STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. DANIEL PEC - SON , Defendant - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-556 / 07-1374
Filed August 13, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANIEL PEC-SON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L.
Block, Associate Juvenile Judge, (waiver) and James D. Coil, District Associate
Judge, (trial and sentencing).
Daniel Pec-Son appeals from his conviction and sentence on two counts
of forgery. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and James J. Katcher, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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HUITINK, P.J.
Daniel Pec-Son appeals from his conviction and sentence on two counts
of forgery following the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction and a bench trial in
district court. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On May 15, 2006, Pec-Son entered Veridian Credit Union with a friend
who acted as Pec-Son’s interpreter because Pec-Son does not speak English.
Pec-Son asked teller Deno Cejvanovic about opening an account and presented
him with a social security card and a resident alien card both showing the name
Daniel Pec. When Cejvanovic attempted to verify the social security number
provided by Pec-Son, he was informed the number was invalid due to death.
Cejvanovic’s coworker received the same information when she tried to verify the
social security number. After Cejvanovic consulted with another coworker about
the situation, Cejvanovic called the police.
When Officer Matthew Wertz arrived at Veridian Credit Union, Pec-Son
told Wertz he was nineteen years of age. Officer John DeKoster also arrived,
and the officers believed the social security and resident alien cards were both
fake.1
At the police station, Pec-Son told officers he was twenty years of age and
that he had been attempting to open a bank account. He admitted that he had
purchased both cards from a man on a street corner about two years earlier and
that he was in the country illegally. Pec-Son was charged with two counts of
1
Wertz later determined that the cards were not fake, but the social security card
belonged to a woman who had died and the resident alien number belonged to a
Mexican male born in 1967.
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forgery, a class D felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 715A.2(1)(d) and
715A.2(2)(a)(4) (2007).
Pec-Son later produced a Guatemalan birth certificate showing he was
actually seventeen years of age at the time of the incident. The juvenile court
waived jurisdiction to an adult criminal court. Pec-Son argues that the juvenile
court abused its discretion when it failed to consider immigration issues in its
decision to waive Pec-Son’s case to adult court.
II. Standard of Review
We generally review rulings in juvenile proceedings de novo, but where
the legislature clearly gives the juvenile court discretion in a specific area, we
review the juvenile court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tesch,
704 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2005). Thus, our review is de novo only to the extent
that we must still examine all the evidence in determining if the juvenile court
abused its discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable.” State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Iowa 2005).
III. Waiver to Adult Court
Pec-Son argues that when the juvenile court considered whether to waive
jurisdiction of his case to adult court, the juvenile court abused its discretion in
finding it could not consider immigration issues. A juvenile court may waive its
jurisdiction over a child after a waiver hearing if all of three conditions apply.
Pec-Son stipulated to the first two conditions, that (1) he is fourteen years of age
or older and (2) probable cause existed to believe that he committed a public
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offense. The issue is whether the juvenile court properly evaluated all factors in
considering the third condition, which requires the court to determine
that the state has established that there are not reasonable
prospects for rehabilitating the child if the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over the child and the child is adjudicated to have
committed the delinquent act, and that waiver of the court’s
jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public
offense would be in the best interests of the child and the
community.
Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(c).
In making the determination required by section
2323.42(6)(c) quoted above, the court is given a nonexhaustive list of factors it
must consider:
a. The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the
circumstances under which it was committed.
b. The nature and extent of the child’s prior contacts with
juvenile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat
and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts.
c. The programs, facilities and personnel available to the
juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the
programs, facilities and personnel which would be available to the
court that would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court
waives its jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an
adult.
Iowa Code § 232.45(8). This section “confers very broad discretion upon the
court to consider such factors as it deems relevant in determining whether it
ought to waive jurisdiction in a particular case.” In re J.J.A., 580 N.W.2d 731,
741 (Iowa 1998).
The juvenile court clearly considered all of the factors it is required to
consider under sections 232.45(6) and 232.45(8). The juvenile court’s order for
waiver of jurisdiction expressed concern that because Pec-Son lived with his
uncle, who had failed to meet with juvenile court authorities, the court could not
conclude Pec-Son would have adequate supervision to participate in the service
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alternatives offered by the juvenile court. The juvenile court further found after
considering Pec-Son’s “age, lack of adult supervision, and nature of the
offenses,” that “it is in the juvenile’s best interest and the community’s best
interests that orders for waiver of jurisdiction be entered.”
The juvenile court did state during the hearing on the motion for waiver of
jurisdiction that “the immigration issue really is--is a non-issue for me. That is not
a factor I’m considering. I don’t think I can--can consider it.” While the Iowa Code
lists several factors the juvenile court must consider, immigration issues are not
one of the required factors. Thus, while the juvenile court could have considered
the possible immigration effects of waiving its jurisdiction, it was not required to.
We find the juvenile court undertook the necessary evaluations required by the
Iowa Code and ultimately, after weighing the “respective prospects for
rehabilitation offered by the juvenile and adult systems,” agreed with the juvenile
court officer’s report that the juvenile system offered only limited service
alternatives due to the lack of parental supervision. See State v. Greiman, 344
N.W.2d 249, 251 (Iowa 1984).
Because we find Pec-Son preserved error on the issue of the juvenile
court’s waiver of jurisdiction, we decline to address Pec-Son’s ineffective
assistance of counsel argument.
sentence of Daniel Pec-Son.
AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and
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