TIMOTHY WHALEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 30, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
No.
No.
1996-CA-001882-MR
1997-CA-000333-MR
1997-CA-000411-MR
TIMOTHY WHALEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN A. SCHROERING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-001035
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING AND DISMISSING
1997-CA-000333-MR AND 1997-CA-000411-MR
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER, and SCHRODER, JUDGES
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Appellant, Timothy Whaley (Whaley) appeals the
judgment against him for one (1) count of assault in the second
degree, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 508.020, in 1996-CA001882-MR.
Whaley also appeals the circuit court judgment
denying his shock probation in 1997-CA-000333-MR and 1997-CA000411-MR.
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Whaley raises several issues on appeal: (1) whether the
1994 amendments to the Unified Juvenile Code unconstitutionally
prescribe circuit court jurisdiction in violation of the Kentucky
Constitution, Section 112(5) and Section 113(6); (2) whether KRS
635.020(4) and KRS 640.010(2) can be reconciled; and (3) whether
Whaley was eligible for probation or shock probation.
Whaley’s first arguments were resolved by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in Commonwealth v. Halsell, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 552
(1996), when the Court held that the 1994 amendments to the
Unified Juvenile Code making all juveniles fourteen (14) or older
subject to trial in the circuit court as adult offenders were
constitutional:
Having reviewed KRS 635.020 in its entirety,
we find that subsection (4) is within the
Kentucky General Assembly’s constitutional
power to limit the jurisdiction of the
district court under Kentucky Constitution
Section 113(6). Following a determination of
reasonable cause to believe a child over the
age of 14 has been charged with a felony in
which a firearm was used in the commission of
the offense, KRS 635.020(4) operates to limit
the jurisdiction of the district court to act
further. By operation of Section 112(5) of
the Kentucky Constitution, the circuit court
then becomes vested with jurisdiction as to
that particular class of offenders.
Id. at 555.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has also resolved the
argument that KRS 635.020(4) and KRS 640.010(2) are
irreconcilable.
In Halsell, supra, the Court stated:
[W]e find that the provisions of KRS
630.010(2) can be harmonized with KRS
635.020(4). Whether it can be determined at
a preliminary hearing described in KRS
640.010(2) or prior to an adjudicatory
hearing as described in KRS 635.020(1), once
the district court has reasonable cause to
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believe that a child before the court has
committed a firearm felony as described in
subsection (4) of KRS 635.020, jurisdiction
vests in the circuit court, the provisions of
KRS 640.010(2)(b) and (c) to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id. at 556.
Whaley’s final argument is that he should have been
eligible for probation or shock probation under KRS 640.040(4).
The Commonwealth contends Whaley is ineligible for probation
under KRS 635.020(4) and KRS 533.060(1).
Whaley and the
Commonwealth entered into an agreement whereby Whaley waived his
right to a preliminary hearing and the Commonwealth recommended a
five (5) year sentence and maintained that probation was
prohibited.
Whaley reserved his right to appeal this issue.
The
trial judge rejected Whaley’s request for probation because it
was barred by statute.
However, the final judgment denies
Whaley’s request for probation on the merits for three reasons:
(1) there was a substantial risk that Whaley would commit another
crime while probated; (2) Whaley was in need of correctional
treatment best provided in a correctional institute; and (3)
probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of Whaley’s
offense.
Whaley was also denied shock probation on two grounds:
(1) that shock probation was barred by statute; and (2) that
Whaley’s motion for shock probation was untimely filed.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that “juveniles
transferred to circuit court pursuant to the 1994 version of KRS
635.020(4) are to be considered ‘youthful offenders’ eligible for
-3-
the ameliorative sentencing provisions of KRS Chapter 640.”
Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 147 (1998).
While the
trial court judgment reflects that it considered and rejected
Whaley’s motion for probation on the merits, the trial court
record indicates that probation was primarily denied as
statutorily barred.
This Court finds that Whaley should receive
full and serious consideration for probation on the merits rather
than questionable alternative consideration after a determination
that probation was statutorily impermissible.
As this Court is
vacating Whaley’s sentence, the issue of shock probation is not
ripe for review.
In accordance with Halsell, supra, and Britt, supra,
this Court affirms the circuit court conviction, vacates the
sentence, and remands, with directions to sentence Whaley in
accordance with the provisions set forth in KRS Chapter 640 in
1996-CA-001882-MR.
This Court vacates the order denying Whaley
shock probation, and dismisses 1997-CA-000333-MR and 1997-CA000411-MR.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: October 30, 1998
William L. Knopf
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. David Niehaus
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
-4-
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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