MONIQUE RHODEN and CURT W. CANFIELD, on behalf of themselves and others Similarly Situated vs. THE CITY OF DAVENPORT, IOWA
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 52 / 07–0172
Filed August 29, 2008
MONIQUE RHODEN and CURT W. CANFIELD,
on behalf of themselves and others Similarly Situated,
Appellees,
vs.
THE CITY OF DAVENPORT, IOWA,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D.
McKenrick, Judge.
Decision of the district court granting summary judgment and
certifying the class action is reversed. REVERSED.
Craig A. Levien and Peter J. Thill of Betty, Neuman & McMahon,
P.L.C., Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas D. Waterman and Richard A. Davidson of Lane &
Waterman, LLP, Davenport, and Catherine Z. Cartee of Cartee & Clausen
Law Firm, P.C., Davenport, for appellees.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, plaintiffs brought a class action challenging the
validity
of
ordinance.
the
Davenport
Automated
Traffic
Enforcement
See Davenport Mun. Code § 10.16.070 (2005).
(ATE)
On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the
Davenport ATE ordinance was preempted by state traffic regulations and
therefore was invalid. The district court also held that the City was not
entitled to summary judgment on its claim that the individual plaintiffs
who paid the civil penalty voluntarily waived their right to recover against
the City. In a subsequent order, the district court certified the class and
ruled that plaintiffs who had paid the civil fine were entitled to recover
against the City.
We granted the City’s application for interlocutory
review.
In City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533 (2008), we
considered whether the Davenport ATE ordinance is impliedly preempted
by the same statutes cited by the plaintiffs in this case—Iowa Code
chapter 321 and sections 364.22(5)(b), 805.6, and 805.8A. In Seymour,
we held that the Davenport ATE ordinance was not preempted by the
cited state law.
Although the plaintiffs here characterize their
preemption analysis as one of express, not implied, preemption, this has
no effect on the outcome of this case.
Implied preemption analysis is
employed only where the legislature fails to expressly preempt local
action.
Nothing in either chapter 321 or sections 364.22(5)(b), 805.6,
and 805.8A expressly preempts municipalities from creating civil money
penalties for traffic infractions.
Thus the Davenport ATE ordinance is
not impliedly or expressly preempted by the cited state law.
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In addition to the claims raised in Seymour, the plaintiffs allege
that
the
Davenport
ATE
ordinance
is
preempted
because
it
is
inconsistent with Iowa Code sections 805.9, 805.12, 602.8106(1), and
364.22(6). Sections 805.9, 805.12, and 602.8106(1) concern the proper
procedure for collecting fines for criminal traffic violations.
This court
concluded in Seymour, however, that the Davenport ATE ordinance
provides for a civil violation that is parallel to and not preempted by the
criminal scheme outlined in Iowa Code chapter 321.
Any perceived
inconsistency with sections 805.9, 805.12, and 602.8106(1), therefore,
does not defeat the Davenport ATE ordinance.
Iowa Code section 364.22(6) concerns the proper procedure for
collecting civil penalties for municipal infractions. That section provides
in relevant part, “All penalties or forfeitures collected by the court for
municipal infractions shall be remitted to the city in the same manner as
fines and forfeitures are remitted for criminal violations under section
602.8106.” Iowa Code § 364.22(6) (emphasis added). Section 602.8106
requires fines to be collected by the clerk of court. Ninety percent of the
fine is thereafter remitted to the city which prosecuted the action. Id.
§ 364.22.
Plaintiffs contend that the Davenport ATE ordinance is
inconsistent with this requirement because it provides that civil fines
under the ordinance are payable to the City at the City’s finance
department. Davenport Mun. Code § 10.16.070(D)(1)–(2).
Assuming that section 364.22 applies to the Davenport ATE
ordinance, we nevertheless conclude that the two provisions are not
“irreconcilable.” City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa
1990). Section 364.22(6) provides that all civil penalties collected by the
court be payable to the clerk of court and then remitted to the city. The
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Davenport ATE ordinance, alternatively, requires only that payments for
unchallenged violations, which do not involve the court, be payable to
the City’s finance department. As a result, no conflict exists between the
two provisions and the Davenport ATE ordinance is not preempted by
section 364.22(6).
For the reasons expressed above and in Seymour, the district court
order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the ground that
the Davenport ATE ordinance is preempted by state traffic and
enforcement regulations is reversed. In light of this disposition, it is not
necessary to address the other issues raised in this appeal.
REVERSED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who dissents and Baker, J.,
who takes no part.
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#52/07–0172, Rhoden v. City of Davenport
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in City of Davenport
v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 545 (Iowa 2008) (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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