JAMES MOORE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 2, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1900-MR
JAMES MOORE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 96-CR-0634 & 96-CR-1105
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, BUCKINGHAM, and EMBERTON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
James Moore appeals from his conviction for
burglary in the third degree and for being a persistent felony
offender (PFO) in the second degree and the resulting seven-year
sentence.
it:
Moore claims on appeal that the trial court erred when
(1) refused to strike for cause a juror who said that he
would have a problem acquitting a defendant who did not testify
in his own behalf; (2) refused to instruct the jury on the
offense of criminal trespass in the third degree; (3) arraigned
Moore on a persistent felony offender indictment after the
burglary trial had begun, and permitted the Commonwealth to
consolidate the charges for trial; (4) permitted the grand jury
to return the aforementioned PFO indictment; and (5) sentenced
him under the second-degree PFO statute which unconstitutionally
prohibits probation, while the more serious first-degree PFO
statute does allow a sentencing court to grant probation.
Having
reviewed the evidence presented at the trial and the applicable
law, we affirm with respect to all issues.
Moore was indicted in March 1996 for burglary in the
third degree arising out of a December 21, 1995 entry of an
office building located at 121 South Seventh Street, Louisville,
Kentucky.
On the first day of his May 1996 trial, after jury
selection but before opening statements, Moore was arraigned on
the PFO charge.
The jury found Moore guilty on both the burglary
charge and the PFO charge and recommended a one-year sentence for
the burglary, enhanced to seven years as a consequence of his PFO
status.
Moore appeals from the June 25, 1996 Judgment of
Conviction and Sentence, wherein the trial court sentenced him in
accordance with the jury's recommendation.
During voir dire, the trial court denied Moore's motion
to strike Juror No. 129 for cause.
The juror's answers suggested
that, if a defendant did not testify, he would probably find the
defendant guilty.
The pertinent part of the dialogue between
defense counsel and Juror No. 129 follows.
Def. Counsel:
And would you still regardless of whether or
not Mr. Moore decided to testify, can
everyone still hold the prosecution to their
burden to prove every element beyond a
reasonable doubt? Can everyone promise that,
this is, I mean, we're talking legalese, I
know and yes, sir.
Juror:
I couldn't.
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Def. Counsel:
You couldn't what?
Juror:
If he wouldn't testify, I couldn't.
Def. Counsel:
You'd have a hard problem, you'd have a
problem with that?
Juror:
Yes, I would.
Def. Counsel:
Okay. Would that be, tell me a little bit
why.
Juror:
Well, if he says, if he doesn't say he didn't
do it, I'd have a problem with it.
Def. Counsel:
Do you understand, that just by going to
trial, he is saying, "I didn't do it"? He
pled not guilty, I didn't do it.
Juror:
Yeah.
Def. Counsel:
And I understand if you do, that's why I
asked the question. I think it's kind of
natural, also. So, would you think if he
didn't testify, you'd find him guilty?
Juror:
Probably.
Def. Counsel:
What's your number, again?
Juror:
129, excuse me.
Approximately seven and one-half minutes later, another
juror informed the trial court that she "would be a little
uncomfortable if the defendant didn't testify."
At that time,
the court instructed the jurors that the defendant's failure to
testify "is not to be held against him in any way."
More
pointedly, the court told the jurors:
Judge:
Well, I'm going to correct something, okay.
Let me tell you this and there was no
objection to it so I let counsel go on. I
would instruct you and under our law, a
person that's accused of a crime does not
have to testify. And the question that you'd
have, assuming that an individual did not
testify and no one's ever certain as it
relates to that and I don't think defense
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counsel's even trying to inject at this time
that her client may or may not testify. But
I would instruct you that it is not to be
held against him in any manner. Could you
follow that law? Could you set that aside?
Could you do that?
Juror:
[Inaudible]
Judge:
Okay. And, I guess, along those lines,
obviously, no matter what your own personal
beliefs are as it relates to what the law is,
if I tell you what the law is, I expect you
all to follow that law even if you do
disagree with it. It's sort of hard
sometimes, isn't it? That's what the law is,
as I see it anyway.
Although Moore maintains that these remarks were addressed to a
single juror our review of the videotape supports the
Commonwealth's contention that the court was speaking to all of
the jurors.
No one expressed misgivings about his or her ability
to follow the court's instructions.
In response to defense counsel's motion to strike Juror
No. 129 one and one-half minutes later, the trial court stated
that there was a good basis for striking the juror, but that
counsel would have to use a peremptory challenge to strike that
juror.
The trial court added that counsel's questions had been
improper, and he had been surprised that the prosecutor had not
objected to the questions.
Defense counsel used a peremptory
challenge to remove Juror No. 129 from the jury, and she also
used all of her peremptory challenges.
A trial court exercises considerable discretion in its
decisions about whether to excuse individual jurors for cause.
Simmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393 (1988), cert. denied
489 U.S. 1059, 109 S. Ct. 1328, 103 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1989).
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To
show an abuse of the trial court's discretion, this court must
find that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Lewis, Ky., 903 S.W.2d 524 (1995).
In order to
show prejudice from an abuse of discretion, the party challenging
the juror must use all peremptory challenges.
Calvert v.
Commonwealth,, Ky. App., 708 S.W.2d 121 (1986).
Moore may allege an abuse of discretion by the trial
judge because his counsel used all available peremptory
challenges.
However, we do not believe that the trial court
abused his discretion here.
First, a juror's questions or
apparent misunderstanding of a legal principle does not
constitute an automatic basis for a challenge for cause.
As the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated in Mabe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 884
S.W.2d 668, 671 (1994),
A per se disqualification is not required merely
because a juror does not instantly embrace every
legal concept presented during voir dire
examination. The test is not whether a juror
agrees with the law when it is presented in the
most extreme manner. The test is whether, after
having heard all of the evidence, the prospective
juror can conform his views to the requirements of
the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.
The legal concept which troubled a prospective juror in Mabe was
the mitigation of punishment when a defendant is under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.
Here, the defendant's right to
silence bothered Juror No. 129.
Second, when a juror is confused about a legal concept,
the trial court may explain the misunderstood concept to the
affected juror.
At that time, the trial court is seeking the
juror's willingness to follow the law.
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If the juror's response
to the court's comments indicates that the juror feels the same
way that he had stated previously, the juror has emphasized his
inability to sit impartially and follow the court's instructions
and should be stricken for cause.
App., 887 S.W.2d 567 (1994).
Humble v. Commonwealth, Ky.
In Humble, a prospective juror also
indicated that the defendant's failure to testify "would affect
[his] judgment."
After the trial court in that case asked him
whether it would bother him even if he thought the prosecution
had not proved its case, the juror still thought "it would be
tough" to ignore the defendant's failure to testify.
Id. at 569.
This Court held that the juror's response showed that it was
reversible error to have denied the challenge for cause.
This case differs from Humble in two respects.
First,
rather than posing a series of so-called "magic" questions (as in
Humble) which sought to rehabilitate the juror, the trial court
here instructed the jurors about the applicable law regarding the
defendant's right not to testify.
Second, after the court's
instructions, it asked the jurors whether in light of those
instructions they could follow the law.
No juror gave a negative
response, which strongly suggests their agreement that they could
and would follow the court's instructions.
Certainly, if any
juror had replied in a negative way to the prospect of following
the law as the court instructed, trial or appellate counsel would
have cited that as a further basis for a challenge for cause.
The challenge to Juror No. 129 did not include such a claim.
The
trial court addressed directly the concerns raised by Juror No.
129 and another juror, explaining the relevant law and the need
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for them to comply with it.
While it might have been preferable
for the court to specifically address each juror who had raised
the issue of the defendant's right to silence, we believe that
the method used by the trial court here was sufficient.
The
trial court instructed all of the jurors on the defendant's right
not to testify and asked if they could "follow that law."
objected.
No one
We believe that the trial court's denial of the motion
to strike Juror No. 129 was not an abuse of its discretion.
See
Mabe v. Commonwealth, supra.
The next issue raised by Moore relates to the jury
instructions.
The trial court instructed the jury on the
offenses of burglary in the third degree and criminal trespass in
the second degree.
Moore asserts that the trial court committed
reversible error when it denied his request that the jury also be
instructed on criminal trespass in the third degree, which is a
violation.
One way in which a person commits second-degree
criminal trespass is to knowingly enter or remain unlawfully in a
building.
A person commits third-degree criminal trespass by
entering or remaining unlawfully in or upon premises.
The
difficulty in distinguishing between these two degrees of
criminal trespass relates to the definition of "premises," which
under KRS 511.010(3) includes the definition of a building and
any real property.
On the face of the statutes, then, both
second-degree and third-degree trespass are committed whenever a
person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building.
The commentary to the Penal Code may be used as an aid
in construing the Code's provisions.
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KRS 500.100.
See, e.g.,
Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 639 S.W.2d 788 (1982).
The
commentary to KRS 511.060 states that criminal trespass in the
third degree is exclusively for trespasses on land, not in
buildings.
The offense that is created by KRS 511.080,
criminal trespass in the third degree, has the
very same elements as the two higher degrees of
trespass except for the area into which unlawful
intrusion is proscribed. The protected area is
described as "premises," which is defined in KRS
511.060 to include "dwellings," "other buildings,"
and "any real property." Defined in this way, it
should be apparent that the lowest degree of
trespass is included in each of the two higher
degrees. Its exclusive coverage is only for
unlawful intrusions onto land.
The commentary aids in resolving the scope of second-degree
trespass and third-degree trespass:
third-degree criminal
trespass is limited to land, and second-degree criminal trespass
occurs in a building.
In this case it is undisputed that the law
office which was the object of the burglary or trespass was a
building, defined by KRS 511.010(1) to include any structure
where people meet for business purposes.
In order to give a jury
instruction for a lesser included offense, there must be some
supporting evidence.
Without a basis upon which the trial court
could determine that Moore knowingly entered or remained
unlawfully on "land," the trial court properly refused to
instruct the jury on third-degree criminal trespass.
Moore next contends that the trial court arraigned him
on a separate PFO indictment (Indictment No. 96-CR-1105) after
his trial for burglary (based upon Indictment No. 96-CR-0634) had
begun, and then erroneously consolidated the PFO charge with the
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burglary charge for trial.
The prosecutor sought authority for
the PFO indictment on May 2, 1996.
The grand jury returned the
PFO indictment on May 14, 1996, and the indictment was filed in
open court the next day.
On that same day, the Commonwealth's
Attorney sent a letter to Moore at his home informing him about
the indictment and a scheduled arraignment for May 20, 1996, but
Moore was incarcerated at the time and did not receive the
letter.
On May 20, the arraignment was continued until the next
day, which coincided with the first day of Moore's burglary
trial.
The court arraigned Moore on the PFO charge after the
completion of the burglary voir dire but before opening
statements or testimony had been heard.
Moore argues that the lateness of the arraignment on
the PFO charge and the belated consolidation of the PFO charge
with the burglary charge deprived him of due process because he
had no or inadequate notice about the PFO charge.
The
Commonwealth claims that defense counsel knew about Moore's prior
record, and that during plea negotiations Moore was told that the
Commonwealth would seek a PFO indictment in another case against
Moore.
Further, the Commonwealth suggests that Moore suffered no
undue prejudice because a PFO charge relates only to sentencing.
Moreover, Moore had two days following the PFO arraignment to
prepare for the penalty phase of the trial.
In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 446 (1962), the United States Supreme Court held that
federal constitutional
due process does not require advance notice that
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the trial on the substantive offense will be
followed by an habitual criminal proceeding.
Nevertheless, a defendant must receive reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to
the recidivist charge even if due process does not
require that notice be given prior to the trial on
the substantive offense.
368 U.S. at 452, 82 S. Ct. at 504, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 450.
The
Kentucky Supreme Court cited Oyler with approval in Price v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 749 (1984), in which the court
discussed the amount of notice required for an enhancement
charge.
"[I]f the Commonwealth seeks enhancement by proof of PFO
status, the defendant is entitled to notice of this before the
trial of the underlying substantive offense."
Id. at 750.
In this case, it is unfortunate that the Commonwealth
failed to give earlier notice about the PFO charge to Moore and
his counsel.
The pretrial notice in this case was substantially
shorter than the month's notice upheld in Price.
Again, Moore
received official notice about the PFO charge after voir dire but
before opening statements or the first witness testified on the
burglary count.
However, there is no record of Moore's request
for a continuance to enable him to prepare a defense to the PFO
charge.
See Price, 666 S.W.2d at 750.
Indeed, during the
penalty phase he was able to introduce evidence about whether he
was the person convicted in 1982 of the felony which formed the
basis for the PFO charge.
In addition, Moore has failed to
identify the manner in which he was prejudiced by the tardy
addition of the PFO charge, i.e., he has not related how the late
addition of the PFO charge impaired his ability to challenge it
more effectively.
We find no due process violation concerning
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the addition of the PFO charge.
Moore's related argument is that Indictment No. 96-CR1105 was returned in violation of RCr 5.02, which states that the
circuit court shall charge the grand jury "to inquire into every
offense for which any person has been held to answer and for
which an indictment. . . .has not been filed, or other offenses
which come to their attention or of which any of them has
knowledge."
Moore submits that RCr 5.02 does not permit a PFO
charge to be the only allegation of an indictment because the PFO
status is not an "offense" for which Moore "has been held to
answer."
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently rejected this
contention in Butts v. Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 943, 946
(1997), when it authorized a lone PFO charge in an indictment as
long as the PFO status offense was based upon pending substantive
charges.
Moore also asserts that he was denied equal protection
of the laws because as a PFO II he was not eligible for
probation, shock probation or conditional discharge pursuant to
KRS 532.080(5).
A defendant found guilty of being a first-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO I) is eligible for probation if
the underlying current offense is a Class D felony such as the
second-degree criminal trespass conviction at issue here.
See
KRS 532.080(7).
While this constitutional issue merits consideration,
it cannot be considered on this appeal because the Attorney
General was not notified of the constitutional challenge at the
trial level in accordance with KRS 418.075(1).
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In Jacobs v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 947 S.W.2d 416, 418-19 (1997), this Court
held that such notification was a prerequisite to consideration
of constitutional challenges even in a criminal case.
The Jacobs
court noted that, despite the Commonwealth's representation by
local prosecutors, in the absence of a unified prosecutorial
system in Kentucky the Attorney General is the appropriate law
enforcement official for defending Kentucky statutes.
Since the Attorney General is elected by
registered voters from throughout the
Commonwealth, he is in a unique position to
defend the constitutionality of an act of the
General Assembly. The Attorney General must
be given this opportunity at the trial level
because a declaration regarding the
constitutionality of a statute affects all
the citizens of the Commonwealth, not just
the citizens represented by the local
prosecuting official.
947 S.W.2d at 419.
In addition, while the equal protection
argument was raised obliquely by Moore's trial counsel at
sentencing, the issue was never really addressed by the
Commonwealth and ruled on by the trial court.
This Court has no
authority to decide issues which were never presented to and
ruled on by the trial court.
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett,
Ky., 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (1989).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce P. Hackett
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Janet M. Graham
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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