ANGELA PROFFITT; and CAMERON WADE PROFFITT V. DARREN CLARKSON
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RENDERED:
March 27, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1836-MR
ANGELA PROFFITT; and
CAMERON WADE PROFFITT
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL BARRY JONES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-109
V.
DARREN CLARKSON
APPELLEE
OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; BUCKINGHAM and KNOPF, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a order entered by
the Monroe Circuit Court modifying a child support order
previously entered by the Monroe District Court in a paternity
action.
Appellants, mother and child, contend that the circuit
court was not authorized to modify the district court's previous
order.
We are constrained to agree.
Hence, we reverse and
remand.
Appellant Cameron Wade Proffitt was born on August 22,
1994, to appellant Angela Proffitt and appellee Darren Clarkson.
Proffitt and Clarkson have never been married.
In February 1995,
Clarkson filed a paternity action in the Monroe District Court.
After paternity was established through genetic testing, but
prior to the district court's final adjudication of paternity,
Clarkson filed a petition in the Monroe Circuit Court seeking an
order awarding him visitation rights with the child.
In
response, Proffitt argued that the circuit court should not award
visitation rights until such time as the district court entered a
judgment adjudicating the issue of paternity.
Clarkson
subsequently renewed his motion and further requested that the
court change the child's surname to Clarkson.
On November 1, 1995, an agreed order was entered which
adjudged Clarkson's visitation rights.
Clarkson agreed in the
order to withdraw his request for a name change.
On March 14, 1996, Clarkson filed a motion in the
circuit court seeking an order modifying his child support
obligation at $79.68 per week on the ground that his wages had
decreased significantly.
The district court had fixed Clarkson's
child support in an order entered January 16, 1996.
Specifically, Clarkson claimed that his support obligation should
be reduced to $194 monthly.
In response, Proffitt argued that the circuit court did
not have authority to modify the district court's order and that
Clarkson was required to seek such relief in the district court.
The circuit court disagreed with appellants' position and
proceeded to reduce Clarkson's child support obligation to $194
per month.
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On appeal, appellants contend that the circuit court
did not have authority to modify the district court's previous
child support order.
We agree.
By virtue of KRS 406.021 and KRS 406.051, a district
court has jurisdiction over paternity actions.
Indeed, KRS
406.021 states in relevant part as follows:
(2)
Paternity may be determined by the
District Court . . . .
. . . .
(3)
If paternity has been determined or
has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state, the
liabilities of the father may be
enforced in the same or other
proceedings . . . .
Further, KRS 406.051(1) states as follows:
The District Court has jurisdiction of
an action brought under this chapter and
all remedies for the enforcement of
judgments for expenses of pregnancy and
confinement for a wife or for education,
necessary support . . . . (Emphasis
added.)
More important, KRS 406.051 was amended effective July 15, 1996,
to extend to the district court concurrent jurisdiction in
paternity actions over issues as to child custody and visitation
which were previously reserved to the circuit court.
406.051(2).
See KRS
However, the legislature did not see fit to expand
the circuit court's jurisdiction in paternity actions in any
respect.
Claims for child support and claims for custody or
visitation are separate and distinct proceedings involving
-3-
separate remedies.
(1990).
Gera v. Gera, Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d 13, 14
Thus, if paternity is established in a district court
paternity action, that court is vested with jurisdiction to award
child support in the action.
KRS 406.051(1).
Moreover, the
power to award support necessarily includes the power to modify
such an award.
Here, the district court made an award of child support
in a final order entered on January 16, 1996.
Rather than ask
the district court to modify its order, appellee chose instead to
request the circuit court to modify the order.
However, under
our present statutory scheme, there is no authority conferred
upon circuit courts to modify support orders entered by district
courts in paternity actions except to the extent that such orders
are appealed from and determined by the circuit court to amount
to an abuse of discretion.
Indeed, any other statutory scheme
would lead to inconsistent decisions and encourage forum
shopping.
Further, although it is true as appellee contends that
the circuit court has jurisdiction to award and modify child
support in actions for legal separation and dissolution and in
actions brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA), the fact remains that the paternity statutes
confer no such authority on circuit courts.
Moreover, contrary
to appellee's argument, merely because the circuit and district
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over URESA actions is of no
significance since the instant paternity action is governed by a
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separate and distinct statutory scheme, and those statutes confer
no concurrent jurisdiction on circuit courts over child support
orders in paternity actions.
For the reasons stated, the circuit court's order is
reversed and this matter remanded to the circuit court with
directions to enter an order denying appellee's motion to modify
his child support obligation.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Reed N. Moore, Jr.
Tompkinsville, KY
Charlton C. Hundley
Tompkinsville, KY
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