STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. MARTEZ PETER JOHN ANDERSON , D efendant - Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-722 / 08-0053
Filed October 1, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARTEZ PETER JOHN ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bruce Zager,
Judge.
Martez Anderson appeals his sentence for intimidation with a dangerous
weapon and carrying weapons.
SENTENCING ORDER VACATED AND
REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Andrews, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Joel Dalrymple, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Potterfield, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Defendant Martez Anderson pled guilty to the non-forcible felony of
intimidation with a dangerous weapon and to carrying weapons in violation of
Iowa Code sections 708.6 and 724.4(1) respectively. The charges arose from an
incident in Waterloo in which Anderson was driving a borrowed car with three
passengers. While Anderson was driving, a passenger fired several shots at a
car driven by Kenneth Keller, leaving Keller uninjured, but causing damage to his
vehicle and to another vehicle which had been parked on the street. Anderson
then sped away.
On June 28, 2007, Anderson was arrested for violations of Iowa Code
sections 708.6, 724.4(1), and 902.7.1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Anderson
pled guilty on October 12, 2007.
On December 21, 2007, Anderson was
sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years for the charge of
intimidation with a dangerous weapon and two years on the charge of carrying
weapons, to be served concurrently. Anderson appeals following his sentencing,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion in considering an unproven
offense in determining his sentence.
II. Standard of Review
A sentence is in the discretion of the district court and should only be
disturbed upon a showing that the district court abused its discretion. State v.
Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1992). There is a strong presumption that
1
The sentencing associated with the charge arising from violation of Iowa Code section
902.7 is not disputed on appeal.
3
the district court properly exercised its discretion. State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d
490, 494 (Iowa 1983). “A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless
the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the
sentencing procedure such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors.”
State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 1983).
III. Defendant’s Sentence
In determining a proper sentence, the district court can consider all
pertinent matters “including the
nature of
the offense, the
attending
circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or chances for
reform.” State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995). “A court may not
consider an unproven or unprosecuted offense when sentencing a defendant
unless (1) the facts before the court show the accused committed the offense, or
(2) the defendant admits it.” State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998).
It is Anderson’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the district court relied
on unproven charges. State v. Ashley, 462 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa 1990). If
Anderson can show that the district court relied on unproven charges, we must
vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing; we are not to
speculate about the weight the district court assigned to an improper
consideration. State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1998).
Anderson contends that the district court considered unproven crimes in
stating “[i]t sounds like it may have been part of an ongoing type of behavior in
this matter,” referencing the State’s contention that this was not an isolated
incident, but part of an escalating pattern involving Anderson. At the sentencing
hearing, the prosecutor stated:
4
This was an ongoing thing as well, as I think the Court, upon review
of the trial information and minutes of testimony, would reflect that
this was not an isolated incident and, in fact, that over the course of
a couple of days this thing had been ongoing and, in fact, was
escalating.
When we consider the district court’s statement in conjunction with the
prosecutor’s statements, we find that the district court improperly considered the
unproven course of conduct alleged by the prosecutor. Anderson specifically
denied involvement in these offenses during the sentencing hearing. Anderson
has affirmatively demonstrated that the district court relied on unproven charges,
and we therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
SENTENCING ORDER VACATED AND REMANDED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
