO. 97-CA-000874-MR
A few additional facts are needed before addressing the
propriety of the trial court's resolution of Young's dignitary
tort claim:
The last year that Young served as the boys’
basketball head coach, the team had a very successful post-season
record.
T-shirts were sold by the booster club, the profits from
which were used to buy rings for the basketball players.
and his wife were in charge of the T-shirt sales.
Young
An audit at
the high school revealed that some people had purchased the
shirts with checks made out to Adair County High School.
Those
checks were not deposited into Adair County High School accounts,
a fact revealed during a routine audit.
Sullivan reported the
findings of the audit to the Board which in turn voted to have an
official investigation conducted.
Young was investigated by
authorities; however, no criminal charges resulted.
Young's defamation claim against Sullivan was premised
on statements attributable to Sullivan that were contained in two
-6-
articles in the Columbia News.5
5
One article quoted Sullivan as
The first article reads in its entirety as follows:
The Adair County school board has asked
state police to investigate its own high
school to see whether money from ticket and Tshirt sales for the boy's state basketball
tournament was managed properly.
The investigation comes amid a heated
controversy surrounding Superintendent Al
Sullivan's decision not to rehire head
basketball coach Keith Young. Young took his
team to the Sweet Sixteen this year, and the
decision not to keep him as coach has torn the
community.
Young, who also is assistant principal at
Adair County High School, said yesterday that
he and Principal George Critz appear to be the
main targets of the investigation.
But Young said he welcomes any review and
called the motives behind this one political.
Critz has not supported Sullivan's decision
and has asked that Young's application to be
rehired be included with the other coach
candidates.
Sullivan said yesterday that the board's
request for a state police investigation is
not a political ploy. He said a quarterly
audit at the high school raised legitimate
questions about how money from the T-shirt and
ticket sales was handled.
"Any time there's a problem with money -whether it's $1, $100, or $1 million -- that
needs to be looked at," Sullivan said.
Young said the T-shirts were sold through
the booster club by more than one person.
Money raised from the T-shirt sale was used to
buy Fifth Region championship rings for the
basketball team, Young said. None of the
money was mishandled and none of it was public
money, he said.
The other article read:
The Kentucky State Police will soon be
(continued...)
-7-
5
(...continued)
investigating the Adair County High School,
and particularly assistant principal Keith
Young, for possible mismanagement of funds.
Questions were brought up following a
quarterly audit - for January, February and
March - at the high school completed by the
firm of Wise and Lee.
"The audit was conducted after several
questions were raised about state tournament
ticket sales at the high school by certain
people and Fifth Regional champion t-shirt
sales by Keith Young," said superintendent Al
Sullivan.
Young responded to the allegations saying,
"The t-shirts were sold through the booster
club with several of us selling them. That's
what we bought our rings with (Fifth Region
Championship rings.)"
"An investigation is fine with me," Young
added.
Representatives of the firm met with board
members behind closed doors last Tuesday
during a special-called meeting to discuss the
audit findings. No action was taken that
night, however, another meeting was held
Tuesday night.
Following a 30-minute executive session,
the school board reconvened in regular session
and Jimmy Kemp made a motion requesting that
the Kentucky State Police do a follow-up
investigation on the recent audit report. The
motion was seconded by Mike Stephens and
passed unanimously.
After the
dealing with
sure of what
integrity of
necessary to
follow up on
meeting Kemp stated, "We're
state money and we want to be
we are doing. To ensure the
this board we felt it was
bring in an outside party to
the audit report."
Stephens added, "The auditors couldn't
establish normal business trails and
procedures in certain areas and there were a
(continued...)
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saying that an audit "raised legitimate questions about how money
from the T-shirt and ticket sales was handled."
article quoted Sullivan as follows:
The other
"The audit was conducted
after several questions were raised about state tournament ticket
sales at the high school by certain people and Fifth Regional
champion t-shirt sales by Keith Young."
A directed verdict in favor of a defendant is
appropriate only when the plaintiff has not "sustained his burden
of proving his claim by at least a scintilla of probative
evidence capable of inducing conviction in reasonable minds."
Wyant v. SCM Corporation, Ky. App., 692 S.W.2d 814, 816 (1985).
The trial court is required to "consider the evidence in its
strongest light in favor of the party against whom the motion was
made and must give him the advantage of every fair and reasonable
intendment that the evidence can justify."
Ky., 814 S.W.2d 921, 922 (1991).
Lovins v. Napier,
In our review, we must
"consider[] the evidence in the same light."
Id.
In the instant
case, the trial court found that Young had failed to sustain his
burden of proving that he had been defamed.
Having reviewed the
evidence presented by Young, we agree with the trial court's
ruling.
In order to establish a claim for defamation one must
prove the existence of:
(1) defamatory language; (2) about the
plaintiff; (3) which is published; and, (4) which causes injury.
McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company, Ky., 623
5
(...continued)
lot of questions."
-9-
S.W.2d 882, 884 (1981), and Columbia Sussex Corporation, Inc. v.
Hay, Ky. App., 627 S.W.2d 270, 273 (1981).
Whether the words are
defamatory must be determined from the statements as a whole.
Ball v. E.W. Scripps Co., Ky., 801 S.W.2d 684, 690 (1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1622, 113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991).
Further, it is axiomatic that the defamatory statements must be
false.
Bell v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company,
Ky., 402 S.W.2d 84, 87 (1966).
The gist of the statements attributed to Sullivan by
the newspaper include the following facts:
(1) Young was in
charge of t-shirt sales for the Booster Club; (2) an audit at
Adair County High School revealed possible mishandling of funds;
and (3) Young was, at the request of the Board, under
investigation by the state police.
facts were indeed accurate.
Young acknowledged that these
While in the normal scheme of things
it is the defendant's burden to establish the truthfulness of an
alleged defamatory statement, Young’s admissions at trial made
such a defense unnecessary.
See Rollins v. Louisville Times
Company, 139 Ky. 788, 90 S.W. 1081 (1906).
There being no issue
of fact as to the falsity of the statements, it is immaterial
whether Sullivan acted with malice or whether he was aware that
the investigation would reveal that Young had not committed any
criminal acts.
The trial court properly granted a directed
verdict in favor of Sullivan on Young’s defamation claim.
KENTUCKY EDUCATION REFORM ACT CLAIMS--APPEAL NO. 96-CA-002283-MR
-10-
The issue presented in this appeal concerns the
interplay between KRS 160.380(2)(a) and KRS 160.390, both of
which were amended in conjunction with the passage of the
comprehensive legislation known as the Kentucky Education Reform
Act (KERA), and portions of a new statute enacted as part of
KERA, KRS 160.345(2)(f) and (h).
KRS 160.380(2)(a), which
pertains to school employees, was amended to read in part as
follows:
"All appointments, promotions, and transfers of
principals, supervisors, teachers, and other public school
employees shall be made only by the superintendent of schools,
who shall notify the board of the action taken. . . ."
KRS
160.390, which is entitled, "General duties as to condition of
schools; responsibilities; reports," was changed to give the
superintendent the responsibility for "all personnel actions
including hiring, assignments, transfer, dismissal, suspension,
reinstatement, promotion, and demotion. . . ."
These changes
resulted in a major shift in authority over personnel.
Prior to
1990, the superintendent merely made recommendations to the local
school board which had the ultimate authority over personnel.
See Chapman v. Gorman, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 232, 235 (1992).
Since
the passage of KERA, the school board has no longer been involved
in individual personnel matters.
See Estreicher v. Board of
Education of Kenton County, Ky., 950 S.W.2d 839 (1997).
While the General Assembly entrusted personnel matters
to the superintendent, it nevertheless granted specific authority
over hiring to the principal and the school council.
This
exception to the superintendent's control is found in subsections
-11-
(2)(f) and (h) of KRS 160.345, the statute concerning schoolbased decision making councils,6 as follows:
By January 1, 1991, each local board of
education shall adopt a policy for
implementing school-based decision
making in the district which shall
include, but not be limited to, a
description of how the district's
policies, including those developed
pursuant to KRS 160.340, have been
amended to allow the professional staff
members of a school to be involved in
the decision making process as they work
to meet educational goals established in
KRS 158.645 and 158.6451. . . . The
policy shall also address and comply
with the following:
. . .
(f) After receiving notification of the
funds available for the school from the
local board, the school council shall
determine, within the parameters of the
total available funds, the number of
persons to be employed in each job
classification at the school. The
council may make personnel decisions on
vacancies occurring after the school
council is formed but shall not have the
authority to recommend transfers or
dismissals.
. . .
(h) From a list of applicants submitted
by the local superintendent, the
principal at the participating school
shall select personnel to fill
vacancies, after consultation with the
school council. Requests for transfer
shall conform to any employer-employee
bargained contract which is in effect.
If the vacancy to be filled is the
position of principal, the school
6
Such councils, also known as "site-based management
councils," or "SBMC's," are generally composed of three teachers,
two parents and a school administrator. KRS 160.345 (2)(a). See
also Kentucky Department of Education v. Risner, Ky., 913 S.W.2d
327 (1996).
-12-
council shall select the new principal
from among those persons recommended by
the local superintendent. Personnel
decisions made at the school level under
the authority of this subsection shall
be binding on the superintendent who
completes the hiring process. The
superintendent shall provide additional
applicants upon request when qualified
applicants are available [emphasis
added].
Sullivan's argument that his authority in personnel
matters is plenary is simply not tenable given the clear and
explicit authority given to the principal and the school council
in matters of hiring.
KRS 160.345(2)(h) unequivocally provides
that, unless the vacancy to be filled is that of principal, it is
the principal who, after consulting with the school council,
selects the candidate to be employed.
Further, this statute
plainly provides that the superintendent's role in this regard is
merely to forward a list of "qualified" applicants to the
principal.
The superintendent has no discretion whatsoever in
the selection of the appropriate applicant and must complete the
"hiring process."
Sullivan argues that the statutes which transferred
authority over personnel to him cannot possibly be reconciled
with these sections of KRS 160.345.
He insists that they are
"diametrically and wholly inconsistent and incapable of being
construed so as to give effect to both."
Clearly, under settled
principles of statutory construction, if the statutes were
irreconcilable, the more specific grant of authority to the
school councils would control over the general personnel
statutes.
Land v. Newsome, Ky., 614 S.W.2d 948, 949 (1981).
-13-
However, the cardinal rule in construing statutes is "to promote
their objects and carry out the intent of the Legislature."
KRS
446.080.
We start with the well-established
premise that in construing legislative
enactments, courts "should look to the
letter and spirit of the statute,
viewing it as a whole. . . ." City of
Owensboro v. Noffsinger, Ky., 280 S.W.2d
517, 519 (1955). Where there is
apparent conflict between sections of a
statute, courts must endeavor to
harmonize its interpretation so as to
give effect to both. Kentucky Insurance
Guaranty Association v. NREPC, Ky. App.,
885 S.W.2d 315 (1994). In so doing, the
reviewing court must attempt to construe
the statute in such a manner that "'no
part of it is meaningless or
ineffectual.'" Brooks v. Meyers, Ky.,
279 S.W.2d 764, 766 (1955). Finally, we
are required to observe the directive
set out in Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Transportation Cabinet v. Tarter, Ky.
App., 802 S.W.2d 944 (1990), that each
section is to be construed in accord
with the statute as a whole.
Combs v. Hubb Coal Corporation, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 250, 252-253
(1996).
With these principles in mind, we hold that the
interpretation urged by Young is the one that fits the scheme
envisioned by the Legislature in its enactment of KERA.
Placing
personnel decisions within the purview of the superintendent and
away from the board "eliminate[d] areas which were once fertile
ground for favoritism and/or nepotism to take root."
Gorman, supra at 235.
Chapman v.
However, the changes were far more
innovative than coalescing personnel authority in the
superintendent.
Clearly, the Legislature intended to empower
-14-
local school authorities to select employees, from those
qualified, that best suited the needs of the individual school.
As our highest Court observed, the "development of
school-based decision making" councils is one of the "two primary
objectives of KERA," the other being decentralization of
authority.
Board of Education of Boone County v. Bushee, Ky.,
889 S.W.2d 809, 814 (1994).
"The obvious intent [in enacting KRS
160.345] is to have the decisions affecting the individual
schools within the district to be made by persons most affected
by what occurs at that school; this is what 'school-based
decision making' means."
Id. (emphasis in original).
It is,
after all, the administrators, teachers, students and parents,
those who are involved with the school on a daily basis, who are
"persons most affected" by the filling of a particular vacancy at
the school.
In Bushee, our Supreme Court emphasized that in
shifting certain powers and responsibilities from local school
boards to school-based decision making councils, the General
Assembly gave school councils their "own independent sphere of
responsibility."
Id. at 816.
Just as local school boards have
had considerable power removed in favor of superintendents,
superintendents are required to share that authority with
principals and school councils.
It is this concept of "shared
responsibilit[y]” that the General Assembly used to form its
foundation to build "an efficient public school system."
158.645.
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KRS
Thus, while no one has questioned Sullivan's statutory
authority to reduce Young's extra-duty assignment as the boys’
basketball head coach, the scheme envisioned by KERA plainly
allowed Critz to select Young to fill the coaching vacancy.
Sullivan was required at that point to complete the hiring
process.
We agree with Sullivan's observation that this
interpretation might, as the instant case demonstrates, result in
a battle of wills, between the principal and superintendent, and
a circuitous pattern of hiring and firing.
Nevertheless, the
scheme provides a check on the superintendent's power to dismiss
a non-tenured employee or to reduce a tenured teacher's extraduty assignments.7
Next, Sullivan argues that Young was not "qualified" as
a matter of law to be considered by the principal and the school
council as he had been dismissed as the head coach.
We agree
with Young that it is absurd to suggest that an assistant
principal with basketball coaching experience is not "qualified"
to coach an extracurricular basketball team.
Whether he was the
best person for the job was the responsibility of the principal
to determine with the input of the school council.
There is
nothing in KRS 160.345(2)(h) to prevent the superintendent from
expressing to the principal and the school council his opinions
and concerns that resulted in the initial reduction of extra
7
Sullivan states that he removed Young as coach "for cause."
While the superintendent was required to give a "reason" for the
reduction of responsibility, KRS 161.760(3), such reasons do not
contemplate legal "cause." There are no property interests
attached to extra-duty assignments, like coaching, and no hearing
rights are associated with such a reduction.
-16-
duties.
However, that decision does not, under the statute,
disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant.
In this vein, Sullivan suggests that his office is not
merely a conduit for receiving and sending on applications.
He
insists that he has some discretion in screening applicants
before submitting them to the school for consideration.
Again,
we believe this argument is contrary to the scheme established in
KERA.
Initially, KRS 160.345(2)(h) provided that a vacancy
would be filled from a list "recommended" by the superintendent.
This section of the statute was amended in 1992 to set the
superintendent's duties in matters of hiring to merely submitting
a list of qualified applicants.
As the term "qualified
applicants" is not otherwise defined, we construe it to include,
by reference to its plain meaning, all those who meet the minimum
legal requirements for the job.
Allowing Sullivan to withhold
applications based upon his subjective opinions would skew the
process and defeat KERA's purpose of allowing the hiring decision
to emanate at the school level.
Finally, Sullivan argues that Young had no right to the
head coaching job and that Critz failed to consult with the
school council.
He bases this argument on the fact that there
are no minutes of the school council reflecting that the required
consultation occurred.
However, the minutes do reflect that in
its meeting on June 6, 1995, the school council went into
executive session to "discuss personnel."
The record reveals
that during the executive session Critz informed the school
-17-
council that he had finally received Young's application from
Sullivan, and that at least one school council member expressed
her opinion regarding Critz's desire to hire Young.
That other
school council members did not express an opinion, although given
the opportunity, does not negate the fact that "consultation" did
occur.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Adair Circuit Court
dismissing Young's claim for defamation is affirmed.
The summary
judgment dismissing Young's claim of entitlement to the boys’
basketball head coaching job for the 1995-96 school year based on
KRS 160.345 is reversed and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings on the issue of Young’s damages.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Arthur L. Brooks
Hon. Ron L. Walker, Jr.
Lexington, KY
Hon. Robert L. Chenoweth
Hon. John C. Fogle, III
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Ron L. Walker, Jr.
Lexington, KY
Hon. Robert L. Chenoweth
Frankfort, KY
-18-
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