OFFICE OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE vs. IOWA UTILITIES BOARD vs. IOWA UTILITIES BOARD
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 143 / 06-0541
Filed February 15, 2008
OFFICE OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE,
Appellant,
vs.
IOWA UTILITIES BOARD,
Appellant.
------------------------------------------------------MCI WORLDCOM, INC.,
Appellee,
vs.
IOWA UTILITIES BOARD,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F.
Staskal, Judge.
The Office of Consumer Advocate and the Iowa Utilities Board
appeal an adverse judicial review decision. AFFIRMED.
John R. Perkins, Consumer Advocate, and Craig F. Graziano, Des
Moines, for appellant Office of Consumer Advocate.
David Lynch, General Counsel, and Mary F. Whitman, Assistant
General Counsel, Des Moines, for appellant Iowa Utilities Board.
Krista K. Tanner and Bret A. Dublinske of Dickinson, Mackaman,
Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
The Iowa Utilities Board (Board) interpreted Iowa Code section
476.103 (2003) and Iowa Administrative Code rule 199—22.23 (1999) to
require the verification of a change in telecommunications service and a
verification of the terms and conditions the customer consented to when
agreeing to the change. On judicial review, the district court reversed the
decision of the Board finding these provisions only required the carrier to
obtain the customer’s verification of a change in service, not a
verification of the terms and conditions of the change in service.
Because we agree with the district court’s interpretation of section
476.103 and rule 199—22.23, and because we find the Board’s
interpretation
of
rule
199—22.23
irrational,
illogical,
or
wholly
unjustifiable under Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(l), we affirm the
decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On November 16, 2002, a telemarketer contacted Dr. Syam Kilaru
on behalf of MCI Worldcom. According to Kilaru, the telemarketer told
him if he changed his telephone service to MCI he would receive an
international long distance rate of 37 cents per minute for calls to India
on any day of the week, at any time.
The telemarketer also informed
Kilaru he would receive one hour of free calling to India per month for
the first three months of MCI’s service and 200 minutes of domestic long
distance minutes for a monthly fee of $12.95.
Kilaru agreed to switch his telephone service to MCI.
The
telemarketer transferred Kilaru’s call to a third-party verification
company hired by MCI.
Kilaru verified that he agreed to transfer his
phone service to MCI. The verification call was recorded but the original
call describing the rates was not.
3
Five or six business days later, MCI sent Kilaru a welcome packet
explaining his rates. Kilaru did not review it. The welcome packet stated
the rate for calls to India was 49 cents per minute on weekdays and 42
cents per minute on weekends. The welcome packet made no mention of
the free calls to India. Kilaru first discovered he was being charged more
than what the telemarketer represented when he received his first bill.
On January 8, 2003, Kilaru filed an informal complaint with the
Board alleging MCI did not honor the rate it offered him to switch long
distance carriers. Kilaru alleged he switched long distance carriers from
AT&T Communications of the Midwest to MCI in response to MCI’s offer.
Pursuant to its rules, the Board forwarded Kilaru’s complaint to MCI on
January 10.
MCI responded, stating its records indicated Kilaru was to be billed
49 cents per minute for weekday calls to India and 42 cents per minute
on the weekends, and the sign-up bonus was a free month of domestic
long distance calling, not free international long distance.
MCI’s
response pointed Kilaru to the welcome packet, which indicated the 42
and 49 cent per minute rates. In its response MCI agreed to credit Kilaru
$219.27 for the first month of calls to India that were not billed in
accordance with the 37 cent per minute rate.
Future calls would be
billed at the higher rates.
On March 10 the Board issued a proposed resolution and
concluded MCI complied with the Board’s and the federal communication
commission’s
rules
by
using
a
third-party
verification
company.
Therefore, the Board found MCI obtained the required authorization to
switch Kilaru’s service and billed him the correct rate.
The Board
informed Kilaru that he could request a formal proceeding if he did not
agree with the proposed resolution.
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On March 24 the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) filed a
petition with the Board contesting the March 10 proposed resolution.
The OCA requested the Board impose civil penalties against MCI for
committing an unlawful slam in violation of Iowa Code section 476.103.
On July 14, 2004, a hearing was held before an administrative law
judge (ALJ), at which Kilaru and a representative from MCI testified. The
ALJ found Kilaru’s testimony credible and found MCI violated section
476.103 and rule 199—22.23.
As a remedy, the ALJ reasoned because there was no meeting of
the minds, there was no valid contract, and MCI should zero out Kilaru’s
account. However, the ALJ found because there was no evidence MCI
intended to mislead Kilaru, a penalty would have no deterrent effect and
would therefore be inappropriate.
Both the OCA and MCI appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board.
The Board affirmed the ALJ.
The OCA petitioned for judicial review,
challenging the Board’s determination that civil penalties should not be
awarded.
MCI filed a cross-appeal/motion to intervene.
The district
court treated MCI’s motion as a petition for judicial review.
The district court reversed the Board’s decision and dismissed the
OCA’s petition.
The Board and the OCA appeal the district court’s
decision.
II. Issue.
We must decide whether the verification provisions contained in
the statute and rules only require the verification of a change in carriers
or whether the statute and rules also require verification of the terms
and conditions of service.
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III. Discussion.
Rules
promulgated
by
an
agency
represent
the
agency’s
interpretation of the Iowa Code provisions the legislature gave it to
administer.
Iowa Ag Const. Co. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 723
N.W.2d 167, 173 (Iowa 2006); see also Iowa Code § 17A.3(1)(c) (requiring
an agency to adopt rules “embodying appropriate standards, principles,
and procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the law it
administers”). The legislature requires us to “give appropriate deference
to the view of the agency with respect to particular matters that have
been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa
Code § 17A.19(11)(c).
When the legislature has clearly vested the
interpretation of a law in the discretion of the agency, the court only
reverses the agency if its ruling is “[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or
wholly unjustifiable interpretation of a provision of law . . . .”
Id. §
17A.19(10)(l). However, when the legislature has not clearly vested the
interpretation of a law in the discretion of the agency, the court applies a
clearly erroneous standard. Id. § 17A.19(10)(c).
The
legislature’s
requirement
that
the
Board
“adopt
rules
prohibiting an unauthorized change in telecommunication service”
evidences a clear legislative intent to vest in the Board the interpretation
of the unauthorized-change-in-service provisions in section 476.103.
See, e.g., Thoms v. Iowa Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 715 N.W.2d 7, 11
(Iowa 2006) (holding section 97B.4, which provides IPERS with authority
to make rules and take other action “ ‘necessary for the administration of
the retirement system in conformity with the requirements of this
chapter,’ ” vested the interpretation of the statute in the agency’s
discretion (quoting Iowa Code § 97B.4(2)(a) (1995)); Auen v. Alcoholic
Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (holding section
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123.21, which grants the agency power to adopt rules “necessary to carry
out this chapter,” vested the interpretation of section 123.45 with the
agency). Therefore, we will only reverse the Board’s decision if it is based
upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable interpretation of
section 476.103.
Regardless of the standard of review the legislature requires courts
to use when reviewing agency action, the interpretation and final
construction of a statute, or an agency rule interpreting a statute, is an
issue for the courts to decide. Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Acad.,
452 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990). We have applied nearly identical rules
for the construction of statutes to the construction of administrative
rules. Id.
When a statute or rule is plain and its meaning is clear, the rules
of statutory construction do not permit courts to search for meaning
beyond its express terms. State v. Snyder, 634 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa
2001). Courts generally presume words contained in a statute or rule
are used in their ordinary and usual sense with the meaning commonly
attributed to them.
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax
Review, 302 N.W.2d 140, 142–43 (Iowa 1981).
Moreover, courts
construe a term according to its accepted usage when a statute does not
define it. Id. Courts only resort to rules of statutory construction when
the explicit terms of a statute or rule are ambiguous. City of Waukee v.
City Dev. Bd., 590 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Iowa 1999). A statute or rule is
ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the
meaning of the statute.
Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa
1996).
The legislature required the Board to “adopt rules prohibiting an
unauthorized change in telecommunication service.”
Iowa Code
7
§ 476.103(3). The legislature required the rules to “be consistent with
federal communications commission regulations regarding procedures
for verification of customer authorization of a change in service.” Id. The
legislature defined a “change in service” as:
the designation of a new provider of a telecommunications
service to a consumer, including the initial selection of a
service provider, and includes the addition or deletion of a
telecommunications service for which a separate charge is
made to a consumer account.
Id. § 476.103(2)(a). At a minimum, the legislature required the rules to
provide:
a.
(1) A submitting service provider shall obtain
verification of customer authorization of a change in service
before submitting such change in service.
(2) Verification appropriate under the circumstances
for all other changes in service.
(3) The verification may be in written, oral, or
electronic form and may be performed by a qualified third
party.
(4) The reasonable time period during which the
verification is to be retained, as determined by the board.
b.
A customer shall be notified of any change in service.
c.
Appropriate compensation for a customer affected by
an unauthorized change in service.
d.
Board determination of potential liability, including
assessment of damages, for unauthorized changes in service
among the customer, previous service provider, executing
service provider, and submitting service provider.
e.
A provision encouraging service providers to resolve
customer complaints without involvement of the board.
f.
The prompt reversal of unauthorized changes in
service.
g.
Procedures for a customer, service provider, or the
consumer advocate to submit to the board complaints of
unauthorized changes in service.
Id. § 476.103(3)(a)–(g).
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In enacting section 476.103, the legislature required the Board to
make
rules
prohibiting
an
unauthorized
designation
telecommunications service provider to a consumer.
of
a
new
The legislature
required the rules to be consistent with the federal communications
commission’s regulations regarding the procedures for verification of
customer authorization to change service. The legislature also required
the
rules
to
contain
certain
minimum
requirements
regarding
verification, notification, compensation, and complaint resolution.
The
legislature did not define what constituted an unauthorized change in
service, but left that decision up to the expertise of the agency.
In response to the legislature’s mandate, the Board adopted rules
prohibiting service providers from making an unauthorized change in
telecommunications services.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 199—22.23.
The
Board’s rules defined three acts consistent with the legislature’s
definition of “change in service”—cramming, jamming, and slamming.
Id. r. 199—22.23(1). The alleged violation in the present suit is that MCI
engaged in slamming when it switched Kilaru’s service to MCI.
The Board’s rules define “slamming” as “the designation of a new
provider of a telecommunications service to a customer, including the
initial selection of a service provider, without the verified consent of the
customer.” Id. The Board defined “verified consent” as “verification of a
customer’s authorization for a change in service.” Id.
Rule 199—22.23(2) contains the Board’s rules regarding the
prohibition of unauthorized changes in telecommunications service. Id.
r. 199—22.23(2).
Rule 199—22.23(2)(a) sets forth the verification
required before a carrier can change a customer’s service. It states:
Verification required. No service provider shall submit a
preferred carrier change order or other change in service
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order to another service provider unless and until the change
has first been confirmed in accordance with one of the
following procedures . . . .
Id. r. 199—22.23(2)(a).
MCI used a qualified independent third party to verify Kilaru’s
authorization before it changed service. Rule 199—22.23(2)(a)(3) deals
with the verification required from a third party as follows:
An appropriately qualified independent third party has
obtained the customer’s oral authorization to submit the
preferred carrier change order that confirms and includes
appropriate verification data (e.g., the customer’s date of
birth or social security number). . . . The content of the
verification
must
include
clear
and
conspicuous
confirmation that the customer has authorized a preferred
carrier change . . . .
Id. r. 199—22.23(2)(a)(3). The first sentence of rule 199—22.23(2)(a)(3)
incorporates
the
definition
of
verified
consent
by
requiring
the
independent third party to obtain the customer’s oral authorization to
submit to the preferred carrier change. It defines the verification data
needed from the customer to confirm the customer’s authorization for a
change in service.
The verification only needs to confirm that the
customer was the person who authorized the change. The independent
third party verifies the identity of the customer by obtaining the birth
date or social security number of the customer.
The last sentence of the rule requires the independent third party
to verify that the customer authorized a preferred carrier change. The
rule does not define “authorize.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“authorize” as “to formally approve” or “to sanction.”
Dictionary 129 (7th ed. 1999).
Black’s Law
The general dictionary definition is
similar: “to endorse, empower, or permit by.”
Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 164 (10th ed. 2002). Applying the common meaning
given to the word “authorize,” the customer is only required to approve,
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sanction, endorse, empower, or permit a preferred carrier change. The
rule does not require verification of the terms of the authorization.
Accordingly, we find the rule as written by the Board is unambiguous.
The rule does not require a verification of the terms and conditions that
the customer consented to when agreeing to the change. Therefore, the
Board’s interpretation of the rule requiring such verification is irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.
We also note this holding is consistent with the other verification
provisions in rule 199—22.23. A carrier may obtain a verification of a
change in service by a written authorization from the customer, an
electronic authorization from the customer, or a customer-originated
change.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 199—22.23(2)(a)(1), (2), (4).
The rules
governing each one of these methods of verification describe the
information needed from the customer in order to change service. Id. In
fact, the rule dealing with a written authorization is very specific as to
what needs to be included in the verification. Id. r. 199—22.23(2)(a)(1).
A written authorization requires clear and unambiguous language that
confirms: (1) the customer’s billing name, address, and telephone
number; (2) the decision to change from one provider to another; (3) the
designation of the new provider; (4) the customer understands that only
one service provider may be designated for certain services; and (5) the
customer may incur a charge for changing service providers. Id. r. 199—
22.23(2)(b)(5).
None of the permissible verifications require the customer to verify
the terms and conditions the customer consented to when agreeing to
change service carriers.
Had the Board wanted to require such a
verification it could have done so by writing that requirement into its
rules.
After all, one of the purposes of rulemaking is to express the
11
policy of an agency in a rule in order to give any affected persons fair
notice of the law before they engage in conduct, which may be governed
by those rules. Arthur E. Bonfield, Amendments to Iowa Administrative
Procedure Act, Report on Selected Provisions to Iowa State Bar Association
and Iowa State Government 16 (1998). Making policy by ad hoc decisions
on a case-by-case basis is contrary to the legislative intent of Iowa Code
section 17A.3(c). Id. 16–19.
IV. Disposition.
Finding the Board’s interpretation of rule 199—22.23 to be
irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable, we affirm the judgment of the
district court reversing the Board’s decision.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Appel, J., who takes no part.
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