DAVID L. BAKER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ENFORCEMENT; NORRIS E. BECKLEY, Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicle Enforcement; PAUL PERKINS; MARCUS SCHNEPP; and WILLIAM WHITE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
February 6, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-001958-MR
DAVID L. BAKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-000270
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ENFORCEMENT;
NORRIS E. BECKLEY, Commissioner of the
Division of Motor Vehicle Enforcement;
PAUL PERKINS; MARCUS SCHNEPP; and
WILLIAM WHITE
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, HUDDLESTON and MILLER, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE.
David L. Baker is a commissioned law enforce-
ment officer1 employed by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet's
Department
of
Enforcement.
Vehicle
Regulation,
Division
of
Motor
Vehicle
A trial board found Lieutenant Baker guilty of a
violation of MVE's Standards of Conduct arising out of his direct
involvement in the theft of a confiscated radar detector from an
1
See Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 281.770.
evidence
locker.
As
a
consequence,
Baker
was
demoted
from
lieutenant to MVE officer and his salary was reduced by ten
percent.
Baker appealed the trial board's decision to Franklin
Circuit Court.
MVE moved to dismiss Baker's appeal as untimely
arguing that Baker's failure to strictly comply with the statute
authorizing an appeal deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to
hear it.
Following briefing and argument, the circuit court
granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.
Upon further appeal
to this Court, Baker seeks reinstatement of his circuit court
appeal and remand for a decision on the merits.
The first issue to be addressed is whether Baker's appeal
was timely filed.
The trial board2 conducted a hearing on February
16, 1996, at the conclusion of which it advised Baker that the
charges against him had been sustained and that he would be demoted
and his pay reduced by ten percent.
On February 29, 1996, a final
order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law was
rendered and served on Baker.
Ten days after the hearing, but
three days prior to rendition of the trial board's final order,
Baker appealed to Franklin Circuit Court.
MVE says that Baker's
premature appeal was untimely, thus depriving the circuit court of
jurisdiction to entertain it; the circuit court sustained MVE's
motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
the appeal.
2
Provision for appointment of a trial board is presently
made by KRS 281.772. The current statute is substantially the same
as the statute in effect when Baker's case was heard.
2
The question whether the premature filing of a notice of
appeal from an administrative ruling is untimely was answered by
the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Smith, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 944 (1994).
In Johnson a trial was had on certain issues relating to an inter
vivos trust.
Within ten days after entry of judgment, some, but
not all, of the parties filed a motion for a new trial and a motion
to alter or amend the judgment.
The filing of those motions
"terminated"3 the time for filing an appeal to the Court of Appeals
until thirty days after they were ruled on by the trial court.
R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 73.02(1)(a) and (e).
Ky.
The parties who chose not
to file post-judgment motions filed notices of appeal within thirty
days following entry of judgment, but at a time when post-judgment
motions made by other parties were awaiting a decision by the trial
court.
The appeal of the parties who had not filed post-judgment
motions was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as prematurely filed,
and they sought discretionary review in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the challenged
notices of appeal had been timely filed.
Writing for the Court,
Justice Leibson said that:
Consistent with the policy announced in Ready [v.
Jamison, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 479 (1986)], there is no reason
why,
even
assuming
these
3
appeals
should
be
deemed
Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 73.02(1)(e) provides that: "The
running of time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion
pursuant to any of the Rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full
time for appeal fixed in this Rule [thirty days per CR 73.02(1)(a)]
commences to run upon entry and service under Rule 77.04(2) of an
order granting or denying a motion under Rules 50.02, 52.02 or 59,
except when a new trial is granted under Rule 59."
3
"premature," this should require dismissal.
Whether we
decide time runs from the date of judgment, or from
overruling
of
post-judgment
motions
made
by
other
parties, the notices of appeal filed here put appellees
on notice of the intent to appeal before expiration of
the thirty day time limit in CR 73.02(1)(a), and thus
served the essential purpose of the rule.
*
*
*
*
*
We hold that these movants' notices of appeal were not
fatally defective simply because they were filed before
the trial court ruled on a post-judgment motion made by
other parties.
The notices of appeal filed forthwith
relate forward to the time when final judgment was
entered
disposing
of
post-judgment
motions
made
by
others.
There is no rule, and no sound judicial policy,
forbidding such construction.
Johnson, 885 S.W.2d at 949-950.
federal courts.
The same rule prevails in the
See Firstier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage
Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 111 S.Ct. 648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991).
In conformity with the rule announced in Johnson, we hold
that because the premature notice of appeal filed by David Baker
relates forward to the issuance of the final order from which his
appeal was taken, his appeal to the circuit court was timely.
At the time Baker filed his notice of appeal, a final and
appealable order had not been issued by the trial board and a
transcript of the hearing before the board was not yet available.
4
Baker later sought permission to amend his original pleading to
supply these deficiencies.4
The motion was denied by the circuit
court, but it should not have been.
In Bobinchuck v. Levitch, Ky.,
380 S.W.2d 233 (1964), Kentucky's highest court said that:
When a practical impossibility, beyond the control of the
appellants, prevents filing of the transcript of evidence
[taken at an administrative hearing] in time, the appeal
may be perfected by filing the transcript later. In such
cases the statute requiring filing of the transcript is
directory.
Id. at 236.
Baker coupled his appeal with a multi-count complaint
which MVE moved to dismiss on the ground that it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.5
The complaint alleges (1)
that a 1994 legislative change6 in the disciplinary system constitutes special legislation in cases where a general law can be made
applicable and is, therefore, unconstitutional;7 (2) the powers
given the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicle Enforcement
4
See KRS 281.773 which outlines the steps that must be taken
to perfect an appeal to the circuit court.
5
CR 12.02(f).
6
House Bill 531, 1994 Acts Chapter 317, codified as KRS
18A.095, and House Bill 200, 1994 Acts Chapter 405, codified in
several statutes, including KRS 18A.095. KRS 18A.095 was further
amended in 1996.
See Senate Bill 143, 1996 Acts Chapter 318,
entitled "AN ACT relating to procedures for administrative hearings
and making changes incidental thereto," § 22.
7
Ky. Const. § 59(29).
5
by House Bill 531, 1994 Acts Chapter 317, constitute "absolute and
arbitrary power" prohibited by Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution;
(3)
the
disciplinary
system
prescribed
by
the
General
Assembly in 19948 violates various undesignated provisions of the
United States and Kentucky constitutions; (4) the disciplinary
system established by the General Assembly, as applied, violates
Baker's due process rights under both federal and state constitutions;9 and (5) the Commissioner's involvement in the disciplinary
process deprived Baker of unspecified privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States and denied him due
process of law, resulting in damage to his reputation and standing
in the community.
Baker sought a declaration that House Bill 531
is unconstitutional, compensatory damages for violations of his
constitutional rights, punitive damages as a result of the alleged
malicious and oppressive conduct of the Commissioner, an attorney's
fee, and costs.
The circuit court sustained MVE's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and dismissed Baker's complaint with prejudice.
Baker has
also appealed from this ruling.
In approaching this issue, we express no opinion as to
the merits of the several claims asserted in Baker's complaint.
When faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, it is neither the province of
this Court nor of the circuit court to consider whether a plaintiff
8
See n. 6, supra.
9
See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1; Ky. Const. § 14.
6
such as Baker can prove his allegations or ultimately prevail.
Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank & Trust, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 327 (1992);
Kevin Tucker & Assocs. v. Scott & Ridder, Inc., Ky.App., 842 S.W.2d
873 (1992).
The complaint should not be dismissed unless it
appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.
Id.
As Kurt A. Philipps, Jr., author of 6 Kentucky Practice 217
(1995), has said:
"As a practical matter, a dismissal for failure
to state a claim should only be granted where the allegations in
the complaint show an insuperable bar to recovery."10
Applying
these principles to the case at hand, we are convinced that Baker's
complaint does, in fact, state one or more claims upon which relief
can be granted.
Accordingly, it should not have been dismissed.
The order dismissing Baker's appeal and his complaint is
reversed.
This case is remanded to Franklin Circuit Court with
directions to permit Baker to file an amended pleading to correct
the deficiencies in his initial complaint/appeal and for further
proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Paul F. Henderson
Somerset, Kentucky
10
Philipps cites as an example a complaint that shows on its
face that it is barred by the statute of limitations.
See Old
Mason's Home of Ky., Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky.App., 892 S.W.2d 304
(1995).
7
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
Edwin A. Logan
Frankfort, Kentucky
8
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.