UNION UNDERWEAR COMPANY, INC., D/B/A FRUIT OF THE LOOM v. JOEL O. BARNHART ZACK N. WOMACK, et al.
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September 18, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No. 1996-CA-000780-MR
UNION UNDERWEAR COMPANY, INC.,
D/B/A FRUIT OF THE LOOM
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-420
v.
JOEL O. BARNHART
ZACK N. WOMACK, et al.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, BUCKINGHAM, and JOHNSON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Union Underwear Company, Inc., doing business
as Fruit of the Loom ("FOL" or "the company"), appeals from a
Warren Circuit Court judgment, based on a jury verdict, deeming
it liable for age discrimination in violation of KRS 344.040(1).
The company was found to have unlawfully discharged the appellee,
Joel Barnhart, from his managerial position at a company facility
in Lexington, South Carolina.
At all times relevant to this case
Barnhart resided and was employed outside Kentucky.
For this
reason, the company, which is incorporated in New York and
maintains its headquarters in Bowling Green, Kentucky, contends
that Warren Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Barnhart's claim.
It also contends that the judgment was not
adequately supported by the evidence and was otherwise tainted by
erroneous evidentiary rulings, by inaccurate jury instructions,
and by opposing counsel's improper closing remarks.
For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment against FOL.
Background Facts and Proceedings in the Trial Court
Barnhart began working for FOL in 1978, when he was
hired as assistant manager at a factory in Aliceville, Alabama.
In 1986 he was promoted to manager of the facility in Lexington,
South Carolina.
That plant is known as Jay Products and is FOL's
sole elastic manufacturing facility.
Later in 1986 Barnhart was
promoted to Vice President of Elastic Technology.
Mike Morse,
who served as FOL's representative in this action, was promoted
to Senior Vice President at the beginning of 1994 and since then
has been employed at the company's headquarters in Bowling Green,
Kentucky.
Upon Morse's promotion he became Barnhart's immediate
supervisor, and in October 1994 he demoted Barnhart from Vice
President to a newly created manager's position.1
Barnhart then
came under the supervision of Willie Turner, whom Morse had
1
At trial witnesses applied various titles to this position
(all along the lines of "manager of elastic technology"), but
there is no dispute that it represented a demotion from Vice
President and that it was a new position outside the company's
management structure.
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recently promoted to Vice President.
In March 1995, Turner
discharged Barnhart, who was then 54 years of age.
Morse's promotion to Senior Vice President and his
promotion of Willie Turner to Vice President appear to have been
part of a substantial reorganization of FOL's technology
division.
Shortly prior to Morse's promotion, Stan Vinson
replaced Jack Moore as Executive Vice President of Technology.
Vinson too is stationed at the company's Bowling Green
headquarters.
He promoted Morse, and Morse, in addition to
promoting Willie Turner, also promoted Mike Bridgeman to Vice
President.
Soon after Morse assumed responsibility for the Jay
Products plant, the plant manager, Darrel Bustle, was discharged,
and, as noted, Barnhart was demoted.
Also, in conjunction with
these personnel changes at Jay Products, management of the
facility was revised.
Apparently Barnhart's old position of Vice
President of Elastic Technology was discontinued.
Willie Turner,
who oversaw three or four other factories, assumed general
oversight of that plant, and Barnhart's and Bustle's
responsibilities for day-to-day management of the elastic
operation were assigned to a new plant manager, Ward Hall, and an
assistant plant manager, Bill Maudlin.
At the time of these
changes Willie Turner was approximately 50 years old, Ward Hall
was approximately 47, and Bill Maudlin was in his early to midforties.
Barnhart's new assignment as manager lasted from
October 1994 until March 1995.
During that period he was removed
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to an office at the back of the Jay Products building and was
asked to study the feasibility of FOL's opening a second elastic
manufacturing plant.
He visited several potential factory sites,
in particular one in Jena, Louisiana, and some equipment
manufacturers, but, as he was given no other job duties, he
eventually found himself with nothing to do.
Willie Turner came
to South Carolina in March 1995 to tell Barnhart that FOL had
decided against an additional elastic facility and, as a result,
that it was necessary to discharge him.
Barnhart testified that
he asked Turner to find some other position for him, even if it
meant a pay reduction, but Turner insisted that no suitable
position existed.
At that time, Barnhart's pension rights had
vested; he would become eligible to receive retirement payments
at age 55.
But because he did not remain employed with the
company until age 62, Barnhart was denied the opportunity to
receive his retirement benefit as a lump sum.
Barnhart filed his complaint in this matter in April
1995, and an amended complaint that May, alleging that he had
been illegally discharged because of his age.
the circuit court conducted a jury trial.
In December 1995
Barnhart, through his
own testimony and by questioning company officers, sought to show
that he had been a productive employee, one who had merited
promotions and raises and whose dismissal was most plausibly
explained as stemming from the company's desire to shed an older
manager to make room for one of the younger persons seeking
advancement.
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FOL countered by presenting a less favorable assessment
of Barnhart's work record, arguing in particular that Barnhart
had been unable or unwilling to address a serious morale problem
at his plant.
Morse testified that as soon as he had assumed his
new position over Jay Products he had begun to receive complaints
from Barnhart's workers.
Concerned, he had visited Jay Products
to consult Barnhart and to investigate the complaints.
Barnhart
tried to assure him that the complaints came from a small number
of chronic complainers, employees and former employees, but
Morse's investigation purportedly led him to believe that the
problems were more widespread.
be surveyed.
He arranged for the employees to
There were two or three surveys, but the company
introduced results only from the last, a survey conducted by a
business consulting firm known as Carolina Consultants.
The
survey showed, FOL maintained, that Barnhart had demoralized many
of his workers by countenancing a romance between two
supervisors.
The romance had allegedly led to unfair hiring
decisions and work assignments.
Purportedly the survey showed
that Barnhart had failed to address complaints about this
situation and others.
FOL also charged that in 1993 and 1994
Barnhart had provided inaccurate estimates of Jay Products'
production costs and had allowed those costs to become excessive.
Barnhart replied by showing that Morse had had the Jay
Products employees surveyed three times during the months leading
up to his demotion: an in-house survey by Barnhart's staff, a
survey conducted by the manager of another FOL plant, and the
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Carolina Consultants survey, which was performed by Chip Long, an
acquaintance of Morse.
According to FOL's officers on cross-
examination, no records of the two earlier surveys had been
preserved.
Barnhart claimed that those surveys did not suggest
any unusual employee dissatisfaction.
Barnhart also offered
expert testimony by a vocational psychologist who criticized the
consultant's survey as biased; it tended, he thought, to elicit
negative appraisals of management.
He also thought an employee
opinion survey a poor basis for judging either employee morale or
managerial performance.
Other factors, such as plant safety,
attendance, and turn-over statistics as well as plant performance
records were crucial considerations for those assessments.
Barnhart's plant had consistently received good, even
outstanding, ratings for safety, attendance, turn-over, and
production.
With respect to FOL's stated concern that in 1993 and
1994 Barnhart had submitted inaccurate budgets for his plant,
Barnhart testified that in 1994 he had requested approval for an
exceptionally high budget because equipment changes were
temporarily raising costs, but Morse and another officer, Jim
Shay, had overridden his request and insisted upon submitting a
budget no higher than recent ones.
Barnhart pointed out that in
1995, after his demotion, the company had approved a Jay
Products' budget significantly higher than that for 1994 and one
in line with his former request.
-6-
The jury found in favor of Barnhart and recommended
compensatory damages of approximately $250,000 and punitive
damages of $750,000.
With minor modifications this is the
judgment the court awarded and from which FOL appeals.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
FOL first contends that Warren Circuit Court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over Barnhart's claim because he
worked and resided outside Kentucky.
Citing KRS 344.020,
"Purposes and Construction of Chapter," FOL maintains that the
General Assembly did not intend KRS Chapter 344 to apply to nonresidents employed outside the state.
Relying on two decisions
by the United States Supreme Court, BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996),
and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 113 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1991),
FOL further maintains that Kentucky's assertion of jurisdiction
over Barnhart's claim contravenes fundamental principles of
federalism by imposing Kentucky's public policy on conduct
outside Kentucky.
We find neither of these contentions
persuasive.
Subject matter jurisdiction, which derives either from
the Constitution or from legislation, is a court's authority to
decide the type of claim presented, and lack of that authority
may be objected to at any time.
Gordon v. NKC Hospitals, Inc.,
-7-
Ky., 887 S.W.2d 360 (1994).
Although there is no dispute that
circuit court has original subject matter jurisdiction over
Kentucky employment discrimination claims, both as the trial
court of general jurisdiction under our Constitution (Ky. Const.
§§ 109 and 112; see also KRS 23A.010) and specifically pursuant
to KRS 344.450, FOL maintains that KRS Chapter 344 provides
remedies only for Kentucky residents or people employed within
Kentucky.
FOL insists, therefore, that the circuit court has not
been vested with the authority to entertain the employment
discrimination claims of nonresidents, such as Barnhart, who were
employed outside the Commonwealth.
Otherwise, FOL argues,
Kentucky would risk the improper imposition of its law beyond the
Commonwealth's territorial boundaries.
We disagree.
KRS 344.040 makes it an unlawful practice for an
employer
(1) To fail or refuse to hire, or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against an individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of the
individual's race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age forty (40) and over, because
the person is a qualified individual with a
disability, or because the individual is a
smoker or nonsmoker, as long as the person
complies with any workplace policy concerning
smoking; . . .
An "employer," according to KRS 344.030(2),
means a person who has eight (8) or more
employees within the state in each of twenty
(20) or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year and an agent of such
a person, . . .
-8-
The term "individual" is not defined within Chapter 344, but KRS
344.030(5) defines "employee" as
an individual employed by an employer, but
does not include an individual employed by
his parents, spouse, or child, or an
individual employed to render services as a
domestic in the home of the employer.
And KRS 344.010(1) defines "person" as including
one (1) or more individuals, labor
organizations, joint apprenticeship
committees, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts,
unincorporated organizations, trustees,
trustees in bankruptcy, fiduciaries,
receivers, or other legal or commercial
entity; the state, any of its political or
civil subdivisions or agencies.
Finally, KRS 344.450 provides that
[a]ny person injured by any act in violation
of the provisions of this chapter shall have
a civil cause of action in Circuit Court to
enjoin further violations, and to recover the
actual damages sustained, together with the
costs of the law suit. The court's order or
judgment shall include a reasonable fee for
the plaintiff's attorney of record and any
other remedies contained in this chapter.
FOL is an employer under these provisions and Barnhart
is an employee.
By referring to any person injured by an
employer's unlawful act, KRS 344.450 would appear to encompass
Barnhart's claim despite his residence and employment outside
Kentucky.
FOL contends, however, that the broadly stated cause
of action created by the statutory sections quoted above is
limited by the chapter's purpose section, KRS 344.020, which
provides in part as follows (emphasis added):
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(1) The general purposes of this chapter are:
(a) To provide for execution within the
state of the policies embodied in the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
amended (78 Stat. 241), Title VIII of the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1968 (82
Stat. 81), the Fair Housing Act as
amended (42 U.S.C. 360), the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(81 Stat. 602), the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-336),
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as
amended (P.L. 102-166, amended by P.L.
102-392);
(b) To safeguard all individuals within
the state from discrimination because of
familial status, race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age forty (40) and
over, or because of the person's status
as a qualified individual with a
disability as defined in KRS 344.010 and
KRS 344.030; thereby to protect their
interest in personal dignity and freedom
from humiliation, to make available to
the state their full productive
capacities, to secure the state against
domestic strife and unrest which would
menace its democratic institutions, to
preserve the public safety, health, and
general welfare, and to further the
interest, rights, and privileges of
individuals within the state; . . .
By reiterating in this way its desire to protect "individuals
within the state" from invidious discrimination, the General
Assembly, FOL maintains, intended to exclude nonresidents such as
Barnhart from like protection.
contention.
The trial court rejected this
This Court reviews a trial court's statutory
interpretations de novo.
Keeton v. City of Ashland, Ky. App.,
883 S.W.2d 894 (1994).
-10-
The fundamental aim of statutory construction is to
determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.
Courts
attempt to do this by relying as much as possible on the plain
meaning of the legislative language, by reconciling and
harmonizing related statutory provisions, and by "considering the
evil the law was intended to remedy."
Beach v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 927 S.W.2d 826, 828 (1996); Mitchell v. Kentucky Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins., Ky., 927 S.W.2d 343 (1996).
Generally, courts are not
to read exceptions into the positive, unqualified terms of a
statute.
Comm. ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 610
(1992).
Nor are courts to infer exclusions from mere assertions,
according to the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"
unless the legislature's intent to exclude whatever is not
asserted is clear:
"This maxim properly applies only when in the
natural association of ideas in the mind of
the reader that which is expressed is so set
over by way of strong contrast to that which
is omitted that the contrast enforces the
affirmative inference that that which is
omitted must be intended to have opposite and
contrary treatment."
Wade v. Commonwealth, Ky., 303 S.W.2d 905, 907 (1957) (quoting
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S. Ct. 531, 537, 71 L.
Ed. 793 (1927).
Applying these principles to the sections of KRS
Chapter 344 set out above, we recognize a primary intention by
the General Assembly to make Kentucky a full participant in the
national effort both to remedy instances of invidious
-11-
discrimination and to deter them.
Co., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992).
Meyers v. Chapman Printing
To address anti-discrimination
legislation principally to "individuals within the state"
reflects, we believe, merely the ordinary purview of the General
Assembly and does not imply that Kentucky's courts are closed to
nonresidents unlawfully discriminated against by Kentucky
employers.
Such an implication is not strongly suggested by the
quoted phrase when read in context, and had such a preclusion of
nonresidents’ claims been intended, the General Assembly could
easily have stated that intent directly.
The most obvious means
of achieving that end would be a restrictive definition of
“employee” or “person” or use of substantive limiting language in
KRS 344.450.
options.
Our General Assembly chose none of these obvious
Furthermore, not only would the limitation urged by FOL
conflict with the inclusive "any person" of KRS 344.450, but it
would also tend to undermine the stated aim of furthering
national cooperation in this area of the law.
The United States Supreme Court has frequently noted
that the overriding purpose of the civil rights laws is "to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of
discrimination."
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S.
352, 115 S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852, 861 (1995) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
In McKennon, a case
construing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
discussing other of the civil rights acts, the Court explained
that
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Congress designed the remedial measures in
these statutes to serve as a spur or catalyst
to cause employers to self-examine and to
self-evaluate their employment practices
. . . Deterrence is one object of these
statutes. Compensation for injuries caused
by the prohibited discrimination is another
. . . . The private litigant who seeks
redress for his or her injuries vindicates
both the deterrence and the compensation
objectives . . .
513 U.S. at 358, 115 S. Ct. at 884, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 861
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
FOL's reading
of KRS Chapter 344 ignores the important deterrent our civil
rights act is meant to provide.
Interstate cooperation in the
national effort to eradicate invidious discrimination is hindered
if the Commonwealth turns a blind eye to the unlawful acts of
Kentucky employers against employees who are residents of other
states.
See Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 864 P.2d 937 (Wash.
1994) (upholding California resident/employee's right to bring
age discrimination claim against Washington employer in
Washington).
Contrary to FOL’s assertions, this application of KRS
Chapter 344 does not violate the Commerce Clause or more general
principles of federalism by imposing Kentucky law and policy
beyond the boundaries of the Commonwealth.
Barnhart’s complaint
is that company officials in Bowling Green, Kentucky, made an
unlawful decision to terminate his employment because of his age.
Although that decision was implemented outside Kentucky, Kentucky
law applies to the decision making and so may extend to its
effects.
The fact that the alleged discrimination included
-13-
conduct in South Carolina does not render Kentucky's regulation
of the corporate decision makers violative of the Commerce
Clause.
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air
Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 83 S. Ct. 1022, 10 L. Ed. 2d 84
(1963).
As for the federalism concerns addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
supra, they simply are not present here.
In that case, the
purchaser of a new vehicle which had been slightly damaged and
repainted without any disclosure received $4,000 in compensatory
damages and $4 million in punitive damages.
In setting aside the
punitive damage award as excessive, the Supreme Court held that
Alabama was infringing on the policy choices of other states when
it allowed a damage award “to punish BMW for conduct that was
lawful where it occurred and had no impact on Alabama or its
residents.
Nor may Alabama impose sanctions on BMW in order to
deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions.”
517 U.S.
at 573, 116 S. Ct. at 1597-98, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 825.
Here, FOL’s
conduct has impact on Kentucky, its home state, and there is no
plausible argument that age discrimination is lawful in South
Carolina.2
The "federalism" question, moreover, as to which
2
Nor is FOL's reliance on Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 111 S. Ct.
1227, 113 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1991), well-founded, for in that case
the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 did not apply to U.S. employers operating outside the United
States. The Court relied on the language of the statute, applied
the strong presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States statutes, and avoided difficult international law
(continued...)
-14-
state's law and policy is more seriously implicated by Barnhart's
allegations, is properly addressed as a choice of law problem,
not one of jurisdiction.
supra.
See Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co.,
FOL did not preserve the choice of law issue and cannot
raise it indirectly under a jurisdictional guise.
Finally, we note that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution restricts
the power of the states to withdraw their courts' jurisdiction
from the claims of nonresidents.
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
518, 98 S. Ct. 2482, 57 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1978); Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. 832 (1947).
The construction of KRS 344.020 which FOL urges would thus raise
significant doubts as to the constitutionality of the statutory
provisions at issue.
Courts, however, must strive to interpret
statutes so as to preserve their validity.
Halsell, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 552 (1996).
Commonwealth v.
As KRS 344.020 does not
clearly forbid Barnhart's claim, "comity would seem to require
that [it] be entertained."
Bertram v. Jones, 205 Ky. 691, 266
S.W. 385, 387 (1924) (invoking the federal Privileges and
Immunities Clause in recognizing the right of an Ohio creditor to
sue Kentucky administrator of Indiana decedent’s estate in
Kentucky.)
Denial of a Directed Verdict
2
(...continued)
questions in so construing the statute.
-15-
FOL next contends that the trial court erred by denying
its motions for a directed verdict.
It maintains that Barnhart
failed to prove the elements of a prima facie case, failed to
rebut FOL's explanation of the discharge, and failed, ultimately,
to prove facts from which age discrimination could reasonably be
inferred.
We review the trial court's rulings on motions for a
directed verdict deferentially, ascribing to the evidence "all
reasonable inferences and deductions which support the claim of
the prevailing party."
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc.,
Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814, 821 (1992).
We may reverse the trial
court's decision and the jury verdict only if it appears that
"the verdict rendered is palpably or flagrantly against the
evidence so as to indicate that it was reached as a result of
passion or prejudice."
Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Company,
Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459, 462 (1990).
KRS Chapter 344 incorporates federal antidiscrimination policies and, accordingly, federal case law in
this area has provided our courts with guidance.
In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.
2d 668 (1973), the Supreme Court established a procedure for the
presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases
which our courts have adopted and which the circuit court
followed in this case.
Under the McDonnell Douglas procedure, a
discharged or otherwise injured employee alleging age
discrimination must first establish a prima facie case.
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The concept of a "prima facie" case is . . .
intended to measure how much the plaintiff
must show before the employer will be forced
to assume the burden of an active defense.
Since information concerning the employer's
motivation is normally not readily available
to the employee, this threshold requirement
is not a stringent one.
All that the plaintiff must show is that he
(1) belongs to the protected class, (2) was
qualified for the position involved, and (3)
was discharged or denied employment under
circumstances that provide some basis for
believing that the prohibited intent was
present.
Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 347 (3rd. Cir
1990).
If the employee establishes this prima facie case, a
rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden
of production shifts to the employer who must show that it took
the adverse action for a non-discriminatory reason.
Finally, if
the presumption of discrimination is thus rebutted, the employee
has an opportunity to counter the employer's explanation by
offering proof that the explanation is a pretext disguising the
real, discriminatory, intent.
Although the burden of production
shifts during this procedure from one party to the other, the
burden of persuasion is always on the employee.
Harker v.
Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226 (1984).
look first, then, at Barnhart's prima facie case.
We
FOL concedes that Barnhart is in the protected class
and was demoted and discharged.
Furthermore, it does not
seriously dispute that Barnhart's long record of employment in
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the position from which he was demoted is at least prima facie
proof of satisfactory job performance.
It insists, however,
that, because Barnhart's position of Vice President of Elastic
Technology was discontinued, he was not replaced by anyone,
younger or otherwise, and thus did not establish the last element
of his prima facie case because the circumstances of his
discharge do not suggest discriminatory intent.
We disagree.
A recent Supreme Court decision, O'Connor v. Consol.
Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S. Ct. 1307, 134 L. Ed. 2d
433 (1996), cautions courts against too mechanical or too
formalistic an application of the McDonnell Douglas procedure.
In particular it emphasizes that, rather than proof of
irrelevant, hyper-technical details, "the prima facie case
requires 'evidence adequate to create an inference that an
employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory
criterion . . . .'"
517 U.S. at 312, 116 S. Ct. at 1310, 134 L.
Ed. 2d at 439 (emphasis and bracketed material in original;
citation omitted).
Moreover, "[w]here the employer alleges that
the discharged employee's position has been eliminated and that
the employee is therefore not replaced, the plaintiff 'need only
show that he was laid off from a job for which he was qualified
while other workers not in the protected class3 were retained.'"
3
Consol. Coin Caterers, supra, held that the worker or
workers who allegedly replaced the plaintiff need not have been
outside the protected class, but need only have been sufficiently
younger than the plaintiff to raise a reasonable inference of
discrimination.
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Ryder v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 879 F. Supp. 534, 536
(W.D. Penn. 1995) (citing Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901
F.2d 335, 342 (3rd Cir. 1990)).
FOL's argument seems to us overly formalistic.
Although it may be true that no one succeeded to Barnhart's
former title, Barnhart showed that his responsibilities were
divided principally between Willie Turner, the new Vice President
over the Jay Products plant, and Ward Hall, the new plant
manager.
Hall assumed the lion's share of Barnhart's job; at the
time he was 47 years old, approximately seven years Barnhart's
junior.
These circumstances do not give rise to a strong
inference of age discrimination.
Nevertheless, under our
standard of review, we cannot say the circuit court clearly erred
by ruling that Barnhart established his prima facie case and by
requiring FOL to proceed with an explanation of its decisions to
demote and discharge him.
FOL claims that it demoted Barnhart only after his new
supervisor, Morse, received numerous complaints from Barnhart's
employees.
Morse testified that he visited Jay Products and
confirmed that these complaints came not from a small number of
discontented workers but from many workers representing most of
the plant's departments.
These concerns were confirmed, the
company claimed, by the Carolina Consultant's survey, which
indicated widespread employee morale problems.
Company officials
also testified that they had been dissatisfied with inaccuracies
in Barnhart's recent budgets.
Morse testified that he demoted
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Barnhart because of these job deficiencies and that Barnhart was
discharged when the company later decided not to open a second
elastic manufacturing plant and thus had no position Barnhart
might fill.
At this stage of the McDonnell Douglas procedure
Barnhart was obliged to produce specific evidence showing that
the company's explanation was a pretext.
230.
Harker, 679 S.W.2d at
He countered by denying that there had been a serious
morale problem at his plant and citing the plant's consistently
good safety, attendance, and turn-over records.
He identified a
small number of individuals with axes to grind who, he said,
complained repeatedly.
He noted that equipment changes and air-
conditioning problems during this period had disrupted the
plant's routine and worried some of the workers.
He testified
that he had responded promptly to all of Morse's instructions and
suggestions, including the suggestion to dismiss the two
supervisors whose romance had interfered with their jobs.
He
testified and introduced other testimony, including expert
testimony, to the effect that two opinion surveys at Jay Products
prior to the Carolina Consultant's survey had failed to indicate
any serious problems, that such surveys were inappropriate
responses to the company's alleged concerns, that FOL had
suppressed the prior results, and that the consultant's survey
had been biased against him (Barnhart) and his staff.
Finally,
he testified and elicited testimony on cross-examination tending
to show that executive managers were more involved in the
-20-
budgeting process than the company's evidence suggested, that he
had anticipated higher costs at the plant and had requested a
suitable budget, but had been refused, and that the next year his
successor had been granted a budget in line with the budget
Barnhart had requested.
Circumstantial as it is, we believe Barnhart's evidence
adequately supports an inference of “invidious intent behind
[his] termination.”
See
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals
Co., 29 F.3d. 1078, 1081-1084 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing the
ways in which pretext may be shown).
Barnhart's evidence can
reasonably be thought to show that the proffered reasons for his
demotion and discharge were not the real reasons, but were either
arrived at after the fact or were contrived to justify a predetermined decision.
A harder question is whether Barnhart satisfied his
burden of proving that he was demoted and discharged because of
his age.
Relying on Harker, supra, FOL maintains that Barnhart
was obliged to produce "cold hard facts" showing discriminatory
intent and suggests that these must be facts directly showing the
employer's age-related animus.
Since Barnhart produced no such
evidence, FOL insists it was entitled to a directed verdict.
We agree that Barnhart was obliged to produce specific
evidence that age discrimination was a determining factor in his
demotion and discharge.
supra.
Manzer, supra.
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers,
Discrimination cases should not become
"disputes over job performance" or "provide a vehicle for
-21-
judicial review of business decisions regarding terminations."
Harker, 679 S.W.2d at 231.
We do not agree, however, that
circumstantial evidence cannot suffice to establish
discrimination or that Harker supports that proposition.
On the
contrary, direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent
will seldom be available.
U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403
(1983).
What is required is "hard proof creating an inference
[that] age discrimination was a determining factor in [the]
discharge."
Harker, 679 S.W.2d at 231(emphasis added).
The evidence clearly established that Barnhart was
discharged in conjunction with other management changes at FOL,
that the alleged dissatisfaction with his performance focused on
employee complaints to corporate headquarters, a factor Barnhart
could not control, and that he was afforded little warning of so
drastic a change in his status, not even a general performance
review.
The evidence of three surveys (with the results of the
first two no longer available) permits an inference that FOL
sought not to identify problems, as it claimed, but to obtain
justification for a decision it had already reached.
Most of
Barnhart's responsibilities were assumed by Ward Hall who is
seven years younger than Barnhart.
Finally, Barnhart’s request
to be assigned to a new position at less pay was rejected without
serious consideration.
This is a close case.
There was no evidence of a
general company policy to dismiss managers simply because of age,
-22-
and, although Barnhart testified that under Morse several younger
managers were promoted or brought into the company, the specific
reorganization in which Barnhart was caught up does not seem
generally to have been age directed.
We believe, nevertheless,
that it was not unreasonable to infer from the scenario described
above that Barnhart's demotion and dismissal were not because of
his inability to perform his job and not primarily for any other
legitimate reason, but were arbitrary, carried out in order to
make room for a younger person.
The circuit court did not err,
therefore, by denying FOL's motions for a directed verdict.
Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Employees’ Comments
FOL also contends that the trial was rendered unfair by
the circuit court's erroneous ruling that two of its witnesses,
Morse and Chip Long of Carolina Consultants, could not repeat
employee comments they had heard at Jay Products which were
critical of Barnhart, including allegations that workers had been
threatened with reprisals if they complained to corporate
headquarters.
FOL also contends that Long should have been
allowed to introduce some 57 typed, single-spaced pages of
negative survey responses allegedly transcribed from the
employees' handwritten originals.
The trial court, sustaining
Barnhart’s hearsay objections, seems to have accepted the hearsay
characterization and to have viewed the evidence as cumulative,
somewhat extraneous and apt to arouse the jury's passions and
biases.
-23-
As FOL points out, the rule against hearsay evidence
excludes only out-of-court assertions offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.
KRE 801.
One non-hearsay use of such
out-of-court assertions is to prove the hearer's state of mind.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.05 (3rd ed. 1993).
FOL contends that the employee comment evidence excluded by the
trial court was offered to prove, not the truth or accuracy of
the employees’ remarks, but the state of mind of Morse and other
FOL officers when they decided to demote and then to discharge
Barnhart.
Because these individuals’ state of mind, their
intent, was the central issue in this case, we agree with FOL
that in these circumstances the employee comment evidence was not
hearsay.
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814,
823 (1992); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Evans, 170 Ky. 536,
186 S.W. 173 (1906).
Nevertheless, KRE 403 permits the trial court to
exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
consideration of undue delay, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
Although the trial court erroneously
deemed this evidence hearsay, it also believed it to be
cumulative and unduly prejudicial and expressed concern that the
lengthy 57-page transcript would make the jury's deliberations
needlessly complicated and time consuming.
-24-
Our review of these
rulings is deferential.
Hall v. Transit Authority, Ky. App., 883
S.W.2d 884 (1994).
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its
discretion.
Morse and Long testified to wide-spread employee
dissatisfaction with Barnhart.
Morse recounted complaints
regarding a romance between two supervisors and Long testified
that the survey results reflected the worst overall employee
attitudes toward management he had ever seen.
Long also
presented survey results challenging Barnhart's claim that a
malfunctioning air conditioner and new, intimidating equipment
were significant factors in the discontent.
The introduction
into evidence of employee comments criticizing Barnhart would not
have added much to the substance of FOL's case, but would have
posed a serious risk of unfairly prejudicing Barnhart.
Critical
comments, for example, or exaggerated descriptions of work-place
abuses would doubtless impress the jury, and Barnhart's ability
to respond to such evidence would have been severely limited due
to his inability to question the employees.
The trial court,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion under KRE 403 by
excluding this evidence.
The Liability Instruction
Next, FOL contends that the trial court misinstructed
the jury by improperly framing the liability issue.
-25-
The
challenged instruction charged the jury as follows:
"Are you
satisfied from the evidence that Joel O. Barnhart was discharged
by Union Underwear Company because of his age."
FOL had
tendered, as an alternative instruction, special interrogatories
requiring the jury to decide whether Barnhart had established a
prima facie case and, if so, whether he had then proved that the
company's stated reasons for the demotion and discharge were
pretexts.
Its objection to the court's instruction reiterated
this idea that the instruction was not sufficiently detailed.
On
appeal, however, FOL asserts that the court’s "because of age"
instruction understates Barnhart's burden of proof.
FOL
maintains that Barnhart had to prove that age was "a substantial
and motivating factor but for which [he] would not have been
discharged."
See First Property Management v. Zarebidaki, Ky.,
867 S.W.2d 185, 188 (1993) (urging use of this formulation
instead of the phrase "because of").
Although we agree with FOL that under Zarebidaki the
court's phrasing of Barnhart's burden of proof may be said to
have been erroneous, we do not believe that FOL preserved this
objection.
FOL’s proposed liability instructions described the
four basic elements of a prima facie case and specifically
employed the “because of his age” language.
At no point did FOL
proffer the “substantial and motivating factor” instruction now
urged on appeal.
Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d at 187.
Nor do we
believe that the error was so palpably prejudicial as to justify
-26-
relief absent preservation.
See Zarebidaki (upholding judgment
despite criticism of the "because of" instruction).
Otherwise, FOL's requested interrogatories were
properly rejected under Kentucky's "bare bones" approach to jury
instructions.
That approach requires the trial court, in its
directed verdict rulings, to assess the effect of evidentiary
presumptions and to decide whether burdens of production have
been met.
If so, the jury is asked to decide only ultimate
questions of liability after the parties have had an opportunity
in their closing arguments to explain the legal bases for the
decision.
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., supra, 840
S.W.2d at 824.
Here the court's instruction together with the
parties' closing arguments adequately informed the jury that FOL
should not be found liable unless Barnhart's age had been a
decisive factor in the decisions to demote and discharge him.
Barnhart’s Counsel’s Improprieties During Closing Argument
Finally, FOL contends that the jury's liability
determination was tainted by Barnhart's counsel's two
improprieties during closing argument.
Counsel's reference to
FOL's growth in foreign countries, the company insists, was an
improper appeal to the jury's anger and fear that jobs had been
or might be moved from their community.
Additionally, counsel's
reading from a deposition that had not been introduced into
-27-
evidence breached his duty to confine his remarks to the evidence
properly of record.
Counsel remarked about FOL's foreign expansion while
arguing that Barnhart's post-demotion assignment to study the
feasibility of a second elastic manufacturing facility in
Louisiana had been pretextual.
FOL could not have been sincere,
he suggested, because most of its recent expansion had been
outside the United States.
Because there had been no evidence to
support this assertion, FOL maintains, counsel's remark was
improper and was unduly prejudicial.
However, FOL did not object
to this comment at the time it was made.
Because the trial court
was not given an opportunity to rule, and because the alleged
misconduct was not so egregious as to implicate the trial court
in a palpable error, this issue is not subject to our review.
CR
59.06; Triplett v. Napier, Ky., 286 S.W.2d 87 (1955); Betzing v.
Wynn, Ky., 248 S.W.2d 727 (1952).
FOL did object to counsel's reading during closing
argument from Barnhart's unintroduced deposition, and we agree
that the alleged misconduct is not to be lightly disregarded.
In
Smith v. McMillan, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 172 (1992), our Supreme Court
reiterated the rule that
"[W]hen counsel deliberately go outside the
record in the jury argument and make
statements, directly or inferentially, which
are calculated to improperly influence the
jury, this court will reverse the judgment
. . . ."
-28-
841 S.W.2d at 175 (quoting from Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Gregory,
284 Ky. 297, 144 S.W.2d 519 (1940)).
Therefore, we consider in
some detail the circumstances giving rise to this issue.
In the course of his testimony, Barnhart claimed that
when Turner gave him the news that he had been terminated, he,
Barnhart, had asked what effect the termination would have on his
retirement benefits, and in particular had asked whether he might
not be given some other position within the company so that he
would have a chance to continue working until age 62 when he
could receive his retirement as a lump sum.
Counsel for FOL
challenged this testimony by asking Barnhart whether he had not
described the conversation with Turner differently at his
deposition.
Counsel for FOL asserted that in his deposition
Barnhart had made no mention of wanting to stay with the company
for the sake of his retirement.
Barnhart replied that he could
not remember exactly what he had said at his deposition and asked
to see a transcript.
Counsel thereupon asked Barnhart if instead
he would take counsel's word for it that the deposition was
different.
Barnhart's counsel did not object to this
questioning, nor on reexamination did he seek to introduce the
transcript of Barnhart's deposition testimony.
During closing
argument, however, Barnhart's counsel referred to Barnhart's
testimony concerning the conversation with Turner and, in a
belated attempt to set the record straight, read a similar
account of that conversation from Barnhart's deposition.
-29-
FOL
promptly objected to the use of the deposition because it was not
in evidence, but the trial court overruled the objection.
As noted above, and as Barnhart's counsel surely knows,
it is improper during closing argument to go outside the record.
Counsel's reading from Barnhart's not-of-record deposition was a
flagrant violation of that rule.
As our highest Court has
observed, however,
[g]ranted that an argument was improper, the
difficult question nearly always is whether
the probability of real prejudice from it is
sufficient to warrant a reversal, and in this
respect each case must be judged on its
unique facts. An isolated instance of
improper argument, for example, will seldom
be found prejudicial. . . . But when it is
repeated and reiterated . . . its deadly
effect cannot be ignored.
Stanley v. Ellegood, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 572, 575 (1964).
As bad as it may have been, we are not persuaded that
counsel's breach was so egregious, nor are we persuaded that the
likelihood of undue prejudice flowing from the breach is great
enough, to warrant a reversal.
In Stanley, supra, and in the
other cases relied upon by FOL, counsel either referred in
closing argument to matters which had been expressly excluded
from evidence, or persisted in making an improper reference after
having been advised by the court of the impropriety.
these situations is before us.
Neither of
As the trial court noted,
moreover, aside from its refutation of the assertion during trial
of FOL's counsel, the passage read from Barnhart's deposition
merely repeated evidence that had been properly introduced.
-30-
We
are not unmindful that the refutation of FOL's counsel is apt to
have had a certain prejudicial effect, but this was an isolated
instance in the middle of a fairly long closing argument.
Whatever the prejudicial effect, it is not apt to have been more
than minimal.
The After-Acquired Evidence Affirmative Defense
Next, FOL maintains, the trial court erroneously
precluded it from presenting an affirmative defense to much of
Barnhart's claim for damages.
FOL alleges that immediately
following his termination Barnhart removed from his office a
large box filled with sensitive company documents.
Only through
discovery for this litigation did the company become aware of his
alleged theft, but since it legitimately could have and allegedly
would have discharged Barnhart for this misconduct, it contends
that Barnhart is not entitled to any damages stemming from his
dismissal beyond the time his misconduct came to light.
Prior to
trial FOL apprised the court that it intended to raise this so
called "after-acquired evidence" defense, and sought guidance as
to when the pertinent evidence might best be introduced.
The
trial court, apparently unfamiliar with this defense, declined
FOL's suggestion to bifurcate the trial and indicated that it
would not exclude theft-related evidence from the liability
proceedings.
Somewhat inconsistently, however, the trial court
then deferred a more definitive ruling on the matter until
-31-
liability should be found and the potential issue with respect to
damages should become actual.
During the trial, both sides elicited testimony about
the allegedly stolen documents.
FOL emphasized its ownership of
the records and attempted to characterize them as potentially
valuable to its competitors.
Barnhart, on the other hand, down-
played the documents' significance and maintained that he had
taken them inadvertently following the company's demand that he
clear his office.
Exactly how this evidence related to
Barnhart's claim could not possibly have been clear to the jury.
Nevertheless, FOL did not seek an instruction presenting its
defense, which would have enabled it to explain this evidence.
Instead, presumably relying on the court's pre-trial ruling that
its defense would be addressed only following a verdict on
liability, it sought to preserve the issue by requesting an
instruction requiring the jury to specify which of Barnhart's
damages, if any, represented his injuries prior to the discovery
of his theft and which those after the discovery.
The trial
court refused to give such an instruction and thereby, FOL
contends, effectively and erroneously eliminated FOL's defense
from the case.
For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
As it has been developed by judicial decisions, the
after-acquired evidence doctrine
allows an employer to be relieved of
liability in a wrongful discharge lawsuit
where it is discovered, normally during
litigation, that the employee was guilty of
pre-discharge misconduct sufficient for
-32-
termination that the employer was unaware of
and was not relying upon for discharge. . . .
The after-acquired evidence doctrine has its
foundation in the logic that an employee
cannot complain about being wrongfully
discharged because the individual is no worse
off than he or she would have been had the
truth of his or her misconduct been presented
at the outset.
Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, Inc., 921
P.2d 224, 226 (Kan. 1996) (citations omitted).
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., supra, 513
U.S. 352, 115 S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the applicability of this doctrine to
discriminatory discharge claims brought pursuant to the Age
Discrimination In Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
Cristine McKennon, a 62 year-old woman who had worked for a
publishing company for 30 years, was discharged from her job in
what the company termed a work-force reduction plan.
sued, claiming age discrimination.
McKennon
In the course of discovery,
the company learned that prior to her discharge McKennon had
learned of the company's plan and to "protect" herself had
"copied several confidential documents bearing upon the company's
financial condition."
Ed. 2d at 859.
513 U.S. at 355, 115 S. Ct. at 883, 130 L.
Armed with this information, the company invoked
the after-acquired evidence doctrine and successfully moved for
summary judgment.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
but the Supreme Court reversed.
Emphasizing the important
national objectives embodied in the anti-discrimination laws, the
Court observed that full application of the after-acquired
-33-
evidence doctrine would be apt to undermine those objectives and
thus would run counter to Congress's anti-discrimination policy.
Accordingly, the Court held that after-acquired evidence of an
employee's misconduct could not shield an employer from liability
for violation of the civil rights laws.
On the other hand,
[t]hat does not mean . . . the employee's own
misconduct is irrelevant to all the remedies
otherwise available under the statute [the
ADEA]. . . . The ADEA, like Title VII, is not
a general regulation of the workplace but a
law which prohibits discrimination. The
statute does not constrain employers from
exercising significant other prerogatives and
discretions in the course of the hiring,
promoting, and discharging of their
employees. . . . In determining appropriate
remedial action, the employee's wrongdoing
becomes relevant not to punish the employee,
or out of concern "for the relative moral
worth of the parties," . . . but to take due
account of the lawful prerogatives of the
employer in the usual course of its business
and the corresponding equities that it has
arising from the employee's wrongdoing. . . .
We . . . conclude that here, and as a general
rule in cases of this type, neither
reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate
remedy. It would be both inequitable and
pointless to order the reinstatement of
someone the employer would have terminated,
and will terminate, in any event and upon
lawful grounds.
The proper measure of backpay presents a
more difficult problem. . . . Once an
employer learns about employee wrongdoing
that would lead to a legitimate discharge, we
cannot require the employer to ignore the
information, even if it is acquired during
the course of discovery in a suit against the
employer and even if the information might
have gone undiscovered absent the suit. The
beginning point in the trial court's
formulation of a remedy should be calculation
of backpay from the date of the unlawful
discharge to the date the new information was
-34-
discovered. In determining the appropriate
order for relief, the court can consider
taking into further account extraordinary
equitable circumstances that effect the
legitimate interests of either party. An
absolute rule barring any recovery of
backpay, however, would undermine the ADEA's
objective of forcing employers to consider
and examine their motivations, and of
penalizing them for employment decisions that
spring from age discrimination.
513 U.S. at 360-62, 115 S. Ct. at 886, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 863-64
(citations omitted).
In Toyota Motor v. Epperson, Ky., 945
S.W.2d 413, 416 (1996), our Supreme Court acknowledged McKennon
and recognized a similarly limited application of the afteracquired evidence doctrine to discrimination suits brought
pursuant to KRS Chapter 344.
The Court expressly referred
"counsel and the trial court to the McKennon case for guidance as
to the admission and use of the evidence in the determination of
damages and appropriate instructions."
Id.
Barnhart contends that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine should not apply in this case because the misconduct of
which FOL complains did not take place until after his
termination (albeit immediately thereafter).
At least two courts
have held that the limited after-acquired evidence defense
recognized in McKennon is not available in this situation.
In
Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F.Supp. 667
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court refused to allow the defense in a sex
discrimination case where, not long after her discharge, the
employee photo-copied some of the employer's personnel files,
including her own which she was entitled to in discovery in any
-35-
event.
The court understood McKennon as applying only to
misconduct that took place while the employment contract was in
effect.
Similarly, in Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention
Center, 905 F.Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa, 1995), a race and sex
discrimination case, the court excluded evidence of the
employee's marijuana use two weeks post-termination.
Finding
McKennon inapplicable in the circumstances presented, the court
said:
"The evidence here is 'after after-acquired' evidence of
misconduct, because it does not involve the discovery of
misconduct, either on or off the job, that occurred during Carr's
employment with the County."
905 F.Supp. at 627.4
Although the employer's interests, recognized in
McKennon, in maintaining control of its workforce and in
protecting its property arise before employment officially
begins5 and do not cease abruptly upon termination, we are
persuaded, in light of the cases just cited, that posttermination misconduct such as that alleged against Barnhart is
not appropriately addressed by a McKennon-type defense.
The
after-acquired evidence doctrine has developed exclusively in the
context of pre-termination misconduct and makes most sense in
4
See also Ryder v. Westinghouse Electrical Corp., 879
F.Supp. 534 (W.D. Penn. 1995), and Calhoun v. Ball Corporation,
866 F.Supp. 473 (D.Colo. 1994) (both expressing skepticism about
the applicability of the after-acquired evidence doctrine to
post-termination misconduct cases).
5
Job application or resume fraud is a common ground of
complaint in after-acquired evidence cases. Wallace v. Dunn
Const. Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995); Toyota Motor v.
Epperson, supra.
-36-
that context, where there has been employee wrongdoing unrelated
to the alleged discrimination which, if known earlier, would have
resulted in a legitimate termination.
Although we are unwilling
to extend McKennon (via Toyota Motor v. Epperson) to the
situation presented here, our rejection of this new application
of the after-acquired evidence defense should not be understood
as devaluing the employer’s interest in maintaining its workplace
nor as condoning the sort of employee misconduct alleged by FOL.
Rather than straining the after-acquired evidence doctrine to
include the sort of post-termination misconduct at issue here,
employers must look to tort and criminal law.
The employer’s
remedy, in appropriate cases, will be a civil action, a
counterclaim, or even criminal prosecution.6
See Calhoun v. Ball
Corporation, 866 F.Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1994) (noting that both
tort liability and criminal sanctions may attend an employee's
misappropriation of the employer's proprietary information).
This approach, we believe, will best further the General
Assembly's purpose of deterring discriminatory employment
practices while at the same time recognizing redress for
employers harmed by the wrongdoing of former employees.
We
conclude, accordingly, that the trial court did not err by
6
In light of the uncertainty in this area of the law at the
time of trial and the fact that FOL’s defense/counterclaim was
never addressed, we recognize that FOL may attempt to employ CR
8.03 and pursue its claim as a counterclaim, which was mistakenly
designated a defense, or attempt to pursue its claim in a
separate civil action. As the validity of such actions is not
before this Court, we offer no opinion as to their propriety.
-37-
refusing to instruct the jury on FOL's after-acquired evidence
defense.
-38-
Punitive Damages
FOL further contends that the trial court erred by
submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury.
It
bases its contention on KRS 411.184(2) which provides that
[a] plaintiff shall recover punitive damages
only upon proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the defendant from whom such
damages are sought acted toward the plaintiff
with oppression, fraud or malice.
FOL maintains that the evidence does not support a finding that
it acted toward Barnhart with oppression, fraud, or malice,7 and
7
At KRS 411.184(1) these terms are defined as follows:
(a) "Oppression" means conduct which is
specifically intended by the defendant to
subject the plaintiff to cruel and unjust
hardship.
(b) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of material fact known
to the defendant and made with the intention
of causing injury to the plaintiff.
(c) "Malice" means either conduct which is
specifically intended by the defendant to
cause tangible or intangible injury to the
plaintiff or conduct that is carried out by
the defendant both with a flagrant indifference
to the rights of the plaintiff and with a
subjective awareness that such conduct will
result in human death or bodily harm.
Our Supreme Court has recently declared KRS
411.184(1)(c) unconstitutional to the extent that it imposes a
standard of “subjective awareness” in the definition of “malice.”
Williams v. Wilson, ____ S.W.2d ____ (rendered 4/16/98). FOL’s
argument, however, and our analysis focus not on that aspect of
the statute, but on those portions of the definitions of
“oppression” and “malice” which limit the recovery of punitive
damages to cases wherein the defendant’s conduct may be
characterized as intentionally cruel and unjust or intentionally
injurious.
-39-
that the court erred by permitting the jury to consider the
matter.8
Punitive damages are those, "other than compensatory
and nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish and to
discourage him and others from similar conduct in the future."
KRS 411.184(1)(f).
The punishment and deterrence provided by
punitive damages is in addition to that provided by compensatory
damages and is limited, accordingly, to conduct which may be
deemed an egregious or aggravated breach of the plaintiff's
rights.
Ordinarily, such a breach will involve intentional
conduct that can be characterized as oppressive, fraudulent, or
malicious, but reckless conduct, too, may also give rise to
liability for punitive damages if the circumstances indicate an
abuse of power or outrageous disregard of a risk of bodily
injury.
Wittmer v. Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885 (1993); Horton v.
Union Light, Heat & Power Co., Ky., 690 S.W.2d 382 (1985).
Where
intent is an element of the plaintiff's cause of action, as it is
here, punitive damages need not be available unless the
defendant's conduct is exceptionally reprehensible,
Miller's
Bottled Gas, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 56 F.3d 726 (6th Cir.
1995), or unless the cause of action itself requires proof of
8
FOL does not challenge the availability of a punitive
damage award for a violation of KRS 344.040. We note that the
federal Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000,
expressly makes punitive damages available to remedy violations
of the federal anti-discrimination laws. Kentucky courts have
recognized the availability of punitive damages under KRS 336.130
which prohibits anti-union discrimination but does not expressly
provide for punitive damages. Simpson County Steeplechase Assn.
v. Roberts, Ky. App., 898 S.W.2d 523 (1995).
-40-
“bad faith sufficient to justify punitive damages.”
Jones, 864 S.W.2d at 890.
Wittmer v.
We believe the civil rights statute
provides a cause of action of this latter type.
As repeatedly
noted, our civil rights statute embodies a determined public
policy to abolish the most damaging expressions of invidious
discrimination.
Typically such discrimination involves a
specific intention9 to deprive the plaintiff of something
fundamental, such as housing, education, or, as in this case,
employment.
Proof of discrimination of this sort sufficiently
evidences "malice" and "oppression" to require that punitive
damages at least be considered.10
The trial court did not err by
submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury.
Attorney Fees
Finally, FOL contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding attorney fees to Barnhart's counsel
without permitting FOL to contest the amount of those fees at a
9
This is not to suggest that unlawful discrimination can
never be in good faith. The civil rights laws leave open the
possibility that discrimination will in some instances be
justified by legitimate employment (or educational etc.)
purposes. An employer who in good faith, but incorrectly, relies
on this narrow exception to the civil rights laws is likely not
to be subject to punitive damages. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993).
10
This, of course, does not mean that a punitive damage
award must be made. “The jury’s decision as to whether to award
punitive damages remains discretionary because the nature of
punitive damages is such that the decision is always a matter
within the jury’s discretion.” Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d at
890.
-41-
hearing and without making findings to account for the award.
We
believe that the better practice would have been to entertain
FOL’s objections at a hearing and to respond to them in an order
specifying the basis for the fee award.
However, these are
matters left to the trial court’s discretion.
Dingus v. FADA
Services Co., Inc., Ky. App., 856 S.W.2d 45 (1993).
The record
indicates that FOL’s written objections to the attorney fees
request adequately presented its concerns and further indicates
that Barnhart’s fee request was not clearly unreasonable.
We
cannot say, therefore, that the trial court abused its
discretion.
In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the
December 19, 1995, judgment of Warren Circuit Court and further
affirm the February 21, 1996, order awarding attorney fees to
Barnhart’s counsel.
ALL CONCUR.
-42-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Norman E. Harned
HARNED, BACHERT, & DENTON
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Zack N. Womack
DEEP & WOMACK
Henderson, Kentucky
-43-
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