JAMES PRESTON V. SHIRLEY PRESTON and J. THOMAS HENSLEY (MASTER COMMISSIONER-BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT)
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RENDERED:
January 16, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1470-MR
JAMES PRESTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CI-0164
V.
SHIRLEY PRESTON and
J. THOMAS HENSLEY
(MASTER COMMISSIONER-BOYLE
CIRCUIT COURT)
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GARDNER and MILLER, Judges.
GARDNER, JUDGE: James Preston (James) appeals from an order of the
Lincoln Circuit Court disposing of a parcel of marital property.
We affirm.
James and Shirley Preston (Shirley) were divorced by
order of the Lincoln Circuit Court on September 16, 1988.
All
issues relating to property disposition were reserved for later
adjudication.
In August 1994, Shirley filed a motion to complete
the property division.
An
evidentiary
hearing
on
the
motion
September 14, 1994, and briefs were tendered.
was
held
on
The sole issue now
on appeal relates to the division of a parcel of real property
located in Boyle County, Kentucky.
The property was purchased
during the marriage, and the parties have stipulated that it is
marital property.
After dissolution, only James made mortgage
payments on the parcel.
James argued that Shirley was entitled to
one-half of the value of the parcel as of the date of dissolution
minus any credit for mortgage payments made by James since the date
of dissolution.
Shirley argued that she was entitled to one-half
of the proceeds from the parcel, irrespective of James's mortgage
contributions after the date of dissolution.
On December 1, 1994,
the court ordered that the parcel be sold, with James receiving
credit for all mortgage payments made after dissolution, and the
remainder to be divided equally between the parties.
The parcel was sold on April 16, 1995 for $64,000.
On
August 15, 1996, James filed a motion requesting the court to
determine the amounts to be distributed to each party.
James was
directed to obtain an affidavit from the mortgage holder reflecting
the amount paid by James between the dissolution and time of sale.
The mortgage holder indicated that more than $25,000 had been paid
by James during this period.
On October 3, 1995, the court ordered that the proceeds
of
the
sale
be
divided
equally
between
the
parties.
James
objected, in that the order failed to account for the mortgage
payments he made after dissolution.
A corrected order was entered
on November 3, 1995, which ordered that the proceeds be divided
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equally after James was credited for the mortgage payments made
after dissolution.
Shortly thereafter, Shirley tendered an order to the
court which credited James with payments made to the mortgage
principal after dissolution but failed to credit him with payments
made to the mortgage interest.
Over James's objection, the order
was adopted by the court and entered on January 22, 1996.
This
appeal followed.
James now argues that the January 22, 1996 order is
erroneous because it credits him with mortgage principal payments
but fails to credit him with payments made to interest.
out
that
two
prior
orders
of
the
court,
neither
He points
which
were
challenged by Shirley, ordered "[c]redit for all payments made . .
." not merely payments made to principal.
Since the final order is
not consistent with the prior orders, James maintains that the
original ruling should be reinstated.
We have closely examined James's claim of error, and find
no basis for tampering with the order from which he appeals.
The
corpus of James's claim is that the January 22, 1996 order is
inconsistent with the court's prior orders. Our examination of the
orders does not reveal a patent inconsistency.
The prior orders
refer to a credit for "all payments" made by James during the
period in question.
While the words "all payments" may refer to
payments including principal and interest, the phrase could also be
interpreted to mean only payments to principal.
Irrespective of
this ambiguity, the trial court retains jurisdiction over the final
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disposition of all property and may amend its prior orders until
jurisdiction is lost.
The dispositive question is whether the
division of the proceeds comports with the requirements of the
marital property statute, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.190.
That statute provides in relevant part that marital property be
divided "in just proportion."
Id.
KRS 403.190 vests with the
trial court wide discretion in the division of marital property.
Johnson v. Johnson, Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 221 (1978). Such division
will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.
Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 849 (1986).
from
which
James
appeals
is
Poe v. Poe,
We cannot conclude that the order
clearly
erroneous.
Whether
the
division of the property in question is couched in terms of
"principal" or "interest," the court is actually dividing "equity."
Payments toward accrued interest have no effect on increasing
equity.
While
the
terms
"principal"
and
"equity"
are
not
interchangeable, a division of the equity in the parcel based on
James's contribution to the mortgage principal appears to be a
division
"in
just
proportions."
Nothing
more
is
required.
Finally, we are compelled to note that James has cited no caselaw
or statutory authority to support his claim of error.
The burden
is on the appellant to produce such authority, and having failed to
meet this burden, James's claim of error must fail.
See generally
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Lincoln
Circuit Court is affirmed.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
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ABRAMSON, JUDGES, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeffrey W. Jones
Danville, Kentucky
Cabell D. Francis
Stanford, Kentucky
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