DAVID C. WIEBBECKE , P etitioner - Appell ant , vs. BENTON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, BENTON COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and MARC GREENLEE, as Administrative Officer , Respondents - Appell ees .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-209 / 06-1672
Filed July 16, 2008
DAVID C. WIEBBECKE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
BENTON COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS, BENTON COUNTY
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT and
MARC GREENLEE, as Administrative Officer,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, Kristin L. Hibbs,
Judge.
The petitioner appeals from the district court‟s review upholding the
Benton County Board of Adjustment‟s zoning decision. AFFIRMED.
Kenneth Dolezal, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
David Thompson, Benton County Attorney, Vinton, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Eisenhauer, J. and Nelson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
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VOGEL, P.J.
David Wiebbecke appeals from the district court‟s denial of his petition for
writ of certiorari based upon the Benton County Board of Adjustment‟s denial of
his request to rezone his property. Finding no errors at law, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In 2004, Wiebbecke purchased two acres of agricultural land in rural
Benton County.
Prior to purchasing the land, Wiebbecke did not consult an
attorney, review the abstract, or obtain a title opinion to determine if any use
restrictions were applicable
Wiebbecke intended to build a large metal pole
building, in which he would reside, store his personal belongings, and work on
old cars. However, he later discovered that the land he purchased was within
Benton County‟s agricultural land use district.
On January 12, 2005, Wiebbecke requested a land use change.
On
February 4, 2005, a public hearing was held and the Benton County Board of
Supervisors, citing the favorable corn suitability rating of the land, denied the
request for a variance. The minutes of the meeting stated the land had a corn
suitability rating of eighty-five, but “the current rule is that any change on land
with a [corn suitability rating] over 70 is not allowed.”1
1
The Benton County Iowa Land Preservation and Use Plan states:
High quality farmland is that agricultural land where the soil has a Corn
Suitability Rating of 70 or above. Low quality farmland has a CSR of 69
or below. Benton County has 296,152 acres of high quality farmland,
which is 69.5 percent of all general agricultural land . . . . As reflected in
the goals, objects and policies of the county, the preservation and
protection of these valuable lands is essential to provide for the
continuous production of food and fiber without hindrance from conflicting
land uses.
3
Wiebbecke appealed this decision to the Benton County Board of
Adjustment.
After a public hearing on March 30, 2005, the Board denied
Wiebbecke‟s request for a variance. Again, the minutes of the meeting stated
that the denial was based upon the fact that the land had a corn suitability rating
higher than seventy and a variance would not comply with the Benton County
Agricultural Land Preservation Ordinance (Ordinance Number 24).
On
September 7, 2005, the Board held another public meeting to reconsider its
previous decision, but again denied Wiebbecke‟s request for a variance.
Wiebbecke filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in district court.
The
petition alleged that the denial of his request for a variance was based upon
Ordinance Number 24 and that the ordinance is illegal and unconstitutional. On
September 18, 2006, following a hearing, the district court dismissed
Wiebbecke‟s petition for writ of certiorari and affirmed the Board‟s denial of
Wiebbecke‟s request for a variance. Wiebbecke appeals from this ruling. 2
II. Standard of Review
“A writ of certiorari shall only be granted . . . where an inferior tribunal,
board or officer, exercising judicial functions, is alleged to have exceeded proper
jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.”
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401.
“Unless
otherwise specially provided by statute, the judgment on certiorari shall be limited
2
Following Wiebbecke‟s appeal, the record was supplemented with the following
information. In October 2007, Wiebbecke filed a new request for a land use change
regarding the same property, to construct a 40 foot by 54 foot “pole building for storage.”
A public hearing was held on November 1, 2007, and the Benton County Board of
Supervisors approved this request. However, the land use change was granted only
“[f]or a pole building for storage, no well or septic will be needed or allowed.” While this
grant would seemingly nullify the reason for disallowing the initial variance request, a
high CSR, it does not affect the arguments as framed on appeal: 1) the assertion the
Board failed to make sufficient written factual findings, and 2) the assertion Ordinance
No. 24 is contrary to statutory law and unconstitutional.
4
to sustaining the proceedings below, or annulling the same wholly or in part, to
the extent that they were illegal or in excess of jurisdiction.” Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.1411. Therefore, “certiorari is an action at law to test the legality of an action
taken by a court or tribunal acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”
Petersen v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 580 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Iowa
1998).
Our review of the district court‟s ruling on certiorari is limited to correction
of errors at law. W.G. McKinney Farms, L.P. v. Dallas County Bd. of Adjustment,
674 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Iowa 2004). We are bound by the factual findings of the
district court if supported by substantial evidence. Id.
III. Analysis
Wiebbecke asserts that the Board‟s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence because it failed to make sufficient written findings of fact.
“[B]oards of adjustment shall make written findings of fact on all issues presented
. . . sufficient to enable a reviewing court to determine with reasonable certainty
the factual basis and legal principles upon which the board acted.”
Citizens
Against the Lewis and Clark (Mowery) Landfill v. Pottawattamie County Bd. of
Adjustment, 277 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Iowa 1979). The Board‟s September 7, 2005
meeting was reported by a court reporter. At this meeting, Wiebbecke‟s attorney
made a presentation, the County responded, and members of the public were
allowed to make arguments for and against Wiebbecke‟s request for a variance.
The Board was actively involved and questioned several of those who spoke.
The discussion and deliberations included the reasons Wiebbecke requested the
variance, the reasons the variance was opposed, as well as the reasons why the
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Board voted to deny the variance. Among the considerations were the CSR of
the property, as well as the size of the property, the character of the surrounding
property and the effect on the neighboring property values, and the fact that a
hardship was created by Wiebbecke rather than the ordinance. Although written
findings were not made, the Board‟s reasoning and conclusions were included in
the reported and transcribed hearing; and thus facilitated our review of the
Board‟s action. See Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Adjustment,
748 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 2008) (“[T]he reviewing court must determine based
on the facts of the particular case whether the actual compliance has
accomplished the purpose of the statute or rule.”); Citizens, 277 N.W.2d at 925
(stating that “facilitate judicial review” is one of the “compelling considerations”
supporting the requirement of written factual findings). Therefore, we find the
Board made sufficient factual findings.
See Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc., 748
N.W.2d at 488 (“[S]ubstantial — as opposed to literal — compliance with the
written-findings requirement is sufficient.”).
In reviewing the Board‟s decision, the district court stated:
The Court finds nothing in the record to suggest that the Board did
not allow discussion of any the various points of view presented or
that improper matters were considered. As is apparent from the
record of the public hearing, all present were given a full
opportunity to present whatever information and arguments, legal
or otherwise, they wished. It is clear from the questions asked by
the Board members that they listened and considered the
information presented before reaching their decision.
The district court then concluded that Wiebbecke failed to prove the
decision of the Board was illegal.
Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors of Madison
County, 636 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Iowa 2001) (“An illegality is established if the board
6
has not acted in accordance with a statute; if its decision was not supported by
substantial evidence; or if its actions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious.”).
We agree.
As we conclude that the Board‟s decision was
supported by substantial evidence, we may not interfere with its judgment. See
Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc., 748 N.W.2d at 497 (“[T]he reasonableness of the
board‟s decision is open to a fair difference of opinion, and therefore, the board‟s
decision should have been affirmed on that basis.”).
Wiebbecke next asserts that Ordinance Number 24 is contrary to statutory
provisions and unconstitutional.
This ordinance was enacted by the Benton
County Board of Supervisors and states it was adopted in accordance with the
Benton County Land Preservation and Use Plan and pursuant to Iowa Code
chapters 335 (County Zoning) and 352 (County Land Preservation and Use
Commissions). The ordinance creates an Agricultural Land Use District defined
as “[a]ll of Benton County that is not within the corporate limits of cities and
towns.” Additionally, the ordinance sets forth the powers of the Board and the
procedure for granting a variance.
Wiebbecke contends that Ordinance Number 24 does not comply with
Iowa Code sections 352.6 and 352.9 (2005). He claims that these code sections
require the county to obtain his permission to include his land in or allow for him
to withdraw his land from the agricultural land use district.
However, we
conclude the code sections cited by Wiebbecke are inapposite as they pertain to
creating, expanding, or withdrawing land from an agricultural area.
Iowa Code section 352.1 recognizes the importance of preserving
agricultural land and provides local citizens and local governments three means
7
to accomplish this: (1) the creation of county land preservation and use plans
and policies, (2) the adoption of an agricultural land preservation ordinance, and
(3) the establishment of agricultural areas. See Iowa Code §§ 352.5 (county land
preservation and use plans and policies), 335.27 (agricultural land preservation
ordinances), and 352.6-.11 (agricultural areas). An agricultural land preservation
ordinance is enacted by the county after notice and a hearing, where an
agricultural area is “self-imposed zoning” initiated by the owners of farmland.
Iowa Code §§ 335.6, 335.27, 352.6; In re Condemnation of Certain Rights, 666
N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa 2003).
In the present case, Wiebbecke sought a variance from Ordinance
Number 24, created under Iowa Code section 352.5 as an agricultural land
preservation ordinance enacted by the county.
Although Iowa Code section
335.27 provides that an agricultural land preservation ordinance is subject to the
same use restrictions of an agricultural area, it does not provide that an
agricultural land preservation ordinance is subject to the consent and withdrawal
provisions of an agricultural land area. Therefore, we conclude sections 352.6
and 352.9 are not applicable to the ordinance and Wiebbecke‟s argument is
without merit.
Additionally, Wiebbecke contends that Ordinance Number 24
is
unconstitutional as it constitutes a taking of property without just compensation.3
Generally,
3
land-use
regulation
does
not
constitute
a
taking
requiring
On appeal, Wiebbecke also asserts that Ordinance Number 24 constitutes spot zoning.
However, as he did not raise this argument to the district court and it was not ruled on by
the district court, we conclude that Wiebbecke did not preserve this argument for appeal.
See, e.g., Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998).
8
compensation unless it either: “1) involves a permanent physical invasion of the
property or 2) denies the owner all economically beneficial or productive use of
the land.” Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Iowa 1994). Neither of these
exceptions is applicable here. Additionally, a government is not required to pay
compensation “where it can be shown the property owner‟s „bundle of rights‟
never included the right to use the land in the way the regulation forbids.” Bellon
v. Monroe County, 577 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
The ordinance was in effect at the time Wiebbecke purchased the land, thus he
did not acquire a use contrary to the existing agricultural classification. See id.
(holding a plaintiff did not acquire a use contrary to the provisions of the existing
road classification). Therefore, we conclude that this claim is also without merit.
Having considered all of the arguments before us on appeal, we affirm the
district court‟s decision.
AFFIRMED.
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