JOHN PAVONE and SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.L.C., Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. GERALD M. KIRKE and WILD ROSE ENTERTAINMENT, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellants.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-412 / 08-0180
Filed November 25, 2009
JOHN PAVONE and SIGNATURE
MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.L.C.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
GERALD M. KIRKE and WILD ROSE
ENTERTAINMENT, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. Gamble,
Judge.
The defendants appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in
plaintiffs’ favor in plaintiffs’ breach of contract action.
REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Mark McCormick, David Swinton, and David W. Nelmark of Belin Lamson
McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, Thomas D. Waterman of Lane &
Waterman, L.L.P., Des Moines, and Brent B. Green and Mariclare Thinnes
Culver of Duncan, Green, Brown & Langeness, Des Moines, for appellants.
Maurice B. Nieland of Rawlings, Nieland, Probasco, Killinger, Ellwanger,
Jacobs & Mohrhauser, L.L.P., Sioux City, Glenn L. Norris of Hawkins & Norris,
P.C., Des Moines, and Stanley E. Munger and Jay E. Denne of Munger,
Reinschmidt & Denne, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellees.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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MAHAN, S.J.
Defendants Gerald M. Kirke and Wild Rose Entertainment, L.L.C.
(collectively “Wild Rose”) appeal from the judgment entered on a $10 million
special verdict in favor of plaintiffs John Pavone and Signature Management
Group, L.L.C. (collectively “SMG”). Wild Rose argues the district court erred in
(1) overruling its motion for directed verdict on SMG’s section 3A and 5A claims,
(2) overruling its statute of frauds objection to SMG’s testimony that the parties
orally agreed to apply section 3A to Emmetsburg, (3) overruling its objection to
the court’s instruction allowing the jury to award benefit-of-the-bargain damages
on SMG’s section 5A claim, (4) failing to find that SMG’s claims are barred when
no management agreement was ever approved by the Iowa Racing and Gaming
Commission (IRGC), (5) allowing the jury to award damages for a period of as
much as thirty years, and (6) denying its motion for new trial based on
inconsistency in the special verdict. We reverse the judgment in favor of SMG
and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Wild Rose.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In early 2004, plaintiff John Pavone was seeking opportunities to manage
casinos through his company SMG. At the same time, defendant Gerald Kirke
was pursuing opportunities to obtain licenses to develop and operate new
casinos in Iowa through his company, Wild Rose.1 In April 2004, the parties
entered into a consulting agreement under which SMG would provide consulting
services to Wild Rose, with the mutual goal of obtaining licenses for Wild Rose to
1
Wild Rose’s president and minority shareholder, Dr. Michael Richards, is not an
individual party to this action.
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open casinos that SMG would manage. Thereafter, Wild Rose submitted an
application for a license to operate a casino in Ottumwa. Through the efforts and
drafts of Wild Rose’s attorney, James Krambeck, and SMG’s attorney, Ryan
Ross, a written consulting agreement (“October Agreement”) was prepared. The
parties executed the October Agreement on October 22, 2004.
Of particular relevance to this appeal are sections 3A and 5A of the
October Agreement. These sections provide as follows:
3. Ownership in Ottumwa Project and Management Entity. If
Wild Rose is awarded a license to operate a casino in Ottumwa,
Iowa, then upon completion of the development of the Ottumwa
Project, the parties shall grant and convey an interest to each other
as follows:
A. Management Agreement.
Upon completion of the
Ottumwa Project, Wild Rose shall enter into an exclusive
management agreement with an entity to be solely owned by
Pavone (subject to rights of Wild Rose under paragraph C
below) for the management of the Ottumwa Project. This
Management Agreement shall provide for an annual
management fee equal to four percent (4%) of the Adjusted
Gross Revenue of the Ottumwa Project. The terms of the
Management Agreement shall be similar to the terms of the
gaming development agreement between Wild Rose and the
City of Ottumwa, Iowa.
....
5. Future Casino Development Opportunities.
A. First Look and Good Faith Negotiation as to Future
Casino Development and Management Opportunities.
i. If Wild Rose has the opportunity to develop or
operate any other casino in Iowa, Wild Rose will use
good faith best efforts to involve SMG when the
opportunity is first known, and to negotiate in good
faith a Management Agreement consistent with the
terms outlined in Wild Rose’s gaming development
agreement with the City of Ottumwa, Iowa. It being
understood that the award of any management
agreement must also be satisfactory to third party
community and non-profit organizations. And it being
further understood that any casino in the Central Iowa
area will likely require the involvement of a
management company, other than SMG.
4
Wild Rose also submitted an application for a license in Emmetsburg.
On
November 3, 2004, the parties apparently orally agreed the October Agreement
would cover casino opportunities in both Ottumwa and Emmetsburg.
The
October Agreement was attached to both the Ottumwa and Emmetsburg
applications, and the applications were filed with the IRGC on November 10,
2004.
In early 2005, as the applications before the IRGC were pending, relations
between SMG and Wild Rose began to deteriorate. The parties attempted to
finalize a management agreement that would supersede the October Agreement,
but final negotiations failed when the parties could not reach agreement as to
fees, term length, and responsibility of hiring key employees, among other things.
On May 3, 2005, SMG informed Wild Rose it was sending a letter to the IRGC to
advise that the parties had not succeeded in reaching a management agreement.
This letter stated, in pertinent part:
This correspondence is in response to the request by IRGC
staff for an executed copy of the management agreement between
Wild Rose Ottumwa, L.L.C. and the Signature Management Group,
L.L.C. for casino operations in Emmetsburg Iowa and Ottumwa
Iowa. During our meeting with IRGC Staff on February 16 th, 2005,
we were asked to provide the commission staff with an executed
copy of the management agreement consistent with the terms and
conditions as outlined between the parties within the letter of intent
dated October 22nd, 2004. This agreement is contained within our
license application as submitted to the IRGC.
After several weeks of negotiations the parties have
unfortunately failed to reach an agreement between the parties.
Signature Management Group, L.L.C. remains hopeful that the
parties may be able to reach an agreement that will be acceptable
to both parties however given the state of current negotiations; I
would be less than candid if Signature did not express its doubts as
to the successful resolution of this matter.
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The parties stalled attempts to renegotiate as they waited to learn whether
IRGC would grant Wild Rose either or both casino licenses. On May 11, 2005,
IRGC denied Wild Rose’s application for a license in Ottumwa, but granted Wild
Rose a license to establish and operate a casino in Emmetsburg.
After the
license was granted for Emmetsburg, attorneys Ross and Krambeck discussed
whether negotiations between SMG and Wild Rose would resume. The record
suggests both parties (for various reasons) felt relations were too damaged to
continue and determined negotiations had reached an impasse. On May 24,
2005, Wild Rose formally notified SMG of the termination of the October
Agreement.2 Wild Rose paid SMG more than $110,000 for SMG’s consulting
services from October 22, 2004, through May 11, 2005.
On March 31, 2006, SMG filed the present suit alleging Wild Rose
breached its contract with SMG.
Specifically, SMG contended Wild Rose
(1) breached section 3A of the October Agreement by failing to enter into and
perform a management agreement with SMG for the Emmetsburg casino and
(2) breached section 5A of the October Agreement by failing to use good faith
best efforts to negotiate a management agreement with SMG for the
Emmetsburg casino.
The case proceeded to a jury trial beginning on August 20, 2007. Wild
Rose filed a motion for directed verdict on August 30, 2007, which the district
court later denied. On September 5, 2007, the jury returned a special verdict in
favor of SMG, finding Wild Rose had breached both sections 3A and 5A of the
October Agreement. The district court allowed the jury to award benefit-of-the2
Wild Rose hired Kevin Preston as general manager of the Emmetsburg casino.
6
bargain damages on both claims.
The jury awarded SMG damages in the
amount of $10 million, without distinguishing between the two claims. Wild Rose
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, for a new
trial. The district court denied the motion on December 31, 2007. Wild Rose
now appeals.
II. Motion for Directed Verdict.
Our rule governing motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict
states:
If the movant was entitled to a directed verdict at the close of all the
evidence, and moved therefor, and the jury did not return such
verdict, the court may then either grant a new trial or enter
judgment as though it had directed a verdict for the movant.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1003(2) (2009); see Easton v. Howard, 751 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa
2008) (noting “[t]he purpose of the rule is to allow the district court an opportunity
to correct any error in failing to direct a verdict”).
A motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict must stand on the grounds raised in the movant’s
motion for directed verdict. Easton, 751 N.W.2d at 4-5.
We review the district court’s denial of a directed verdict for correction of
errors at law. Id. at 5. In doing so we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and take into consideration all reasonable
inferences that could by fairly made by the jury. Id. If substantial evidence in the
record supports each element of a claim, the motion for directed verdict must be
overruled. Id. Evidence is substantial when reasonable minds would accept the
evidence as adequate to reach the same findings. Id. Our role on appeal is to
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determine whether the trial court correctly determined there was sufficient
evidence to submit the issue to the jury. Id.
A. Section 3A Claim.
Wild Rose argues the district court erred in overruling its motion for
directed verdict on SMG’s section 3A claim. Wild Rose contends section 3A
failed to establish the material terms required in a management agreement, and
was therefore an unenforceable “agreement to agree.”
“An agreement to agree to enter into a contract is of no effect unless all of
the terms and conditions of the contract are agreed on and nothing is left to
future negotiations.” Scott v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 556, 562
(Iowa 2002) (quoting Crowe-Thomas Consulting Group, Inc. v. Fresh Pak Candy
Co., 494 N.W.2d 442, 444-45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)).
A writing that clearly
contemplates the subsequent execution of a formal agreement raises the
inference that the parties to the writing did not intend to be bound until the
subsequent formal agreement is finalized. See, e.g., Kopple v. Schick Farms,
Ltd., 447 F. Supp. 2d 965, 976 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Air Host Cedar Rapids, Inc. v.
Cedar Rapids Airport Comm’n, 464 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Iowa 1991); CroweThomas, 494 N.W.2d at 444-45.
Furthermore, an agreement that is absent
essential details and terms (or leaves such details and terms open for
subsequent negotiation) is not usually recognized as a binding contract between
the parties. See Kopple, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 977-78; Air Host, 464 N.W.2d at
453. Generally speaking, we do not find that a binding contract exists where
parties agree to a contract on a basis to be settled in the future. Air Host, 464
N.W.2d at 453.
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In its ruling on Wild Rose’s post-trial motions, the district court determined:
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the
October Agreement outlines all of the material terms and conditions
regarding the ownership and management of the Emmetsburg
Casino. These essential terms include: 1) a description of the
parties; 2) that Pavone would manage the casino; 3) that Wild Rose
would own the casino; 4) that the duration of the agreement
through, the incorporation by reference of the Ottumwa Gaming
Development Agreement (“OGDA”), was an initial term of ten years
which could be extended for three-year terms at the option of Wild
Rose for a term of up to 30 years; 5) that the duties of the casino
manager would be governed by industry standards known to the
parties; 6) that compensation of the manager would be 4% of
adjusted gross revenue together with an equity swap and reciprocal
buy-sell agreements; and 7) that the agreement could be
terminated for cause as set forth therein.
A reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Wild Rose
agreed to enter into and perform a management agreement with
Pavone on these terms and that no other terms were essential to
the transaction. As Pavone puts it, Wild Rose was going to own
and Pavone was going to manage. Wild Rose later determined it
wanted concessions from plaintiff. For example, Wild Rose wanted
the ability to hire and fire key management employees. This is
evidenced by the fact Gary Kirke hired Kevin Preston as general
manager of the casino without consulting Pavone. However, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Pavone’s agreement to
manage the casino addressed this issue. A jury could reasonably
conclude that the authority to manage the casino included the
authority to control the hiring and termination of key management
employees. A reasonable finder of fact could conclude that when
Pavone refused to surrender control of management employees to
the owner, the defendants refused to enter into and perform a
management agreement on the material terms set forth in the
October Agreement thereby breaching paragraph 3(A) of the
contract. This was a legitimate jury question. Defendants are not
entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
We disagree. Upon our review of the undisputed facts in this case, we
find the October Agreement created a consulting agreement between SMG and
Wild Rose, but not a management agreement. By its terms, section 3A of the
October Agreement contemplates the parties’ execution of an “exclusive
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management agreement” if Wild Rose was awarded a license to operate a
casino. This language provides a strong inference that the parties did not intend
to be bound by a management agreement until its final terms were settled and a
final management contract was executed. Crowe-Thomas, 494 N.W.2d at 44445.
Furthermore, the October Agreement failed to establish many material
terms necessary for a binding management contract. For example, the October
Agreement did not include any essential terms relating to the hiring and firing of
key personnel, duration of the contract, or the scope of services to be provided
by SMG. The absence of these essential terms leaves many specifics of the
management agreement open for future negotiation. Indeed, after the October
Agreement was created, SMG admitted on several occasions that no
management agreement existed between the parties and prompted attorney
Ross to begin drafting a formal management agreement, which was to be
significantly longer and more comprehensive than the October Agreement.3 The
parties continued to negotiate, and in May 2005 SMG wrote a letter to the IRGC
admitting the parties had failed to reach a management agreement.
For these reasons, we conclude the October Agreement constituted an
agreement to agree to a contract on a basis to be settled in the future. See Air
Host, 464 N.W.2d at 453; Crowe-Thomas, 494 N.W.2d at 444-45. The record
does not contain evidence sufficient to reasonably conclude otherwise. Easton,
751 N.W.2d at 4-5. As such, the district court erred in overruling Wild Rose’s
3
Attorney Ross prepared and submitted to attorney Krambeck the first draft of the
“proposed” management agreement on February 21, 2005. The draft was nineteen
pages in length and contained many more terms than the October Agreement.
10
motion for directed verdict on SMG’s section 3A claim and in submitting the issue
to the jury.
B. Section 5A claim.
Wild Rose further argues the district court erred in overruling its motion for
directed verdict on SMG’s section 5A claim. Wild Rose contends it was under no
contractual duty to negotiate the management agreement in good faith and the
record does not contain sufficient evidence for the jury to find the breakdown in
negotiations was caused by Wild Rose’s bad faith. Therefore, Wild Rose claims,
the court erred in submitting SMG’s section 5A claim to the jury.
“A contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith in its
performance and enforcement.” Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Iowa
1990) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 at 99-101 (1981)). As
Wild Rose acknowledges, our supreme court has recognized the duty of good
faith applies only with regard to the performance and enforcement of contract.
Id. at 314. The duty of good faith does not extend to negotiations, but rather, bad
faith negotiations of a contract may result in the imposition of sanctions or other
tort remedies. See id.
In this case, however, section 5A states: “Wild Rose will use good faith
best efforts to involve SMG when the opportunity is first known, and to negotiate
in good faith a Management Agreement . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Although
section 5A does not necessarily require the parties to reach a management
agreement,4 the express provisions of section 5A impose a duty on Wild Rose to
4
As Jury Instruction No. 16 explains:
11
use good faith to involve and negotiate with SMG regarding any casino
opportunities available to Wild Rose. Additionally, Iowa law and the Restatement
impose a duty on a party to a contract to use good faith in performance of such
contract. In contrast to Wild Rose’s contention, therefore, we find it is possible in
this case for Wild Rose to be found in breach of section 5A.
We must now determine whether the pertinent facts on the issue of Wild
Rose’s good faith in negotiations were in dispute. If so, the motions for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were properly denied. Easton,
751 N.W.2d at 5. If not, the determination was for the court. Id.
Upon our review of the record, we conclude the undisputed facts on the
issue of Wild Rose’s actions in negotiations with SMG clearly show Wild Rose
performed a good faith negotiation in an effort to reach a management
agreement with SMG. The record contains extensive correspondence between
Wild Rose and SMG as both parties diligently worked to reach a management
agreement. The parties were able to agree on a somewhat complicated fee
arrangement. However, negotiations reached an impasse when the parties could
not agree on the hiring and firing of key personnel. This was by no fault of Wild
Paragraph 5(A) of the October 22, 2004 agreement imposes upon
the defendants a duty of good faith in the negotiation of a management
agreement for future casino developments including Emmetsburg. A
party breaches a duty of good faith by violating community standards of
decency, fairness, and reasonableness.
The fact the parties may have failed to reach an agreement as to
material terms of a management contract regarding Emmetsburg other
than those terms the plaintiffs contend were required by Paragraph 5(A)
of the October agreement does not necessarily mean that defendants
acted in bad faith.
You shall consider all of the surrounding facts and circumstances
in determining whether the defendants breached a duty of good faith.
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Rose; it was completely reasonable that Wild Rose demanded a right to approve
or disapprove of important personnel decisions.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Wild Rose did not breach a duty
of good faith by violating community standards of decency, fairness, and
reasonableness throughout the course of its negotiations with SMG. The record
does not contain evidence sufficient to reasonably conclude otherwise. Id. at 45. As such, the district court erred in overruling Wild Rose’s motion for directed
verdict on SMG’s section 5A.
III. Conclusion.
Upon our determination that no factual issues existed as to SMG’s breach
of contract claims under sections 3A and 5A, we conclude the district court erred
in overruling Wild Rose’s motions for directed verdict and in submitting the claims
to the jury. In light of this conclusion, there is no reason to address the remaining
claims on appeal.
We therefore reverse the judgment in favor of SMG and
remand for entry of judgment in favor of Wild Rose.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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