STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JOHNSON COUNTY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 56 / 07–0252
Filed June 13, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JOHNSON COUNTY,
Defendant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen
C. Gerard II, District Associate Judge.
The State of Iowa filed a petition for a writ of certiorari requesting
review of two orders by the juvenile court requiring the department of
human services to pay the cost for detaining a juvenile in a detention
center. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Bruce Kempkes, Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff.
No appearance for defendant.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
The issue we must decide is whether the juvenile court can require
the department of human services to pay the cost of detaining a juvenile
in a detention center while waiting for placement in a group care
residential treatment facility.
Because the juvenile court did not have
the statutory or inherent authority to do so, we sustain the writ of
certiorari, and annul the parts of the juvenile court orders requiring the
department to pay for the cost of detention.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The State filed a delinquency petition on November 28, 2006,
alleging a juvenile committed various criminal offenses. The court held a
hearing on the delinquency petition on January 11, 2007. During the
hearing the juvenile admitted to the charges.
The court placed the
juvenile in the custody of the department of human services for
placement in a group care residential treatment facility.1 Because there
was a waiting list for placement in such a facility, the juvenile was
detained at the Linn County Detention Center. The court also ordered
the department to pay any costs or expenses associated with the
juvenile’s continued placement in the detention center or other shelter
while awaiting placement in a group care residential treatment facility.
At the juvenile’s first seven-day detention review hearing on
January 18, the court heard testimony from a representative of the
department regarding the department’s group care residential treatment
waiting list, which operates on a first-come-first-served basis without
consideration of a particular child’s need for placement.
In its post-
hearing order the court found probable cause to believe the juvenile
1In its petition for writ of certiorari the State indicated the juvenile was appealing
the court’s custody order; however, this is not an issue on this petition.
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committed delinquent acts; thus, his detention was still warranted, and
there was substantial evidence to support the continued removal of the
juvenile from his home to avoid imminent risk to the child and for the
protection of the community.
The court also noted that ordering the
juvenile’s continued detention in the center was not in the child’s best
interest, but that the court was unable to exercise its discretion to
bypass the waiting list.
Additionally, the court found the department
was not asserting reasonable efforts to place the juvenile in a proper
treatment facility.
The court held another detention review hearing on January 25
during which it heard additional testimony regarding the waiting list.
During that hearing a representative of the department opined the
juvenile would likely be placed in a group care residential treatment
facility within thirty to ninety days of the hearing.
Again, the court
entered an order continuing the juvenile’s detention under the same
terms as its prior order.
On January 30 the court was notified the department was able to
place the juvenile in the residential treatment program at Woodward
Academy.
The court approved the placement and ordered custody to
remain with the department.
The department filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this court
challenging the juvenile court’s orders requiring the department to pay
any costs associated with the placement of the juvenile in the detention
center prior to his placement in a group residential treatment facility.
We granted the petition.
II. Issue.
The only issue we must decide is whether the juvenile court orders,
requiring the department to pay the delinquent child’s detention costs
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while awaiting placement in a group residential treatment facility, was
legal.
III. Scope of Review.
We have “constitutional powers to issue writs to, and exercise
supervisory and administrative control over, other judicial tribunals.”
State v. Davis, 493 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Iowa 1992). A writ of certiorari lies
where an inferior tribunal exceeds its proper jurisdiction or otherwise
acts illegally. Stream v. Gordy, 716 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Iowa 2006); see
also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401 (“A writ of certiorari shall only be granted
when specifically authorized by statute; or where an inferior tribunal,
board or officer, exercising judicial functions, is alleged to have exceeded
proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.”). We have found illegality
to exist “when the court’s ruling lacks ‘substantial evidentiary support or
when the court has not applied the proper rule of law.’ ” Bousman v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Allen v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 582 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Iowa 1998)).
Our scope of review for juvenile court proceedings is de novo. In re
D.L.C., 464 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Iowa 1991).
However, because “[r]elief
through certiorari proceedings is strictly limited to questions of
jurisdiction or illegality of the challenged acts,” our review is for
correction of errors at law. French v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 546 N.W.2d 911, 913
(Iowa 1996).
IV. Analysis.
It is the responsibility of the legislature to enact laws governing the
expenditure of state funds. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 857,
146 N.W.2d 626, 635 (1966).
The legislature has fulfilled this
responsibility in regard to funding for detention centers. See Iowa Code
§ 232.142. According to the Code:
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1. County boards of supervisors which singly or in
conjunction with one or more other counties provide and
maintain juvenile detention and juvenile shelter care homes
are subject to this section.
2. . . . Expenses for providing and maintaining a
multicounty home shall be paid by the counties participating
in a manner to be determined by the boards of supervisors.
3. A county or multicounty juvenile detention home
approved pursuant to this section shall receive financial aid
from the state in a manner approved by the director. Aid
paid by the state shall be at least ten percent and not more
than fifty percent of the total cost of the establishment,
improvements, operation, and maintenance of the home.
...
6. A juvenile detention home fund is created in the
state treasury under the authority of the department. The
fund shall consist of moneys deposited in the fund pursuant
to sections 321.218A and 321A.32A. The moneys in the
fund shall be used for the costs of the establishment,
improvement, operation, and maintenance of county or
multicounty juvenile detention homes in accordance with
annual appropriations made by the general assembly from the
fund for these purposes.
Iowa Code § 232.142(1), (2), (3), (6) (2007) (emphasis added).
Section
232.142 clearly places the responsibility for the costs of providing and
maintaining juvenile detention centers with the counties. The juvenile
court orders requiring the department to pay the cost of keeping the
juvenile in the detention center contradict the legislative mandate of
section 232.142.
Of course, when a court is acting within its jurisdiction it always
has the inherent authority to do what is reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice in a case before the court. Schwennen v. Abell,
471 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 1991).
However, the use of inherent
authority must be essential to the existence of the court and necessary to
the orderly and efficient exercise of the court’s jurisdiction.
Emke, 476 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa 1991).
Myers v.
The juvenile court orders
6
requiring the department to pay the cost of the juvenile’s detention were
neither essential to the existence of the court, nor were they necessary to
the orderly and efficient exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. See Grant v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 492 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 1992) (holding the district
court lacked inherent authority to order the plaintiffs in a civil action to
pay reasonable attorney fees and costs of the guardian ad litem
appointed to represent the incarcerated civil defendant).
Therefore, the juvenile court did not have the statutory or inherent
authority to order the department to pay the cost of the juvenile’s
detention.
V. Disposition.
We find the juvenile court acted illegally when it ordered the
department of human services to pay the cost of detaining a juvenile in
the juvenile detention center because it had no statutory or inherent
authority to do so.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari in this court is
sustained. We annul the parts of the juvenile court orders requiring the
department to pay for the cost of detention.
WRIT SUSTAINED.
All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.
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