LARRY KEITH NICHOLS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 12, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-0966-MR
LARRY KEITH NICHOLS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-001482
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOX, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Appellant Larry Keith Nichols entered a conditional
plea of guilty in the Jefferson Circuit Court to second-degree
assault and first-degree robbery, reserving the issue of whether
KRS 635.020(4) violates the constitutional guarantees of due
process of law and equal protection.
The trial court sentenced
appellant to ten years' imprisonment on each offense, to be
served concurrently, for a total of ten years.
Appellant now
appeals the issue of constitutionality, claiming that KRS
635.020(4), the "juvenile transfer statute" (or "waiver statute")
under which appellant was transferred to circuit court to be
tried as an adult, violated his constitutional rights to due
process of law and equal protection.1
Appellant was arrested in March 1995 on charges of
first-degree assault and first-degree robbery, stemming from an
incident wherein appellant, fifteen years old at the time, and
co-defendant in the case, Keith Satterfield, allegedly forced the
victim into his own apartment, demanded money, and then shot the
victim six times with a .22 caliber handgun.
A juvenile petition
was filed on March 27, 1995, in district court, and the case was
set for a preliminary hearing the following month to determine
whether appellant should be transferred to circuit court due to
the nature of the charges.
At the preliminary hearing, the district court found
probable cause to believe that first-degree assault and firstdegree robbery (class B felonies) were committed by appellant,
and further found that appellant was fifteen years old at the
time he committed the alleged offenses.
Given appellant's age
and in light of appellant's having used a firearm in committing
the two felonies with which he was charged, the presiding judge
transferred appellant to circuit court in accordance with KRS
635.020(4), which provides in part:
Any other provision of KRS Chapters 610 to
645 to the contrary notwithstanding, if a
child charged with a felony in which a
firearm was used in the commission of the
offense had attained the age of fourteen (14)
1
It is the 1994 version of KRS 635.020(4) which this Court
reviews. That version has since been revised by the legislature,
effective July 1997.
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years at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense, he shall be tried in the
Circuit Court as an adult offender and shall
be subject to the same penalties as an adult
offender . . . .
In June 1995, the grand jury returned an indictment
charging appellant with criminal attempt to commit murder and
first-degree robbery.
Later that year, in December, appellant
entered a conditional plea of guilty to an amended charge of
second-degree assault and to first-degree robbery, pursuant to
RCr 8.09, which permits a defendant to enter a conditional plea
of guilty while reserving the right to appeal from "the adverse
determination of any specified trial or pretrial motion."
In
light of the trial court's having denied appellant's motion to
declare KRS 635.020(4) unconstitutional, appellant reserved the
right to appeal that issue to this Court.
Judgment was entered
on March 4, 1996, and sentence was imposed as recommended by the
Commonwealth, i.e. ten years' imprisonment on each felony
offense, to be served concurrently, for a total of ten years.
Appellant argues that KRS 635.020(4) is an arbitrary
infringement upon due process of law and, further, that it denies
those subjected to its mandates equal protection under the law,
in violation of Section 2 of Kentucky's Constitution: "Absolute
and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority."
We note here that at the time appellant filed this
appeal, the constitutionality of KRS 635.020(4), insofar as it
allegedly violated Sections 27, 28, 112, and 113 of the
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Constitution, was pending before Kentucky's Supreme Court.
Commonwealth v. Halsell, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 522 (1996).
In fact,
this Court ordered appellant's appeal abated pending the outcome
of Halsell, which became final in November 1996.
Halsell held that (1) KRS 635.020(4) does not violate
those provisions of Kentucky's Constitution (Sections 112 and
113) governing jurisdiction of district and circuit courts; and,
(2) It does not conflict with KRS 640.010, which requires the
district court, in some circumstances, to consider certain
mitigating factors prior to determining whether jurisdiction
should be transferred to circuit court.
Additionally, the court
in Halsell analyzed KRS 635.020(4) under Sections 27 and 28 of
the Constitution, and found that it did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine.
In light of Halsell, this Court
issued an order directing appellant in this case to show cause
why the Jefferson Circuit Court's ruling as to the
constitutionality of KRS 635.020(4) should not be summarily
affirmed.
Appellant responded by noting that KRS 635.020(4) has
not yet been analyzed under Section 2 of the Constitution to
determine whether it violates the guarantees of due process of
law and equal protection.
This Court found sufficient cause to
continue the appeal, and we now address appellant's arguments.
DUE PROCESS
KRS Chapter 640 controls proceedings against juveniles
who are transferred from district court to circuit court as
"youthful offenders" due to the nature of the offenses with which
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they have been charged.
Those offenses which trigger transfer
are identified in KRS 635.020, e.g. capital offenses, class A and
B felonies, class C and D felonies under some circumstances, and
felonies in which a firearm was used to commit the offense.
In
most cases, transfer will not be considered unless and until the
county attorney has moved that the juvenile be proceeded against
as a youthful offender.
If such a motion is made, the district
court conducts a preliminary hearing wherein it is obligated to
consider certain mitigating factors prior to transferring the
juvenile.
These factors are set out in KRS 640.010(2)(b):
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense;
2. Whether the offense was against persons or
property, with greater weight being given to
offenses against persons;
3. The maturity of the child as determined by
his environment;
4. The child's prior record;
5. The best interest of the child and
community;
6. The prospects of adequate protection of
the public; and
7. The likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the child by the use of
procedures, services, and facilities
currently available to the juvenile justice
system.
If, however, a juvenile is charged with a felony in
which a firearm was used to commit the crime, he is automatically
transferred to circuit court under KRS 635.020(4), absent any
consideration by the court of KRS Chapter 640's mitigating
factors.
Appellant argues that automatic transfer cannot be
reconciled with the procedural protections afforded in KRS
640.010(2), that automatic transfer divests juveniles of the
constitutionally "protected" status they acquired in Kent v.
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United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84
(1966), and that Kent nonetheless forbids transfer absent
consideration of mitigating factors.
Before we take up
appellant's interpretation of Kent, we note that Kentucky's
Supreme Court has already addressed the issue of whether KRS
635.020(4) can be reconciled with KRS 640.010(2)(b), and has held
not only that the two statutes are not in conflict, but that
consideration of KRS 640.010(2)(b) mitigating factors is not
required prior to deciding whether a firearm felony should be
transferred to circuit court for trial.
Ky., 934 S.W.2d 552 (1996).
Commonwealth v. Halsell,
The Court in Halsell noted, first of
all, that consideration of the seven factors listed in KRS
640.010(2)(b) is triggered only by the county attorney's motion
to proceed under Chapter 640, and that no such motion was made in
that case.
Likewise, we note the absence of any such motion in
the case now under review.
The Halsell Court further stated:
Considering KRS 635.020 as a whole, we
note that subsection (1) directs the district
court initially to proceed under the
provisions of Chapter 635 if, prior to an
adjudicatory hearing, there is a reasonable
cause to believe a child has committed a
firearm felony of the type described in
subsection (4) of that chapter. Subsection
(4) itself, is prefaced by the words, "Any
other provision of KRS Chapter 610 to 645 to
the contrary notwithstanding, if a child
charged with a felony in which a firearm was
used in the commission of the offense had
attained the age of fourteen (14) years at
the time of the commission of the alleged
offense, he shall be tried in the circuit
court as an adult offender. . . ." [emphasis
added]. Thus, KRS 635.020(4) makes it clear
that the provisions of KRS 640.010(2) are not
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applicable if the district court has found
there is reasonable cause to believe that the
elements of KRS 635.020(4) have been
established.
Id. at 555-56 (emphasis in original).
The court in Halsell concluded that regardless of
whether reasonable cause is determined at a preliminary hearing
described in KRS 640.010(2) or prior to an adjudicatory hearing
as described in KRS 635.020(1), "[O]nce the district court has
reasonable cause to believe that a child before the court has
committed a firearm felony as described in subsection (4) of KRS
635.020, jurisdiction vests in the circuit court, the provisions
of KRS 640.010(2)(b) and (c) to the contrary notwithstanding."
Id. at 556.
We disagree that Kent requires consideration of
mitigating factors in each and every case, prior to transfer.
In
Kent, the juvenile court transferred a sixteen-year-old boy
without conducting an evidentiary hearing, in spite of the fact
that the District of Columbia's waiver statute required a "full
investigation" prior to transfer.
The U.S. Supreme Court stated
that the statute "assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the
particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory
requirement of a 'full investigation.'"
Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
The court, noting that the statute itself gave the juvenile court
a "substantial degree" of discretion as to factual considerations
to be weighed, concluded the sixteen-year-old defendant was
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entitled to a hearing and a statement of reasons for his
transfer.
Id.
The holding in Kent is limited in that it identified
the minimum procedural process due pursuant to specific language
of the waiver statute it reviewed, which clearly created the
expectation of an evidentiary transfer hearing.
We do not
believe, however, the court created a hard-and-fast rule that a
full-blown investigatory hearing is required in each and every
transfer of a juvenile.
In fact, in a case decided nearly ten
years later, the U.S. Supreme Court, analyzing its holding in
Kent, specifically denied that it had intended to prescribe the
type, or amount, of evidence necessary to transfer a juvenile.
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346
(1975).
Breed involved a juvenile who had been subjected to in-
depth evidentiary and adjudicatory proceedings at both the
juvenile court and circuit court levels, which the court
ultimately found to constitute double jeopardy.
Pertinent to the
case we now review, however, is Breed's articulation of the due
process requirement, in general, within the context of juvenile
transfer proceedings:
In Kent v. United States . . . the Court held
that hearings under the statute there
involved "must measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment." However,
the Court has never attempted to prescribe
criteria for, or the nature and quantum of
evidence that must support, a decision to
transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court.
We require only that, whatever the relevant
criteria, and whatever the evidence demanded,
a State determine whether it wants to treat a
juvenile within the juvenile-court system
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before entering upon a proceeding that may
result in an adjudication that he has
violated a criminal law and in a substantial
deprivation of liberty, rather than subject
him to the expense, delay, strain, and
embarrassment of two such proceedings.
Breed, 421 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added).
The due process requirement, then, as it has been
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Breed, is simply that
the juvenile must not be subjected to more than one adjudicatory
proceeding.
Contrary to appellant's position, the court in Kent
made no decision whatsoever concerning the type of evidence that
Kentucky's, or any other state's, juvenile courts must consider
prior to transferring a juvenile to circuit court.
Further, we
believe that KRS 635.020(4) addresses the concern, and satisfies
the due process requirement, expressed in Breed that juveniles be
transferred as expeditiously as possible, prior to any type of
adjudicatory proceeding.
Finally, we disagree with appellant's argument that
juveniles possess an inherent right to be afforded certain
protections and immunities due solely to their juvenile status.
Even Breed recognized that "not all juveniles can benefit from
the special features and programs of the juvenile-court system
and that . . . transfer to an adult court should be available."
Breed,
421 U.S. at 535.
The fifth circuit, in its review of a
Florida waiver statute, had this to say about juvenile status:
[T]reatment as a juvenile is not an inherent
right but one granted by the state
legislature, therefore the legislature may
restrict or qualify that right as it sees
fit, as long as no arbitrary or
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discriminatory classification is involved. .
. . Doubtless the Florida legislature
considered carefully the rise in the number
of crimes committed by juveniles as well as
the growing recidivist rate among this group.
Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977).
State
courts, too, have grappled with the same issue and concluded as
such:
[H]istorically, a juvenile has no right to
remain before the juvenile court, except as
provided by statute. A juvenile is not even
constitutionally entitled to a hearing before
transfer to adult court. In light of this
history, we conclude that a legislature may
completely exclude certain serious offenses
from juvenile court jurisdiction.
In the interest of A. L., 271 N.J.Super. 192, 203, 638 A.2d 814,
820 (1994).
Kentucky's juveniles are afforded special immunities
and protections by way of the legislature, not the constitution.
We briefly address appellant's remaining due process
arguments.
Appellant attacks the language, "charged with a
felony in which a firearm was used in the commission of the
offense," as too vague for the purpose of distinguishing between
violent and nonviolent offenses, and between mere possession of a
weapon and actual use of it.
We disagree, and adopt the analysis
and reasoning set forth in Haymon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657
S.W.2d 239 (1983), involving a statute which precludes
eligibility for probation if the commission of the offense
"involved the use of a weapon from which a shot or projectile may
be discharged that is readily capable of producing death or other
serious physical injury. . . ."
Id. at 240.
The defendant in
Haymon, having stolen a shotgun, was armed with that gun as he
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left the premises, although he never actually fired the gun
during the commission of burglary.
Nonetheless, he was denied
probation under the above-referenced statute.
Defendant argued
that the statute's language "use of a weapon" was ambiguous and
that, further, because he was merely "armed" with the gun, but
had not "used" it, his offense did not fall within the scope of
the statute.
Kentucky's Supreme Court agreed that the phrase
"use of a weapon" was ambiguous as used in the statute, and
reversed denial of defendant's probation, holding that defendant
was "entitled to the benefit of the ambiguity."
Id.
In light of Haymon, we believe the appellant in this
case is entitled to the benefit of any ambiguity inherent in the
phrase "felony in which a firearm was used."
This ambiguity,
however, does not benefit appellant, who shot his victim six
times with a .22 caliber handgun, and as a result, was charged
with first-degree assault and first-degree robbery.
In the
context of this particular case, we have no trouble making the
distinctions appellant denies can be made, and say with certainty
that appellant "used" his firearm in the commission of a
"violent" crime.
Thus, appellant clearly falls within the scope
of KRS 635.020(4).
Finally, appellant interprets the language in KRS
635.020(4), "shall be subject to the same penalties as an adult
offender," as completely exempting juveniles automatically
transferred to circuit court from the sentencing protections
otherwise afforded in KRS Chapter 640, e.g. exemption from
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capital punishment and persistent felony offender provisions.
Appellant argues that the statute is thus unconstitutionally
arbitrary as to the penalties it imposes.
First of all, we
believe that the Supreme Court in Halsell, 934 S.W.2d at 552,
clearly characterized KRS 635.020(4) as a purely jurisdictional
statute, thus precluding any attack upon it as a penal statute.
More significant to our review, however, is the recent holding in
Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., ___ S.W.2d ___, 45 Ky. L. Summ. 4, 22
(March 19, 1998), that juveniles automatically transferred to
circuit court under KRS 635.020(4) are, in fact, "eligible for
the ameliorative sentencing provisions of KRS Chapter 640."
at 23.
Id.
In light of Britt, appellant's premise that the
sentencing protections of KRS Chapter 640 are not extended to
juveniles who are automatically transferred to circuit court, is
faulty.
Appellant, and others similarly situated, are entitled
to those protections and thus, appellant's due process argument
is without merit.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Appellant argues that KRS 635.020(4) draws an
arbitrary, irrational line between, e.g., a capital juvenile
offender who chooses to use a firearm to kill his victim and a
capital juvenile offender who, by "mere fortuity," uses some
means other than a firearm to kill his victim.
Appellant notes
that in the first case, the juvenile is denied consideration of
certain KRS Chapter 640 mitigating factors and is, additionally,
subject to adult penalty enhancement or even execution.
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Whereas
in the latter situation, the juvenile is afforded all the
circumstantial and sentencing protections of KRS Chapter 640.
Appellant argues that this differentiation in treatment
effectively denies juveniles such as appellant the "legal status"
(i.e. juvenile status) to which they are entitled and results in
unequal treatment of individuals similarly situated.
We
disagree.
First, we are mindful that treatment as a juvenile is
not an inherent right.
In fact, the extent of any right to
treatment as a juvenile is derived from statutory law and is
defined by state legislatures.
Thus, appellant has not been
stripped of a status to which he is constitutionally entitled.
Second, we believe that when subjected to the rational basis
test, KRS 635.020(4) survives appellant's constitutional
challenge.
"Legislative distinctions between persons,
under traditional equal protection analysis,
must bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate state end." Chapman v. Gorman,
Ky., 839 S.W.2d 232, 239 (1992). Put another
way, "[t]he proper test to be applied under
the equal protection clause and the cited
sections of the Kentucky Constitution is
whether there is a rational basis for the
different treatment." Hooks v. Smith, 781
S.W.2d 522, 523 (1989).
Roberts v. Mooneyhan, Ky. App., 902 S.W.2d 842, 844 (1995).
This
Court in Roberts reiterates the presumption that statutes enacted
by the General Assembly are constitutionally valid, and that
"those attacking the rationality of the legislative
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classification have the burden 'to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it.'"
Id. (citation omitted).
We believe there is a legitimate interest in holding
juveniles who use firearms during the commission of a crime
accountable for their behavior.
Further, we believe there is a
legitimate interest in protecting the community from such
behavior.
As our Supreme Court has stated, "[f]irearms are
inherently more dangerous to human life than other weapons. . .
."
Parrish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 560, 563 (1979).
The legislative decision to transfer juveniles charged with a
felony in which a firearm was used, is rationally related to
these goals.
Appellant has failed to persuade this Court
otherwise.
As for the legislature's having singled out a
particular group of offenders for different treatment, each of
whom chooses to use a deadly weapon to further commission of a
felony offense, we find this language to be applicable:
[T]he equal protection clause does not
prevent the legislature from recognizing
"degrees of evil. . . ." [A] State is not
constrained in the exercise of its police
power to ignore experience which marks a
class of offenders or a family of offenses
for special treatment. Nor is it prevented
by the equal protection clause from confining
"its restrictions to those classes of cases
where the need is deemed to be clearest."
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 2d
1655 (1942) (citations omitted).
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We hold that KRS 635.020(4) does not violate
appellant's due process or equal protection rights.
Accordingly,
the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
reluctantly concur.
I
In view of Section 2 of our Kentucky
Constitution, I have great reservation about a criminal statute
that arbitrarily considers a juvenile an adult predicated upon
the use of a firearm.
Hopefully, this matter will be later
examined by the supreme court.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Irvin J. Halbleib
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Vickie L. Wise
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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