DANIEL E. GARREN, Plaintiff, vs. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–0714
Filed November 7, 2008
DANIEL E. GARREN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY,
Defendant.
________________________________________________________________________
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Don C.
Nickerson, Judge.
Plaintiff challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a
final hearing at his annual review.
WRIT SUSTAINED, AND CASE
REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Steven L. Addington
and Michael H. Adams, Assistant Public Defenders, for plaintiff.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Linda J. Hines and Becky
Goettsch, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendant.
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PER CURIAM.
By petition for writ of certiorari, Daniel Garren, a civilly committed
sexual predator, challenges a district court judgment denying his request
for a final hearing to determine whether he is eligible for the transitional
release program. He claims the district court exceeded its jurisdiction
and acted illegally when it weighed conflicting expert opinions at his
annual review to determine he was not entitled to a final hearing. We
conclude the controlling statute does not require the committed person
prove at the annual review a likelihood of winning at his final hearing.
The statute governing annual reviews requires the committed person
show there is admissible evidence that could lead a fact finder to find
reasonable doubt on the issue of whether his mental abnormality has
changed. We therefore sustain the writ.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Garren was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under
the Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, Iowa Code chapter
229A in October 1999. In the ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, he was convicted of
various sexual offenses involving minor girls.
Prior to commitment,
Garren was diagnosed with pedophilia and antisocial personality
disorder, both which predispose him to commit future sexually violent
offenses.
Since his 1999 commitment, Garren has had seven annual
reviews, and in each one, the court has denied Garren’s request for a
final hearing. At his October 2006 annual review, the State submitted
evidence from two licensed psychologists who worked with Garren
stating, although Garren was making progress, he was not ready for
transitional release and remained more likely than not to commit
sexually violent offenses if not confined in a secure facility.
Garren
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submitted a report by Dr. Richard Wollert concluding Garren was ready
for transitional release and that his age (sixty-three) altered his mental
abnormality such that he is no longer a high risk for reoffending. The
district court weighed the evidence presented by both parties and
determined Garren had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence he
was entitled to a final hearing to determine whether he was eligible for a
transitional release program.
Garren filed an application for writ of
certiorari with this court, claiming the district court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it weighed evidence to determine he was not entitled to
a final hearing.
II. Scope of Review.
In a certiorari case, we review the district court’s action for
correction of errors at law. Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d
431, 434 (Iowa 2007).
We may examine “only the jurisdiction of the
district court and the legality of its actions.” Christensen v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998).
An “illegality exists when the
court’s factual findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the
court has not properly applied the law.”
Id.
We accept as true the
district court’s factual findings, if well supported. State Pub. Defender v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 644 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 2002).
III. Merits.
In Johnson v. Iowa District Court, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2008), we
interpreted Iowa Code section 229A.8 to require the committed person
show there is admissible evidence that could lead a fact finder to find
reasonable doubt on the issue of whether his mental abnormality has
changed. Johnson, ___ N.W.2d at ___. If the committed person meets
this standard at the annual review, he is entitled to a final hearing. Id.
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Iowa Code chapter 229A allows for the commitment of sexually
violent predators in order “to protect the public, to respect the needs of
the victims of sexually violent offenses, and to encourage full, meaningful
participation of sexually violent predators in treatment programs.” Iowa
Code § 229A.1 (2007). Under section 229A.8, the committed person is
entitled to an annual review in which he may request a final hearing to
determine whether he is eligible for release or transitional release. At an
annual review, the committed person bears the burden of proof to show
by a “preponderance of the evidence” there is “competent evidence which
would lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held.”
Id. § 229A.8(5). If the committed person meets this burden, he is entitled
to a final hearing. At the final hearing, the state bears the burden of
proof to show “beyond a reasonable doubt” the committed person’s
mental abnormality has not changed.1 Id. § 229A.8(6). The committed
person has no burden to prove anything at the final hearing. Id. If, at
the final hearing, the fact finder determines there is a reasonable doubt
as to whether the committed person still suffers from a mental
abnormality, the commitment ends. Id.
In determining whether the committed person is entitled to a final
hearing, the district court should apply the following standard:
if the
committed person presents competent2 evidence that could lead a fact
1The
final hearing on whether the committed person is eligible for transitional
release is different. Iowa Code § 229A.8A. The prerequisites for the transitional release
program include, among other things, that the committed person’s “mental abnormality
is no longer such that the person is a high risk to reoffend.” Id. § 229A.8A(2)(a).
2Competent
evidence means admissible evidence, not credible evidence. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004); see also State v. Decker, 744 N.W.2d 346,
356 (Iowa 2008).
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finder to find reasonable doubt on the issue of whether his mental
abnormality has changed such that he is unlikely to engage in sexually
violent offenses, then the committed person should be granted a final
hearing. Johnson, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Garren has met this standard by
submitting the report of Dr. Wollert.
Further, the district court applied the incorrect standard in
determining Garren was not entitled to a final hearing:
[T]he Court concludes that [Garren] has failed to show by a
preponderance of evidence that his mental abnormality has
so changed that he is either appropriate for transfer to a
transitional release program or that he is not likely to engage
in sexually predatory violent offenses if discharged.
(Emphasis added.)
The statute does not require that the committed
person demonstrate that his mental abnormality has changed, only that
the committed person present “competent evidence which would lead a
reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held.” Iowa Code
§ 229A.8(5)(e). We sustain the writ of certiorari and remand the case to
determine whether Garren is entitled to a final hearing under the
standard set forth in Johnson. See Johnson, ___ N.W.2d at ___.
IV. Conclusion.
We interpret the statute governing annual reviews to require the
committed person show there is admissible evidence that could lead a
fact finder to find reasonable doubt on the issue of whether his mental
abnormality has changed.
sustained.
The writ of certiorari to this court is
The district court acted illegally when it denied Garren’s
request for a final hearing.
WRIT SUSTAINED, AND CASE REMANDED.
This opinion shall not be published.
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