WILLIAM CHIPMAN, Administrator of the Estate of CONNI BLACK V. CITY OF FLORENCE; BOBBY JO WINCE; JOHN DOLAN; THOMAS DUSING; RON KENNER; ROB REUTHE; and CHRIS ALSIP AND SUSAN STEMLER V. CITY OF FLORENCE; BOBBY JO WINCE; JOHN DOLAN; and THOMAS DUSING
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RENDERED: November 25, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1996-CA-001287-MR
WILLIAM CHIPMAN, Administrator
of the Estate of CONNI BLACK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH BAMBERGER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-CI-000202
V.
CITY OF FLORENCE; BOBBY JO WINCE;
JOHN DOLAN; THOMAS DUSING; RON
KENNER; ROB REUTHE; and
CHRIS ALSIP
APPELLEES
NO. 1996-CA-001318-MR
SUSAN STEMLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH BAMBERGER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-CI-000459
V.
CITY OF FLORENCE; BOBBY JO WINCE;
JOHN DOLAN; and THOMAS DUSING
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART
AND REMANDING 1996-CA-001287-MR
AND
AFFIRMING 1996-CA-001318-MR
BEFORE:
1
** ** ** ** ** ** **
ABRAMSON1, DYCHE and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
Judge Abramson concurred in this opinion prior to leaving the
Court on November 22, 1998.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE. William Chipman, Administrator of the Estate of
Conni Black, and Susan Stemler appeal from summary judgments
granted in favor of the several Appellees after the trial court
determined that the Appellees did not owe a legal duty to Black to
protect her from third-party harm, and that Stemler, as a matter of
law, could not establish claims against the Appellees for various
torts.
Because the cases arise out of the same set of facts, they
have been consolidated on appeal.
Both of the Appellants brought federal civil rights
actions against some or all of the Appellees pursuant to 42 United
States Code (U.S.C.) § 1983. After their complaints were dismissed
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, they appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.
Many of the issues raised in these appeals were
addressed by that Court in a well-reasoned opinion authored by
Judge Danny Boggs.
(6th Cir. 1997).
See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856
Our recitation of the facts relevant to these
appeals draws heavily on Judge Boggs's opinion.
Inasmuch as the
Appellants' complaints were dismissed upon the Appellees' motions
for summary judgment, we view the facts at this juncture in the
light most favorable to the Appellants and resolve all doubts in
their favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
On the evening of February 18, 1994, Conni Black and her
boyfriend, Steve Kritis, arrived at Willie's Saloon in Florence,
Kentucky.
Black and Kritis drank heavily at the bar.
2
While
dancing, Black met Susan Stemler. Some three hours after arriving,
Black and Stemler went to the women's restroom and discussed
problems each was having with their respective boyfriend.
Kritis
entered the restroom and began to verbally and physically abuse
Black.
Black left the restroom, but quickly returned.
Kritis entered and physically abused her.
Again,
The confrontation
continued in the parking lot, and Black asked Stemler to take her
home.
As they were leaving, Kritis struck Stemler in the back of
the head with a blunt object.
Kritis pursued Stemler and Black in his truck as they
left the parking lot at approximately 2:15 a.m.
At one point
during the chase, Kritis rear-ended Stemler's car with his truck.
Terry Barker witnessed the incident in the bar's parking lot and
followed the two vehicles.
According to Barker, the vehicles
eventually came to the driveway of William Minnick, a retired
Florence police officer, where they stopped with Kritis's truck
blocking
Stemler's
exit.
Minnick's
Stemler's car window and yelling.
wife
saw
Kritis
hitting
Stemler was able to back around
Kritis's truck and on to the street.
She drove from the scene with
Kritis in pursuit. Barker followed the vehicles and, after calling
911, so did Minnick.
After the vehicles reentered U.S. Highway 42, Lieutenant
Thomas Dusing of the Florence Police Department, responding to
Barker's plea, pulled his vehicle in front of Stemler's car and
Kritis's truck as they were stopped at a traffic signal.
Stemler
exited her automobile and approached Lieutenant Dusing telling him
3
that Kritis was drunk, that he had assaulted both her and Black,
that he had threatened to kill her, and that he had pursued her
automobile at a high rate of speed.
Shortly thereafter, several
other officers arrived, including Bobby Joe Wince and John Dolan of
the Florence Police Department and Rob Reuthe and Chris Alsip of
the Boone County Sheriff's Department.
Reuthe approached Kritis, who was seated in his truck, at
which point Kritis told him that Stemler was a lesbian and was
kidnapping his girlfriend.
Lieutenant Dusing later testified that
Reuthe told him that Stemler was a lesbian.
Reuthe also told
Lieutenant Dusing that Kritis smelled of alcohol, but that he had
not tested Kritis for intoxication.
Dusing later submitted a
police report claiming that he did not smell alcohol on Kritis's
breath.
This
assertion
was
contrary
to
his
contemporaneous
statements to Wince and Minnick that Kritis smelled of alcohol.
A
blood test taken over two hours later revealed that Kritis had a
blood alcohol level of .115.2
Subsequent observers would also
testify that, over an hour after Stemler and Kritis were stopped,
it was immediately apparent that Kritis was drunk.
Nevertheless,
neither Dusing nor any other officer tested Kritis for intoxication
or asked him to step out of his truck.
2
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 189A.010(1) provides that "[a] person
shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle
anywhere in this state: (a) While the alcohol concentration in his
blood or breath is 0.10 or more . . . ." "Alcohol concentration"
is defined in KRS 189A.005(1) as "either grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath
. . . ."
4
Lieutenant
Dusing
asked
Wince
to
test
Stemler
for
intoxication, and although Stemler passed all but one of the field
tests, she was later determined to have a blood alcohol level of
.105.
Lieutenant Dusing decided that Stemler should be arrested
for driving under the influence, and the other officers agreed.
Stemler urged the officers to test Kritis for alcohol intoxication
to no avail.
As Stemler was being arrested, two unidentified officers,
one from the City of Florence and the other from Boone County,
approached Barker, who related the complete story of the chase.
Upon learning that Stemler was being placed under arrest, Barker
told the officers that they were arresting the wrong person and
that Kritis was obviously "crazy."
The officers allegedly became
"arrogant," and told Barker that he didn't "know what's going on"
and that he could "go on about [his] business."
Officer Wince
failed to list Barker as a witness at the scene, and Barker was
never contacted to be a witness at Stemler's trial.
While Wince
was testing Stemler, Minnick arrived at the scene and was told by
Alsip and Wince that Stemler was a lesbian.
Lieutenant Dusing ordered Dolan to approach Black, who
was still in the passenger seat of Stemler's car and very intoxicated, and to inform her that she would be arrested for public
intoxication "if she didn't want to leave with the male."
Alsip
and Dolan lifted her out of Stemler's car and assisted her to
Kritis's truck.
Black stumbled as she walked to the truck.
Alsip
physically placed Black on the passenger seat of the truck, but did
5
not fasten her seat belt.
Alsip later admitted that he never heard
Black say that she wanted to leave with Kritis.
Alsip also
conceded that had he known of the events that preceded his action,
he would not have placed Black in the truck, but would have instead
arrested Kritis.
As soon as Black was in his truck, Kritis drove away,
eventually
entering
Interstate
Highway
75.
Within
according to Kritis, Black woke up and "went haywire."
minutes,
She began
hitting him, which lead to Kistis hitting her back and losing
control of his truck.
with a guardrail.
The truck swerved to the right and collided
The impact threw Black partially out of the
passenger side window. Black's arm was completely severed from her
body and her head was split into two parts.
Although the truck was
severely damaged, Kritis continued to drive slowly north on I-75
and then east on I-275 until the truck struggled to a stop.
A passing motorist stopped to render assistance and
Kritis admitted to him that he was drunk, something the motorist
had already concluded.
Officer Stephen Johnson of the Lakeside
Park-Crestview Police Department arrived at the scene and was
immediately convinced that Kritis was drunk.
Kritis was arrested
for driving under the influence.3
*
*
3
*
Kritis later pled guilty to manslaughter in the second
degree and wanton endangerment in the first degree and was
sentenced to imprisonment for five years.
6
The administrator of Black's estate filed a wrongful
death action under Kentucky law against the City of Florence and
Boone County officers mentioned above, the City of Florence, and
against Ron Kenner, the Sheriff of Boone County.
Sheriff Kenner,
who was sued in his official capacity, died on May 11, 1997.
His
successor has not been joined in the suit filed by Black’s estate.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of all of the Appellees when
the
circuit
court
determined,
as
a
matter
of
law,
that
the
Appellees did not owe a duty to protect Black because no "special
relationship" existed between the parties.
Stemler's complaint
seeking damages for malicious prosecution, false arrest, abuse of
process, false imprisonment and negligent or intentional infliction
of emotional distress was also summarily dismissed.
Stemler
voluntarily dismissed her claim for assault and battery.
*
*
*
To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff, such as
the administrator of Black's estate, is required to establish: (1)
the existence of an actionable duty; (2) the breach of that duty;
and, (3) consequent injury. Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.,
Ky., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (1992).
issue of law.
Id. at 248.
The question of duty presents an
Thus, we must determine whether Black
and officers from the City of Florence and Boone County had a
sufficiently direct relationship such that the officers owed her a
duty not to subject her to danger.
In Ashby v. City of Louisville, Ky. App., 841 S.W.2d 184
(1992),
Betty
Ashby
obtained
a
7
protective
order
against
her
cohabitant, Carl Branch.
arrest warrant was issued.
After Branch violated the order, an
Branch was not arrested until a week
later, and only after he had brutally murdered Ashby.
Ashby's
administratrix sued alleging that the police officers failed to
utilize due care to protect her daughter when they failed to
execute the warrant.
The trial court granted summary judgment for
the officers dismissing Ashby's complaint.
On appeal, this Court
said that in the absence of a "special relationship," a law
enforcement agency does not owe individual citizens a duty to
protect them from criminal activity.
Rather, the duty owed is to
the public as a whole.
The Ashby court, relying on
Id. at 189.
the United States Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103
L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), said that no "special relationship" will be
found to exist for purposes of due process "unless it is shown, in
a given situation, that the victim was in state custody or was
otherwise restrained by the state at the time in question, and that
the violence or other offensive conduct was perpetrated by a state
actor."
Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 190.
Finding that no "special
relationship" existed between the parties, this Court affirmed the
judgment dismissing Ashby's complaint.
Six years later, in Fryman v. Harrison, Ky., 896 S.W.2d
908
(1995),
the
Kentucky
Supreme
Court
adopted
the
"special
relationship" approach enunciated in Ashby, not just for actions
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, but for ordinary tort cases.
Although the Court held that no "special relationship" existed
8
where the victim of an assault claimed that his assailant was
negligently released from jail, the Court emphasized the fact that
the plaintiff would be victimized was not reasonably foreseeable.
In distinguishing Evans v. Morehead Clinic, Ky. App., 749 S.W.2d
696 (1988), the Fryman Court stated that the duty to protect is
limited to "reasonably foreseeable victims of a particular danger."
The Court continued:
In this case, the Court of Appeals went beyond the
holding of Evans, to create a duty to protect a victim
who was not known or identifiable or foreseeable.
Evans
is not controlling of this case because neither Davis
[the Bourbon Circuit Clerk] nor Fryman [the Bourbon
County Jailer] knew that Custard would injure Harrison as
opposed to any other member of the public. In Evans, the
victim was identifiable.
Fryman, 896 S.W.2d at 911.
See, to the same effect, Commonwealth,
Corrections Cabinet v. Vester, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1997).
The first requirement from Ashby, to establish liability
against the Appellees, is that Black must have been "in state
custody or . . . otherwise restrained by the state at the time in
question . . . ."
Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 190.
We disagree with
Appellees' contention that we are confined to the definition of
custody as used in the Miranda line of cases.4
4
In Berkemer v.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that constitutional
(continued...)
9
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that persons temporarily detained pursuant to
ordinary traffic stops are not in "custody" for the purposes of
Miranda.
However, Ashby requires that Black have been in custody
or "otherwise restrained by the state."
In Stemler, which addressed Black's federal claim, the
Court determined that Black was in custody:
In the present case, Black's complaint alleges -- and the
record evidence could reasonably be read to show -- that
the officers threatened to arrest her if she did not
leave in Kritis's truck, and they physically lifted her
out of Stemler's car and placed her in the truck against
her will.
In so doing, the officers took the 'affirma-
tive act of restraining [Black's] freedom to act on her
[own] behalf,' and consequently imposed upon themselves
a duty to ensure that they were not placing her in
danger.
Their actions were, in the words of DeShaney
[supra], a restraint on Black's personal liberty, not a
failure to act on her behalf.
Stemler, 126 F.3d at 867-68.
Here,
the
officers
affirmatively
restrained
Black's
freedom and liberty when they physically moved her from Stemler's
vehicle to Kritis's truck, threatening to arrest her if she did not
4
(...continued)
warnings must be given to a suspect prior to custodial interrogation.
10
leave with him.
Had the officers simply driven past the scene and
refused to stop, there would not have been a restraint on Black's
freedom.
However, once the officers began the investigation and
physically placed Black in Kritis's truck, her liberty and freedom
were undeniably restrained.
"[W]hen the State by the affirmative
exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it
renders him unable to care for himself, . . . it transgresses the
substantive limits on state action set by . . . the Due Process
Clause."
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at ____, 103 L.Ed.2d
at 261.
Clearly, Black was restrained by the police officers to
the extent that she was not able to care for herself.
She was
given the option of going with Kritis or being arrested, and was
not afforded the opportunity to seek another means of transportation. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's
knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions
of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed
on his freedom to act on his own behalf."
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
200, 109 S.Ct. at ____, 103 L.Ed.2d at 262.
Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 1995), cited
by the Appellees, is distinguishable.
In Foy, the plaintiff and
his friend were told by police officers to leave a dormitory after
they had been drinking.
drive back to Ohio.
Foy and his friend embarked on a long
Within forty-five minutes, the friend lost
control of his vehicle and crashed, killing Foy. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the officers had
not violated Foy's right to substantive due process, since there
11
was no restraint on his liberty that had caused him to keep
driving.
Foy
The difference in the case at hand and Foy is apparent.
was
only
told
to
leave
the
premises,
whereas
Black
was
physically placed in Kritis's truck while she was incapacitated.
In Foy, the decedent had the choice to continue driving with his
friend.
Black, on the other hand, was deprived of a truly
meaningful choice.
In Stemler, the Court recognized that there may be
situations where the state may owe a duty to someone despite the
fact that the person may not be in custody.
41
F.3d
1061
(6th
Cir.
1994),
the
In Gazette v. Pontiac,
Court,
while
referencing
DeShaney, stated that "a duty to protect can arise in a noncustodial setting if the state does anything to render an individual more
vulnerable to danger."
Gazette, 41 F.3d at 1065.
Nonetheless, we
need not reach a decision on this point because Black was in the
police officer's custody at the time she was forced into Kritis's
truck.
The second requirement of Ashby is that Black must
establish
that
the
"violence
perpetrated by a state actor."
or
other
offensive
conduct
Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 190.
was
Based
upon several recent Kentucky Supreme Court decisions, we do not
take this requirement to mean that the police officers must have
been the ones who killed Black; rather, the offensive conduct was
perpetrated by state actors when the officers physically removed
Black from one vehicle and placed her into the truck driven by
Kritis.
In Commonwealth v. Vester, supra, the Court held that the
12
Corrections Cabinet did not owe a duty to persons who lived fifty
miles from a penitentiary and who were killed by convicts six days
after they had escaped.
While recognizing that the decision in
Fryman controlled, the Court said that "since the victim[s] of the
injury
[were]
not
readily
identifiable
to
the
governmental
officials, they were under no duty to protect [them] from harm."
Vester, 956 S.W.2d at 206.
Although foreseeability, which is a critical element of
proximate
cause,
cannot
create
the
duty,
the
state
responsibly toward individuals who are in custody.
must
act
"[T]he core
principle that the state must not act with deliberate indifference
to the risk of injury to persons in its custody is well-established."
Stemler, 126 F.3d at 870.
As the Supreme Court said in
DeShaney, "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds
him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a
corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and
general well-being."
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at
____, 103 L.Ed.2d at 261.
the
Appellees
propose,
If Fryman were to be read as strictly as
a
jailer
who
negligently
permitted
a
prisoner in his custody to injure a fellow prisoner would be free
from legal responsibility.
Such an application of Fryman is
contrary to established Kentucky law.
Ky., 387 S.W.2d 600 (1964).
See Glover v. Hazelwood,
See also Sanders v. City of Belle
Glade, 510 So.2d 962, 964-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that the cases are legion in which a governmental body has been
held negligent and thus liable to a prisoner for injuries sustained
13
at the hands of other inmates or guards).
The standard that
applies to inmates also applies to other persons in the custody of
the state.
In the present case, the evidence viewed in the light
most favorable to Black supports a claim for wrongful death against
the Appellees.
As the Stemler court said:
The very notion that police officers should not have
known that they could not force an incapacitated woman to
drive off with an obviously drunk man who they had reason
to believe had beaten her betrays a chilling and unacceptable vision of the role of the police in our society.
Stemler, 126 F.3d at 870. Because a special relationship did exist
between the parties which created a legal duty, we cannot say that
it would be impossible for the Appellant to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in her favor.
Accordingly, it was
improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of
Appellees.
Steelvest, Inc., supra.
Lastly,
with
regard
to
Black,
it
is
clear
that
in
Kentucky county governments, which are a subdivision of the state,
are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Gov't, Ky. App., 641 S.W.2d 51, 53 (1982).
However,
when a county employee is sued in his individual capacity, he is
not afforded immunity for his negligence merely because of his
status as a county employee.
S.W.2d 309, 311 (1995).
Speck v. Bowling, Ky. App., 892
The key to determining the applicability
of immunity for individuals turns on whether the function performed
14
by the individual was discretionary or ministerial.
Franklin
County, Ky. v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195, 201 (1997).
County
officials and employees are not immune from suit in their individual capacities for neglect involving their ministerial duties.
Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 188.
In Upchurch v. Clinton County, Ky., 330
S.W.2d 428 (1959), Kentucky's highest court described the difference between the duties:
Discretionary or judicial duties are such as necessarily
require the exercise of reason in the adaptation of means
to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether
the act shall be done or the course pursued.
Discretion
in the manner of the performance of an act arises when
the act may be performed in one or two or more ways,
either of which would be lawful, and where it is left to
the will or judgment of the performer to determine in
which way it shall be performed.
However, an act is not
necessarily taken out of the class styled 'ministerial'
because the officer performing it is vested with a
discretion respecting the means or method to be employed.
Id. at 430.
It has consistently been recognized that many functions
performed by police officers are ministerial rather than discretionary, at least in the legal sense of the terms.
This Court has
held that an officer operating his cruiser on the highway is
performing a ministerial function and, therefore, is not entitled
to assert qualified immunity.
Speck, 892 S.W.2d at 311-12.
15
The
Kentucky Supreme Court has held that searching an individual taken
into custody is a ministerial function.
S.W.2d at 202.
Franklin County, Ky., 957
Although the officers involved in this case may
have used a degree of discretion throughout the police stop, their
duties clearly became ministerial once Black was in custody.
Discretionary functions are usually attributed to those involved in
actual policy-making decisions, rather than to those implementing
the policy, such as police officers.
Id. at 201-02.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the individual Appellees
were
performing
a
discretionary
entitled to qualified immunity.
function,
they
would
not
be
Good faith is a requirement for
asserting qualified immunity, and there is sufficient support in
the record for the proposition that the individual Appellees did
not act in good faith during their investigation.
See Thompson v.
Huecker, Ky. App., 599 S.W. 2d 488, 496 (1977) (holding that the
individual is privileged so long as his actions are reasonable
under the circumstances).
individual
officer
Additionally, if the conduct of an
violates
clearly
established
statutory
or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known,
qualified
Garrett,
Ky.
880
immunity
S.W.2d
does
530,
not
534
attach.
(1994)
See
(citing
McCollum
v.
Buckley
v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993)).
In Stemler, the United States Court of Appeals held that
the individual officers were not entitled to assert qualified
immunity as a defense to Black's substantive due process claim
because the officers should have known that their actions did not
16
conform to constitutional mandates.
The Court recognized that it
was the responsibility of the individual Appellees to know Black's
constitutional rights:
The fact that the law may have been unclear, or even
hotly disputed, at the margins does not afford state
actors immunity from suit where their actions violate the
heartland
of
the
constitutional
guarantee,
as
that
guarantee was understood at the time of the violation.
Stated differently, it is simply irrelevant that the
definition of the right to substantive due process has
been in flux if, under any definition found in the case
law at the time, the defendants should have known in
February 1994 that their actions violated that right.
Stemler, 126 F.3d at 867.
Therefore, although we hold that the
individual Appellees were engaged in a ministerial function, a
contrary ruling would still preclude the use of qualified immunity.
Black's
complaint
properly dismissed.
against
the
late
Ron
Kenner
was
He was, as earlier noted, sued only in his
official capacity as sheriff of Boone County.
As did the United
States Court of Appeals in Stemler, supra at 864, fn. 8, we treat
the claims against Kenner in his official capacity as a suit
directly against Boone County subject to dismissal on sovereign
immunity grounds.
*
*
17
*
Our next inquiry focuses upon whether summary judgment
dismissing Susan Stemler's claims against the City of Florence and
three officers, Bobby Jo Wince, John Dolan and Thomas Dusing, was
properly granted.
In her complaint, Stemler sought to recover
damages for (1) malicious prosecution, (2) abuse of process, (3)
false arrest and imprisonment, and, (4) negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Six elements must be established to prevail on a claim of
malicious prosecution:
(1) the institution or continuation of
criminal proceedings, (2) by, or at the instance, of the defendant,
(3) the termination of such proceedings in the civil plaintiff's
favor, (4) malice in the institution of such proceeding, (5) want
or lack of probable cause for the proceeding, and, (6) damage as a
result of the proceeding.
Broaddus v. Campbell, Ky. App., 911
S.W.2d 281, 283 (1995) (citing Raine v. Drasin, Ky., 621 S.W.2d
895, 899 (1981)).
The
circuit
court
correctly
determined
that
summary
judgment was appropriate because probable cause for Stemler's
arrest and prosecution had been established.
Although Stemler's
first criminal trial resulted in a mistrial when the jury was
unable to reach a unanimous verdict and the second trial resulted
in an acquittal, there was probable cause to believe that Stemler
committed a criminal act.
Even though Stemler contends that the
breath
to
test
adequate
administered
independent
her
evidence
was
that
probable cause to arrest Stemler.
18
inaccurate,
gave
the
there
police
is
an
officers
Stemler admitted that she had
consumed alcohol just prior to driving the automobile, she smelled
of alcohol and she failed at least one field sobriety test.
Furthermore,
as
the
circuit
court
noted,
the
district
judge
presiding over the criminal case involving Stemler made a finding
that probable cause for her arrest existed.
"We believe it is
axiomatic that where there is a specific finding of probable cause
in the underlying criminal action, or where such a finding is made
unnecessary
by
the
defendant's
agreement
or
acquiescence,
malicious prosecution action cannot be maintained."
a
Broaddus, 911
S.W.2d at 283.
Stemler's claim for false imprisonment fails in like
manner.
Because the Appellees are police officers, there is no
distinction
between
false
arrest
and
false
imprisonment.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Middleton, Ky. App., 555
S.W.2d 613 (1977).
"To sustain a recovery for the tort of false
imprisonment, a complainant must establish that he was detained and
that
the
detention
was
unlawful."
Wal-Mart
Stores,
Mitchell, Ky. App., 877 S.W.2d 616, 617 (1994).
Inc.
v.
Therefore, the
same probable cause analysis that applies to the claim of malicious
prosecution applies to the false imprisonment claim. Because there
was probable cause justifying an arrest, summary judgment was
appropriate.
Stemler contends that summary judgment was improperly
granted with regard to her abuse of process claim.
"The essential
elements of the tort include (1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a
willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
19
conduct of the proceeding."
Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson,
Ky. App., 598 S.W.2d 765, 766 (1980).
There is no evidence of
record that the Appellees used the process to gain an advantage
over Stemler or employed legal process for some purpose other than
that for which it was intended.
See Bourbon County Joint Planning
v. Simpson, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 42 (1990).
Although the officers
may have been crude during Stemler's arrest, we agree with the
circuit court that Stemler cannot establish that they acted with an
improper motive.
Additionally, as the circuit court recognized,
Assistant Attorney General Larry Fentress, the Special Prosecutor
in the Stemler criminal trials,
not the Appellees, controlled the
cases and independently made prosecutorial decisions.
Stemler contends that, in any event, the Appellees are
liable
for
distress.
intentional
and
negligent
infliction
of
emotional
However, this Court has previously held that if the
plaintiff raises traditional tort claims which allow recovery for
emotional distress, there can be no claim for intentional or
negligent
infliction
of
emotional
distress.
See
Rigazio
Archdiocese of Louisville, Ky. App., 853 S.W.2d 295 (1993).
v.
In
Rigazio, we said that:
[W]here an actor's conduct amounts to the commission of
one of the traditional torts such as assault, battery, or
negligence for which recovery for emotional distress is
allowed, and the conduct was not intended only to cause
extreme emotional distress in the victim, the tort of
outrage will not lie. Recovery for emotional distress in
20
those
instances
must
be
had
traditional common law action.
under
the
appropriate
The tort of outrage was
intended to supplement the existing forms of recovery,
not swallow them up.
Id. at 299.
* * *
In 1996-CA-001287-MR, the summary judgment in favor of
the late Ron Kenner is affirmed.
The summary judgment if favor of
the other Appellees is vacated and this case is remanded to Boone
Circuit Court for further proceedings.
In 1996-CA-001318-MR, the judgment is affirmed.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
DYCHE,
JUDGE,
CONCURRING.
While
I
agree
with
the
majority opinion, I feel it necessary to emphasize that the issue
we have decided is the propriety of the summary judgment granted by
the trial court.
Many of the material facts are still in dispute,
such as whether Ms. Black went with Kritis at her own request or at
the behest of appellees.
The opinion of this Court holds that, for
the purposes of review of the summary judgment, the facts are
viewed most favorable to appellants; this is not to say that
appellant will necessarily prevail at trial and recover money
damages.
Our opinion merely says that, looking at the facts most
favorable to appellant, a cause of action has been stated.
21
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT CHIPMAN:
Richard G. Meyer
DETERS, BENZINGER &
P.S.C.
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES CITY OF
FLORENCE and OFFICERS DUSING,
DOLAN and WINCE:
LaVELLE,
David Whalin
R. Kent Westberry
LANDRUM & SHOUSE
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT STEMLER:
Eric C. Deters
DETERS, BENZINGER &
LaVELLE, P.S.C.
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BOONE
COUNTY:
W. Kenneth Nevitt
R. Thaddeus Keal
WILLIAMS & WAGONER
Louisville, Kentucky
22
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