RUSSELL WAYNE JEFFIRES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 14, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
96-CA-2075-MR
RUSSELL WAYNE JEFFIRES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY D. RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00099
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, DYCHE, and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Russell Wayne Jeffires appeals from his
conviction for assault in the second degree and the resulting
five-year sentence.
Jeffires’s claims that the trial court erred
when it (1) permitted a witness to testify to a matter solely
within the province of the jury; (2) permitted a defense witness
to be improperly questioned about a prior felony conviction; (3)
permitted Jeffires to be questioned about other crimes; and (4)
denied his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, based on
the strength of his self-defense claim.
Having reviewed the
evidence presented at the trial and the applicable law, we
affirm.
On July 19, 1995, the Nelson County grand jury indicted
Jeffires for assault in the first degree and for wanton
endangerment in the first degree.
Following Jeffires’s trial on
May 20 and 22, 1996, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
assault in the second degree and recommended a sentence of five
years.
The trial court entered a Judgment of Conviction on July
8, 1996, and sentenced Jeffires to imprisonment for five years.
On July 5, 1996, the trial court denied Jeffires’s motions for a
new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
One year earlier, during the Fourth of July weekend in
1995, Jeffires went to Melody Lake on July 3 to spend time with
his four children, celebrate the birthday of one of his sons, and
to stay with friends there.
By the time Jeffires arrived, the
man Jeffires was staying with and the men in a neighboring cabin
had been drinking and arguing.
After supper, Mike Redmon, who
lived in the cabin where Jeffires was staying, told the group
inhabiting the cabin next door to move a truck parked in front of
Redmon’s cabin.
As the man who owned the truck went to move it,
Jeffires and several other men followed.
During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, witnesses
testified that at the rear of the truck that was being moved
Jeffires struck Donnie Bronger in the face with a handgun.
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A
Nelson County police officer also testified about what the
parties and other witnesses had told him on the night of the
incident and thereafter.
His testimony was contradicted by
several prosecution witnesses.
Defense witnesses testified that
Jeffires hit Bronger with his fist only after Bronger had swung
at Jeffires.
They also testified that Bronger hurt himself when
he fell on the damaged bumper of his own car while running toward
it after Jeffires hit him.
Jeffires’s first claim on appeal is that the trial
court committed reversible error when it overruled his objection
to the testimony of Bronger’s surgeon about the seriousness of
Bronger’s injury, because the issue of the injury’s seriousness
was solely within the province of the jury.
Bronger testified
that he was in the hospital for fourteen days and that his
surgery cost between $30,000 and $45,000.
He also testified that
he missed six or seven weeks of work, that he still had no
feeling in his upper lip and right cheek, and that his eyes
became repeatedly infected.
Dr. Christopher Gordon, a plastic
surgeon at the University of Louisville Hospital, testified that
the right side of Bronger’s face was fractured, and that he
placed at least five plates in Bronger’s face during a six-hour
surgery.
The prosecutor asked Dr. Gordon whether Bronger had
sustained a serious physical injury, to which Dr. Gordon
responded “unquestionably.”
At the time of Jeffires’s trial, the general rule was
that opinion evidence about the ultimate issue of guilt or
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innocence was improper but that a witness could state an expert
opinion from observed facts to assist the jury in drawing the
correct inference from the facts.
See, e.g., Renfro v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 795 (1995); Brown v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 812 S.W.2d 502 (1991).
In this case, the ultimate issues
about guilt or innocence related to (1) whether Jeffires struck
Bronger; and (2) if Jeffires struck Bronger, Jeffires’s culpable
mental state at the time he struck Bronger, the nature and extent
of injuries sustained by Bronger, and whether Jeffires acted in
self-defense.
Dr. Gordon invaded the province of the jury by
testifying in conclusory terms about the nature and extent of
Bronger’s injuries.
Recently, in Stringer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d
883, 889-890 (1997), the Kentucky Supreme Court revisited the
“ultimate issue” rule and disavowed earlier Kentucky precedent
applying the rule, including Brown and Renfro, supra.
The Court
concluded a long discussion about expert testimony addressing
ultimate facts by stating:
Generally, expert opinion testimony is
admitted when the issue upon which the
evidence is offered is one of science and
skill, and when the subject matter is outside
the common knowledge of jurors. Presumably,
jurors do not need assistance in the form of
an expert's opinion that the defendant is
guilty or not guilty. However, they usually
do need the assistance of a[n] . . . expert
in determining the cause of a . . . condition
in order to understand the evidence and
determine the ultimate issue of fact in
issue. KRE 401; KRE 702.
*
*
*
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We now again depart from the “ultimate issue”
rule and rejoin the majority view on this
issue. Expert opinion evidence is admissible
so long as (1) the witness is qualified to
render an opinion on the subject matter, (2)
the subject matter satisfies the requirements
of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 469 (1993), (3) the subject matter
satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in
KRE 401, subject to the balancing of
probativeness against prejudice required by
KRE 403, and (4) the opinion will assist the
trier of fact per KRE 702.
956 S.W.2d at 889-890.
There is no indication that Stringer has
any retroactive application and we need not address its
applicability here.
Even if the expert opinion expressed by Dr.
Gordon was improper under pre-Stringer precedent, it nevertheless
was harmless in view of the overwhelming and prolonged evidence
about the nature and extent of Bronger’s injuries and treatment.
As noted, his injuries required a six-hour surgical procedure
costing $30,000-$45,000 and resulted in a fourteen-day hospital
stay.
Five plates were placed in Bronger’s face, he missed six
or seven weeks of work, and he has lingering facial problems.
Where the record as a whole contains such overwhelming evidence
of the alleged ultimate fact, a single statement such as Dr.
Gordon’s, while error, is nonetheless harmless.
See, e.g.,
Renfro, supra, 893 S.W.2d at 797.
Jeffires’s second contention is that the trial court
erred when it permitted a defense witness to be questioned about
a stale, 10 ½ year-old felony conviction.
The Commonwealth
initially sought to impeach Redmon with that Florida conviction.
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After a conference in chambers where Redmon’s extensive record
was discussed, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to
impeach Redmon with a single question about a prior felony
conviction - a 1990 conviction for theft of a motor vehicle.
The
trial court admonished the jury about the limited purpose for
which it could consider this prior conviction.
In response to
Jeffires’s post-verdict motion to review Redmon’s criminal
record, the trial court denied Jeffires’s motion, concluding in
its July 31, 1996 Order that Redmon was properly impeached with a
conviction that was not ten years old.
We agree.
By allowing
the Commonwealth to impeach Redmon with a six year-old
conviction, the trial court did not violate KRE 609(b).
The third claim advanced by Jeffires is that the trial
court committed reversible error when it permitted Jeffires to be
questioned about other crimes.
During cross-examination of
Jeffires, the Commonwealth questioned him about whether he owned
any pistols or rifles and whether he had ever pointed a rifle at
the house of a “Mr. Crow.”
Jeffires denied owning guns and
denied pointing a gun at Mr. Crow or his house.
After a side bar
conference, the trial court declined to admonish the jury but did
caution the Commonwealth to refrain from any further questioning
on this matter.
While evidence about other crimes is inadmissible under
KRE 404(b) to show criminal predisposition, it may be offered for
some other purpose such as motive, plan, identity, or where it is
so interwoven with other essential evidence that the two cannot
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be separated.
As to the “Mr. Crow” incident, the Commonwealth at
trial questioned Jeffires who denied the incident.
Because of
the trial judge’s ruling, the Commonwealth produced no proof to
substantiate its purpose in asking about the alleged incident.
Admission of limited questioning as to the alleged prior bad act
of pointing a gun at the home of “Mr. Crow” was harmless because
it was not sufficiently prejudicial to affect the outcome of the
trial.
See Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 904 S.W.2d 220 (1995).
As to the questions about whether Jeffires had owned pistols or
rifles, such questioning was proper cross-examination intended to
challenge his credibility.
That credibility was indeed
challenged further on rebuttal when the Commonwealth introduced
testimony that Jeffires’s children had verified that there was a
gun in his home.
Jeffires’s last assertion is that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction for assault in
the second degree.
The record of the trial reveals that
Jeffires’s counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of
the Commonwealth's proof, and the trial court denied the motion.
Jeffires renewed the motion after verdict when he moved for a new
trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
A motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal is the established procedural
device for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a conviction.
Failure to make the motion properly precludes
consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence by reviewing
courts.
The law in Kentucky is clear on this issue.
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The
Kentucky Supreme Court detailed in Scruggs v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
566 S.W.2d 405, 412 (1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 928, 99 S. Ct.
314, 58 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1978), the specific procedures for
preserving for appellate review questions relating to the
sufficiency of the evidence.
[A]t the conclusion of the Commonwealth's
evidence in chief, the defendant may make a
motion for the court to direct a verdict of
acquittal. In the event the motion is
granted, then the charges will be dismissed.
On the other hand, if the motion is denied,
then, and in that event, the defendant must
either stand on his motion and refuse to put
on any proof or he may present his evidence
to support his defense. At the conclusion of
the defendant's case, he must renew his
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The consequence of Jeffires's trial
counsel's failure to follow this two-part procedure is that the
issue of evidentiary sufficiency is not properly preserved for
review by this Court.
The failure to make a timely motion for a directed
verdict may be deemed a palpable error affecting the substantial
rights of the defendant, when the insufficiency of the evidence
constitutes a substantial constitutional error violative of due
process.
See RCr 10.26.
Under these circumstances, this Court
can review the error even though it was not properly preserved
for appellate review.
Perkins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 694
S.W.2d 721 (1985).
A jury verdict must be upheld if there is substantial
evidence to support it, viewing the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the Commonwealth.
The United States Supreme Court
in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979) stated that the pertinent
inquiry does not require a court to "ask
itself whether it believes that the evidence
at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." Instead, the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This
familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh
the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate
facts. Once a defendant has been found
guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's
role as weigher of the evidence is preserved
through a legal conclusion that upon judicial
review all of the evidence is to be
considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. The criterion thus impinges
upon "jury" discretion only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental
protection of due process of law.
See also, Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187
(1991).
The trial testimony in this case revealed that it was
not conclusive that Jeffires was acting in self-defense.
Most
trial witnesses testified that Jeffires struck Bronger, some
saying he hit Bronger with a gun and others saying he hit him
with his fist.
Some witnesses asserted that Bronger was running
at Jeffires when the latter hit him, and others declared that
they saw nothing on Bronger’s part that provoked Jeffires.
Here,
the prosecution was successful in creating a jury issue in its
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attempt to disprove Jeffires’s self-defense claim.
See, Luttrell
v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky. 1997) (insufficient
evidence for directed verdict on self-protection).
There was some conflict in the proof about how Bronger
suffered serious physical injuries - from Jeffires’s blow or from
his own awkwardness.
The Commonwealth’s witnesses claimed that
the injury suffered by Bronger that evening was from Jeffires’s
assault, while defense witnesses testified that Bronger’s serious
wounds were the result of Bronger falling on the bumper of his
car as he ran toward the car after being hit.
Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to believe that Jeffires
committed a second-degree assault.
See, Key v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 840 S.W.2d 827 (1992).
Finding no error in the trial court’s rulings, we
affirm the July 5, 1996 Judgment of Nelson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Wm. Jonathan Grider
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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