STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. JOHN HENRY MAHOGANY, Defendant - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-602 / 07-1249
Filed September 17, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN HENRY MAHOGANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James C.
Bauch, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions, based on his guilty pleas, to thirddegree kidnapping and third-degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, and John Mahogany, Anamosa, pro se, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and James Katcher, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel, J., and Robinson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
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ROBINSON, S.J.
I.
Background Facts & Proceedings
The minutes of testimony in this case show that Amanda lived with two
roommates in Waterloo. At about 2:00 a.m. on May 26, 2005, the boyfriend of
one roommate came to the home with John Mahogany. After a period of time
Mahogany agreed to take Amanda to a store to buy a cold drink. Instead of
driving to the store, however, Mahogany drove Amanda to a park, where he
kissed her and put his hand in her pants, resulting in hand to genital contact.
Amanda struggled, but could not get away.
Mahogany then drove to an alley near a school. He pulled Amanda’s
pants and underwear off, and attempted vaginal penetration with his penis. At
this location genital to genital contact occurred. Amanda tried to put her clothes
back on.
Mahogany drove to a third location, near a cemetery, where he pulled
Amanda into the back seat of his vehicle. He again removed her pants and
underwear. He forced her to perform oral sex, and then engaged in vaginal
penetration and ejaculated. Mahogany drove Amanda back to her home, and
sped away.
Amanda’s friends called the police, and she was taken to the
hospital for a sexual assault examination.
DNA evidence collected from the
examination matched the DNA of Mahogany.
Mahogany was charged with kidnapping in the first degree. After four
days of trial, he entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he agreed
to enter an Alford plea to kidnapping in the third degree, as a habitual offender, in
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violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1, 710.4, and 902.8 (2005), and sexual
abuse in the third degree, as a habitual offender, in violation of sections 709.4(1)
and 902.8.1 The parties agreed the minutes of testimony would provide the
factual basis for the pleas. Mahogany was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
not to exceed fifteen years on each offense, to be served consecutively.
Mahogany filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence.
He
subsequently filed an amended motion, claiming that third-degree sexual abuse
was a lesser included offense of third-degree kidnapping, and the sentences on
the two offenses should be merged. After a hearing, the district court determined
Mahogany was charged with, and committed, two separate and distinct crimes
that supported separate convictions for third-degree sexual abuse and thirddegree kidnapping.
Mahogany appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion to correct an illegal sentence.
II.
Standard of Review
On defendant’s claims that his sentence is illegal under section 701.9, our
review is for the correction of errors at law. State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339,
341-42 (Iowa 1995). To the extent defendant is raising constitutional issues, our
review is de novo. Id. at 341.
III.
Merits
Mahogany claims his two convictions should be merged under section
701.9, which provides:
No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is
necessarily included in another public offense of which the person
1
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164-68, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162, 168-72 (1970).
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is convicted. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one
offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, the court shall
enter judgment of guilty of the greater of the offenses only.
He also claims that the two sentences in this case violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause because he is being punished twice for one offense. See State v. Butler,
505 N.W.2d 806, 807 (Iowa 1993) (noting the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
against multiple punishments for the same offense). Section 701.9 codifies the
double jeopardy protection against cumulative punishment, and therefore, the
statutory and constitutional claims will be considered together.2 See State v.
Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 445 (Iowa 1993).
The merger statute, section 701.9, does not apply when there are two
separate and distinct crimes. State v. Bundy, 508 N.W.2d 643, 643-44 (Iowa
1993); State v. Dittmer, 653 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). Whether
one offense is a lesser included offense of another is irrelevant when the State
files the two charges as separate offenses and proves them both.
State v.
Truesdell, 511 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). “Where the alleged acts
occur separately and constitute distinct offenses there can be no complaint that
one is a lesser included offense of the other.” State v. Spilger, 508 N.W.2d 650,
652 (Iowa 1993).
2
Mahogany did not raise these issues during the sentencing hearing, and did not
appeal his sentence. A sentence that is contrary to section 701.9 is void, however, and
a challenge to such a sentence is not subject to the normal rules of error preservation.
State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 2001). As to his constitutional claims, he
asserts his failure to raise these earlier was due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and
these claims are also not subject to the general rules of error preservation. See State v.
Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 338, 232 (Iowa 1982). On appeal, we will consider defendant’s
statutory and constitutional claims together.
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Where a defendant pleads guilty to two crimes, the record must minimally
support a factual basis for two separate crimes. State v. Walker, 610 N.W.2d
524, 527 (Iowa 2000). An Alford plea is conditioned on the court’s ability to find
factual support for every element of the offense in the record from sources other
than the defendant. State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001).
Mahogany relies upon State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 611-12 (Iowa
1997) and State v. Newman, 326 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Iowa 1982), to support his
claim that the kidnapping and sexual abuse involved one continuing event. In
those cases, even though more than one incident of sexual abuse occurred, the
cases were presented to the jury as a single episode. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d at
611-12; Newman, 326 N.W.2d at 793. Under these circumstances, the supreme
court concluded the sexual abuse charge could not be considered a separate
offense from the kidnapping charge. Id. at 612; Newman, 326 N.W.2d at 793.
Based on the specific facts of a case, however, a defendant may be
convicted of both kidnapping and sexual abuse. Newman, 326 N.W.2d at 793.
“A defendant should not be allowed to repeatedly assault his victim and fall back
on the argument his conduct constitutes but one crime.”
Id.
In State v.
Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Iowa 1981), the supreme court found the
facts demonstrated the occurrence of two separate crimes in time and place
resulting in the defendant’s conviction of first-degree kidnapping and seconddegree sexual abuse.
In this case, the parties agreed the minutes of testimony would be
considered to form the factual basis for the plea. The evidence shows Mahogany
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transported Amanda against her will to three different locations. 3
He also
engaged in acts that would constitute sexual abuse at three different locations,
and three different times.4 In considering Mahogany’s motion, the district court
found:
[T]here was a separate act of sexual abuse that initially occurred in
the car in an area that was not secluded and would be readily
visible to the public. Ultimately he drove her to a very secluded
area in a cemetery that was dark and far from any inhabited
buildings or houses. In the Court’s view, these are two separate
and distinct actions and would support a separate conviction for
Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree, and the subsequent and later
actions of the defendant constituted Kidnapping in the Third
Degree.
We conclude the minutes of testimony provide a factual basis to support at least
two distinct crimes committed at different times.
We affirm the decision of the district court denying Mahogany’s motion to
correct an illegal sentence.
AFFIRMED.
3
Under section 710.1(3), kidnapping is defined as the confinement or removal or a
person, without the authority or consent to do so, with the intent to subject the person to
sexual abuse.
4
Under section 702.17, a “sex act” may consist of hand to genital contact, mouth to
genital contact, or genital to genital contact. Sexual abuse occurs when a sex act is
performed by force or against the will of the other person. Iowa Code § 709.1(1).
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