WILLIAM R. DISHMAN, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
January 16, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1199-MR
WILLIAM R. DISHMAN, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-4
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GARDNER,
BUCKINGHAM, GARDNER and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
JUDGE:
William
Dishman
(Dishman)
appeals
from
his
judgment of conviction for theft by unlawful taking over $300 and
for persistent felony offender, second degree (PFO II).
After
reviewing the three issues raised by Dishman, the applicable law
and the record below, this Court affirms.
Dishman's
November 27, 1995.
conviction
stems
from
events
occurring
on
Dishman and Daphney Briscoe (Briscoe) went to
Hill's Department Store in the South Park Shopping Center in
Lexington.
Chris Walls, a plain clothes store detective working
for Hills, later testified that he observed Dishman and Briscoe
shoplift items totalling nearly $700 by concealing them in a
wheelchair, duffel bag, and box. Hills' operations manager, Teresa
Pettis (Pettis), also observed much of the shoplifting activity.
Dishman and Briscoe were arrested after they left the Hills' store
and were unable to produce any receipts for the merchandise.
Dishman and Briscoe were jointly indicted in January 1996
for theft by unlawful taking over $300.
Briscoe subsequently pled
guilty to the charge and later claimed that Dishman did not assist
her in shoplifting the merchandise, and was not with her in the
store when she took the merchandise.
Dishman's case proceeded to
a trial by jury, and he was found guilty of theft by unlawful
taking of property over $300 and of PFO II.
ten years in prison in April 1996.
He was sentenced to
Dishman has now brought an
appeal to this Court.
Dishman first argues that the circuit court erred by
refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial after a witness for the
Commonwealth allegedly referred to his past record.
Specifically,
he objects to a statement made by Chris Walls, a store detective
for Hills.
In response to a question from the Commonwealth
regarding the events surrounding the shoplifting, Walls stated that
as soon as Dishman walked into the store, Walls was notified by an
employee of Hills "that Dishman had a record of."
At this point,
defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench.
The
Commonwealth's attorney told the trial judge that she did not know
Walls would make that statement.
mistrial.
Defense counsel moved for a
After conferring with Walls, the court sustained the
objection, but denied the motion for a mistrial. The court ordered
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Walls' response to be stricken and admonished the jury not to
consider the statement.
The court asked at least twice if each
juror could do this and stated that there was no place in the trial
for the response Walls was about to make.
We have uncovered no
reversible error.
It is ordinarily presumed that a jury will follow an
admonition to disregard inadmissible evidence that is inadvertently
presented to it, unless (1) there is an overwhelming probability
that the jury will be unable to follow the court's admonition; and
(2) there is a stong likelihood that the effect of the inadmissible
evidence would be devastating to the defendant.
Alexander v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1993).
See Clay v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 200, 204 (1993).
Absent bad
faith, an admonition by the trial court cures a defect in the
testimony.
Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d at 859.
This is
especially true where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt
presented.
(1984).
manifest
See Dunn v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 689 S.W.2d 23
A mistrial is appropriate only where the record reveals a
necessity
for
such
an
action
or
an
urgent
or
real
necessity. Clay v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d at 204, quoting Skaggs
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672 (1985).
A trial court has
discretion in deciding whether to declare a mistrial, and an
appellate court must not disturb its decision absent an abuse of
discretion.
Clay v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d at 204.
In the instant case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to declare a mistrial.
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The trial court's
admonition in the instant case was very thorough and cured any
prejudice that may have occurred from Walls' incomplete statement.
The record shows that the Commonwealth did not elicit the response
from Walls. The evidence presented for the Commonwealth's case was
strong.
While
Walls'
statement
was
unfortunate,
it
was
not
completed and was not so prejudicial that it could not be cured by
an admonition.
The cases cited by Dishman are distinguishable,
because the statements presented to the jury in those cases were
either deliberate or much more egregious than in the instant case.1
Dishman next contends that the circuit court erred by
refusing to permit him to ask the arresting officer at trial if
Briscoe had told the officer at the time of her arrest that she
alone had committed the crime and that Dishman was innocent.
issue is not adequately preserved for two reasons.
This
The record
shows that Dishman's trial counsel asked the officer if Briscoe
made a statement to him on the night she was arrested, regarding
the participation of her and Dishman in the alleged shoplifting on
the night she was arrested. The Commonwealth objected, and defense
counsel stated he was not asking what the statement was but whether
there was a statement. Counsel specifically stated that he was not
seeking to ascertain the contents of the statement.
Dishman's
counsel told the court that he thought the Commonwealth would bring
1
Dishman in his argument maintains that the Commonwealth
contributed to the prejudicial effect of the response by
continually referring to him and Briscoe as the shoplifters. We
have reviewed the passages cited by him but have found no improper
conduct or statements which directly call Dishman or Briscoe
"shoplifters."
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out that Briscoe had made a statement exonerating Dishman for the
first time at trial, and he wanted to show that she made a
statement regarding participation in the shoplifting to the officer
on the night of the arrest.2
Thus, the record shows that trial counsel never sought to
ask the witness about the substance of the statement, so any
argument
regarding
this
matter
was
not
adequately
preserved.
Further, it has been held that error cannot be predicated on
rejection of evidence where no avowal is made which would disclose
what answer would be given if the witness was permitted to testify.
Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 839, 841 (1992); Caudill v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1989).
case,
the
record
reflects
that
Dishman
In the instant
sought
no
avowal.
Additionally, we have found no prejudice resulting from the trial
court's apparent refusal to permit the asking of defense counsel's
proffered question.
Finally, Dishman argues that the circuit court erred by
permitting the Commonwealth to show that Briscoe had already pled
guilty to the same charge for which he was on trial.
The record
shows that Dishman's trial counsel at the bench told the trial
court that since Briscoe was his witness, he was going to ask her
if she had pled guilty to the charge.
The Commonwealth's counsel
did not object but stated only that she would ask Briscoe about
2
The trial court's comments regarding this matter at the bench
are inaudible, but it is apparent that it ruled for the
Commonwealth as there was no further questioning by defense counsel
on the matter. The Commonwealth later asked Briscoe whether she
had pled guilty to the theft charge.
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whether she was waiting to be sentenced.
Dishman's counsel then
conferred with him and announced that the defense had concluded.
The Commonwealth then told the court that if defense counsel was
not going to ask the question, she would ask it.
Dishman's counsel
argued that Briscoe was not a convicted felon until ten days after
the final judgment.3
Dishman's counsel finally told the court that
he objected but could not think of a reason for the objection.
The
Commonwealth did ask Briscoe whether she had pled guilty to which
Briscoe responded affirmatively.
We have found no reversible error. Dishman is not now in
a position to argue about the question since his counsel was going
to ask the same question.
When counsel did object, the only
reasons provided was that Briscoe's judgment of conviction was not
final.
Counsel stated he could not think of another reason.
One
cannot pursue one theory at trial and another on appellate review.
Port v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 327, 333 (1995).
found no error which would compel reversal.4
See
We have
Tipton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 640 S.W.2d 818, 820 (1982).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
3
There is a good deal of discussion between counsel and the
trial court, but the trial court's comments are inaudible.
4
Under the facts of this case, the Commonwealth's question to
Briscoe regarding her guilty plea was admissible and thus not
inappropriate. See Kentucky County Judge/Executive Association,
Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Justice Cabinet, Department of
Corrections, Ky. App., 938 S.W.2d 582 (1996); Grace v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 915 S.W.2d 754 (1996).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Suzanne E. Baker
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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