STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EUGENE HENRY MANN, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-067 / 07-0487
Filed March 14, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EUGENE HENRY MANN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick C.
McCormick, District Associate Judge, (motion to suppress) and John C. Nelson,
Judge, (trial and sentencing).
The defendant appeals following his convictions for operating while
intoxicated (third offense) and possession of marijuana. AFFIRMED.
Robert Tiefenthaler of Tiefenthaler Law Office, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Amy Ellis, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
VOGEL, J.
Eugene Mann appeals following his convictions for operating while
intoxicated (OWI), third offense, and possession of marijuana, in violation of Iowa
Code sections 321J.2 and 124.401(5) 1 (2005). We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
The facts in this case are essentially undisputed. As Officer Mark Covey
sat in his patrol car at Fourteenth and Pierce Streets in Sioux City, he heard the
sound of an engine revving.
After determining the sound had come from a
pickup truck traveling southbound on Pierce Street, Officer Covey pulled out and
began to follow the truck. Pierce Street consists of three marked lanes of traffic,
all traveling south.
When Officer Covey began to follow the vehicle, it was in the far left lane.
He immediately observed the vehicle move from the left lane to the center lane
without signaling. Next, he saw the vehicle twice attempt to merge from the
center to the right lane.
Officer Covey described the vehicle as swaying or
drifting over toward the right lane and that both times its tires actually touched the
white lane dividers, and then abruptly jerked back to the center lane. Eventually,
the pickup merged into the right lane, again without using a turn signal, and came
to a stop at a stoplight at the intersection of Sixth and Pierce Streets. When the
light turned green, the vehicle turned right onto Sixth Street.
1
While Mann was charged under chapter 124, the district court’s “Bench Trial Ruling”
finds Mann guilty under chapter 123. It is apparent this is merely a clerical error, and
that Mann was indeed found guilty of a violation of section 124.401(5) as earlier
referenced in the ruling.
3
Officer Covey then activated his lights, pulled the vehicle over and
discovered that Eugene Mann was its driver. In speaking with Mann, Officer
Covey detected an odor of alcohol, that Mann’s eyes were watery, and that he
was speaking loudly. Mann initially claimed that he had not been drinking, but
upon further questioning admitted that he had drank “a couple of beers” prior to
getting into his vehicle. To a second officer on the scene, Mann admitted to
having consumed two shots of Southern Comfort. After Mann failed sobriety
tests, he was arrested and charged with OWI and possession of marijuana. A
search of the vehicle led to the discovery of a baggie, which was later determined
to contain 8.8 grams of marijuana.
Prior to trial on the charges, Mann moved to suppress the evidence
obtained following what he argued was an illegal traffic stop. After a hearing, the
court denied the motion.
Mann then elected to proceed to a bench trial on
stipulated minutes of evidence. The court found him guilty as charged. Mann
appeals, claiming the court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Scope and Standards of Review.
Mann challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress,
which implicates his constitutional rights; as a result, our review is de novo.
State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 510 (Iowa 1997). We make an independent
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).
Motion to Suppress.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
person’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
Evidence
4
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in a prosecution, no matter
how relevant or probative the evidence may be. State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d
642, 643-44 (Iowa 1995). To stop an individual for investigatory purposes the
Fourth Amendment requires that a police officer have reasonable cause to
believe that a crime has occurred or is occurring. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21,
88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d
636, 641 (Iowa 2002).
An automobile stop is governed by these Fourth
Amendment protections and will be upheld only when it is reasonable. Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95
(1996).
When a person challenges a stop on the basis that reasonable
suspicion did not exist, the State must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and articulable
facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, [reasonably warrant a belief that] criminal activity may have
occurred. Mere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of criminal activity is
not enough.
Whether reasonable suspicion exists for an
investigatory stop must be determined in light of the totality of the
circumstances confronting the officer, including all information
available to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to
stop the vehicle. The legality of the stop does not depend on the
actual motivations of the officer involved in the stop.
State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004) (internal citations omitted).
In concluding that Officer Covey had observed a traffic violation--careless
driving--the district court determined the officer was justified in stopping Mann’s
vehicle. The Iowa Code defines careless driving as intentionally “caus[ing] the
vehicle to unnecessarily turn abruptly or sway.” See Iowa Code § 321.277A(4).
In particular, the district court rejected Mann’s contention that no evidence
supported that his abrupt swaying had been unnecessary.
5
We agree with the State that the appropriate question is not whether Mann
actually violated 321.277A, but rather whether the State could establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Officer Covey had reasonable cause to
believe Mann violated the prohibition against careless driving. Here, in the late
evening hours of November 23, 2005, Officer Covey observed a vehicle make
two lane changes without using his turn signal. While perhaps not illegal, they
certainly did give rise to a certain level of suspicion. He also observed Mann’s
vehicle twice drift over towards the right lane of traffic and onto the lane-dividing
line, then abruptly jerking back to the center of the lane. If those two incidents
were attempts to change lanes, both were attempted without signaling. Officer
Covey explained that when Mann was making these abrupt maneuvers, there
was another vehicle “halfway even up with” and “partially beside him” in the right
lane. Officer Covey’s understandable and expressed concern was that if Mann
had continued drifting to the right, he would have struck that other vehicle. There
were also other vehicles “in the vicinity,” with which the officer was concerned for
their safety. Based on these facts, we believe the evidence supports that Mann
intentionally caused his vehicle to turn abruptly and sway.
Iowa Code §
321.277A(4).
However, Mann further claims there was no evidence to support that his
turns and sways were “unnecessary.” See id. He asserts an abrupt lane change
was necessary because he intended to turn right on Sixth Street and he needed
to be in the correct lane. We reject this argument. The term “unnecessarily”
obviously connotes some measure of necessity. Other than the simple desire to
turn right, we agree with the district court that there was no apparent
6
circumstance that compelled Mann to make such abrupt and jerking lane
changes. Accordingly, we conclude the district court properly found that Officer
Covey reasonably believed Mann committed a traffic offense, careless driving,
such that a stop of Mann’s vehicle was justified. We therefore affirm the denial of
Mann’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
