BRUCE E. MARTIN, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-959 / 09-0014
Filed December 30, 2009
BRUCE E. MARTIN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve,
Judge.
Appellant appeals the summary disposition of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Brian Farrell, Hiawatha, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Julie Walton, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee, State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mansfield, JJ.
2
VOGEL, P.J.
Bruce Martin appeals the denial of his third application for postconviction
relief, asserting the court erred in granting summary disposition as his trial
counsel and second postconviction counsel were ineffective. On our de novo
review, we affirm. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
On December 1, 2003, Martin was charged with four counts of seconddegree sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(2) (2003), which
was later amended, adding one count of lascivious acts with a child in violation of
709.8.
In February 2004, Martin pled guilty to one count of second-degree
sexual abuse and to lascivious acts, but was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
prior to sentencing. In June 2004, Martin again pleaded guilty to one count of
second-degree sexual abuse and to lascivious acts, but subsequently asked to
again withdraw his pleas. His request was denied and he was sentenced to a
maximum indeterminate twenty-five year prison term for second-degree sexual
abuse, and a five-year indeterminate prison term for lascivious acts with a child,
the sentences to run concurrently.1
Martin filed an application for postconviction relief. The court granted the
State’s summary judgment motion in October 2006, dismissing the action. Martin
did not appeal.
Martin filed a second application for postconviction relief in
January 2005, and an amended application in October 2006, claiming his trial
counsel was ineffective in various ways, including failing to fully investigate the
charges and obtain “possibly exculpatory” reports and documents. Following a
1
On appeal, our supreme court vacated a sentencing provision it determined was
inapplicable.
3
trial on the merits, the district court denied the application, finding Martin, “failed
to produce any evidence on relevant issues upon which this Court could find that
the entry of his pleas were not voluntary and intelligently entered.” Our supreme
court dismissed his subsequent appeal as frivolous in March 2008.2 In June
2007, Martin filed a third application for postconviction relief, asserting he had
“evidence to show my innocence in this crime.” He again claimed trial counsel
and now his second postconviction counsel were ineffective in failing to
investigate “numerous documents” relevant to the charges. Granting the State’s
motion for summary disposition, the district court denied Martin’s third application
for postconviction relief. Martin appeals.
Martin argues the district court erred in granting summary disposition. In a
postconviction relief action, the court may grant a motion for summary disposition
when it appears from the record as a whole that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559-60 (Iowa 2002). In order
to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Martin must prove by
a preponderance of evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty
and (2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). In order to satisfy the
prejudice requirement, Martin must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Iowa 2006).
Martin maintains his trial and second postconviction counsel did not
investigate his claims that another male family member was the actual
2
Martin v. State, 06-1799 (Iowa March 2008).
4
perpetrator, nor did counsel investigate numerous documents Martin claims
existed supporting his innocence. He now asserts trial counsel’s failures bore on
his decision to plead guilty. The second postconviction court addressed Martin’s
assertions, as did the third postconviction court, which specifically found,
The Applicant may only be granted relief from his conviction by
showing the guilty pleas he entered on June 10, 2004 were either
unknowing or involuntary. . . . The Applicant draws no factual
connection between the investigation or presentation of these
reports and the validity of his guilty pleas. The Applicant states
only that “these documents demonstrate his innocence in that no
reports with regard to his asserted sexual abuse of his daughter
surfaced until 2002 or 2003 relating to acts supposedly taking place
in 1995 or 1996.” . . . This assertion is untenable. The fact that
reports from 1994 and 1998 do not specifically identify him as
perpetrating sexual abuse against his daughter simply has no
bearing on whether his guilty pleas were entered in a knowing and
voluntary manner.
We agree with the postconviction court’s findings that summary disposition
was appropriate because Martin’s claims of his innocence do not undermine the
validity of his guilty plea.
Martin failed to show that but for the alleged
ineffectiveness he would not have pleaded guilty. See Straw, 709 N.W.2d at
136. Martin therefore suffered no breach of duty by his trial or postconviction
counsel, nor resulting prejudice.
Having reviewed the record and agreeing with the district court’s fact
findings, reasoning, and conclusions of law, we affirm pursuant to Iowa Court
Rule 21.29(1)(a), (c), (d), and (e).
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
