COURTNEY MUNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. BRUECK CONSTRUCTION, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-956 / 07-0536
Filed February 13, 2008
COURTNEY MUNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
BRUECK CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, R. David
Fahey, Jr., Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from the order that granted the defendant’s motion for
directed verdict and overruled his motion for new trial on his claim for breach of
contract and breach of implied warranty. AFFIRMED.
Steven Ort of Bell, Ort & Liechty, New London, for appellant.
Patrick Woodward of McDonald, Woodward & Ivers, P.C., for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
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VOGEL, P.J.
The plaintiff appeals from the order that granted the defendant’s motion for
directed verdict on his claim for breach of contract and breach of implied
warranty and overruled his motion for new trial. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
In the summer of 1999, Courtney Munson approached Brueck
Construction with a set of architect-drawn home plans, and asked Brueck to bid
on certain aspects of the construction.
Brueck agreed to the proposal and
assumed, among other duties, the obligation to oversee or subcontract the
installation of plumbing, heating, and insulation. As originally planned, the walkout lower level of the home contained work and storage space; however, Munson
changed the plan and directed that those spaces be finished as an exercise room
and a home theater.
Among other portions of the construction, Munson himself contracted for
the excavation, foundation, and concrete floors. When these were finished in
November of 1999, Brueck began his work.
Munson’s contract with Brueck
specified that there were to be four “frost proof hose faucets (outside)”; however,
the locations of the spigots were to be determined in a “walk through” with the
owner. Brueck had subcontracted with McCann Mechanical to do the plumbing.
During a walk-through with plumber Don Riley, Munson directed that a spigot be
placed in the wall in the southeast corner of the exercise room.
Riley, concerned about the placement of that spigot in an outside wall
because of the increased risk of freezing, expressed those concerns to Brueck’s
onsite manager, Steve Brueck, and McCann Mechanical’s owner, James
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McCann. It was the opinion of both that Munson understood the concern, and
that the spigot should nonetheless be placed where Munson wished. Therefore,
at Munson’s direction, Riley placed the outside faucet on the back, lower level of
the house.
The contract further provided that Brueck would insulate the home.
Although Brueck intended to use fiberglass batt insulation, Munson insisted that
Brueck use a process called spray-in cellulose insulation.
Brueck’s owner,
Robert Brueck, concerned about possible mold, voiced concerns about the
amount of water used in the process.
Brueck had never used this process
before, but acceded to Munson’s wishes and subcontracted the work to S&S
Spray-In Insulation.
On November 2, 2000, after construction was complete, the home was
turned over to Munson. At that time Munson occupied the home, spending nine
months of the year there and three months of the year in Florida. In 2003,
Munson decided to spend only two to three months of the year in Iowa and the
remainder in Florida. He occupied the house for several weeks in December
2003, but returned to Florida just after New Year’s Day, 2004.
During his
absence, Munson’s employee, Perry Piper, was to check on the house on a
regular basis. On February 9, 2004, Piper entered the home and discovered the
lower level was flooded.
He estimated there was between seven and eight
inches of water standing on the floor. The flooding occurred when the water pipe
located in the exterior wall cracked approximately eighteen inches above its
connection to the outside faucet. The cracked pipe was a result of freezing.
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On July 19, 2005, Munson filed an action against Brueck alleging breach
of contract, breach of implied warranty, and negligence 1 . Following the close of
plaintiff’s evidence at trial, Brueck moved for a directed verdict. In an on-therecord ruling, the court granted the motion and dismissed Munson’s suit in its
entirety. The court later overruled Munson’s motion for new trial, which was
limited to the implied warranty theory. Munson appeals from these rulings.
Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s rulings on motions for directed verdict for the
correction of errors at law. Yates v. Iowa West Racing Ass’n, 721 N.W.2d 762,
768 (Iowa 2006). In reviewing such rulings, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether the evidence
generated a fact question. Id. “Where substantial evidence does not exist to
support each element of a plaintiff’s claim, the court may sustain the motion.”
Dettmann v. Kruckenberg, 613 N.W.2d 238, 251 (Iowa 2000).
Evidence is
substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a
conclusion. Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1995). If
reasonable minds could differ on resolution of the issue, then it should be
submitted to the jury. Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454,
466 (Iowa 2000).
Our review of a district court’s ruling on a motion for new trial depends on
the grounds raised in the motion. Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John
Deere Health Care, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 2006).
Because the
sufficiency of the evidence presents a legal question, we review the trial court’s
1
Munson dismissed the negligence claim prior to trial.
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ruling on this ground for the correction of errors of law. Estate of Hagedorn ex
rel. Hagedorn v. Peterson, 690 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Iowa 2004).
Implied Warranty.
In directing the verdict on Munson’s implied warranty for a particular
purpose claim, the court found that no evidence had been presented as to the
causation of the frozen pipe.
It recognized that no expert testimony was
presented that
the plumbing should not have been at that location or that it was
incorrectly installed, that the insulation was insufficient, or that the
insulation was incorrectly installed. Similarly, there is no evidence
in this record that the insulation was insufficient, either in its design
or it was incorrectly installed. There is likewise, no evidence in this
record that some combination of those two things caused this
failure. That is the proper subject of expert testimony.
Finally, the court noted that the only evidence in the record was that the plumbing
and installation work was undertaken in a good and workmanlike manner.
In construction contracts it is implied that the building will be erected in a
reasonably good and workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for the
intended purpose. Busker v. Sokolowski, 203 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Iowa 1972).
Where a contractor agrees to build a structure to be used for
a particular purpose, there is an implied agreement on his part that
the structure when completed will be serviceable for the purpose
intended . . . .
Where the contract contains a guarantee or warranty,
express or implied, that the contractor’s work will be sufficient for a
particular purpose or to accomplish a certain result, unless waived
by the owner, the risk of accomplishing such purpose or result is on
the contractor, and there is no substantial performance unless the
work is sufficient for such purpose or accomplishes such result.
Semler v. Knowling, 325 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Iowa 1982) (quoting 17A C.J.S.,
Contracts, § 494(2)(a), at 715-16 (1963)).
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The supreme court in Semler noted the following elements for recovery
must be present under the theory of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose:
(1) The seller must have reason to know the consumer’s particular
purpose. To give rise to an implied warranty the contract must
respond to a particular need of the consumer, not just to general
purposes.
(2) The installation contractor must have reason to know that the
consumer is relying on his skill or judgment to furnish appropriate
installation services.
(3) The consumer must, in fact, rely upon the installer’s skill or
judgment.
Semler, 325 N.W.2d at 399.
Whether such a warranty arises is usually a
question of fact determined from the circumstances of the parties’ negotiations.
Id.
First, we conclude no substantial evidence was introduced at trial that
would support the first element of this claim—that Brueck had in any way
responded to a “particular need” of Munson. In that regard, there is no evidence
that the water pipes were intended by Munson to meet a particular purpose other
than to move water from one point to the next. Providing and installing a water
pipe is merely a general purpose under the greater building contract. Nothing
sets this purpose aside from any other such pipe installation. Its general purpose
is distinguishable from that discussed in Semler.
There, the contractor was
“hired for a single, particular purpose: to install a working sewer system by a
means which did not necessitate cutting the street in order to hook up Semler’s
building with the City’s main sewer line.” Semler, 325 N.W.2d 397. Conversely,
here, Brueck was hired for the entirely general purpose of overseeing or
subcontracting the installation of the home’s plumbing, heating, and insulation.
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Furthermore, there is simply no evidence, other than speculation, in the
record as to what caused the pipe to freeze and eventually burst. No expert
evidence was introduced by the plaintiff to substantiate a deficiency in the
plumbing, insulation, or construction.
No opinions were rendered that the
plumbing or insulation was not installed in a good and workmanlike fashion.
Rather, the undisputed evidence established that pipes can freeze and crack for
any number of reasons, including some that are in the sole control of the home
owner, namely the failure to maintain adequate heat in the structure during the
winter months and the placement of connectors or hoses on the outside spigot.
None of the reasons offered for the pipe freezing were excluded and no
causation was opined by any of the witnesses that was not more speculation
than fact. Accordingly, due to this lack of evidence in the record, we conclude
the court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of Brueck and overruled the
motion for new trial on Munson’s implied warranty claim.
Breach of Contract.
Munson alleged in his pleadings that Brueck failed to perform its contract
in a good and workmanlike manner and that the pipe installation was not done in
a manner fit for its intended purpose. In granting the directed verdict on this
ground, the court relied on the same grounds it cited in granting the directed
verdict on the implied warranty claim.
We conclude the trial court properly granted Brueck’s motion for directed
verdict on this ground as well. In a breach-of-contract claim, the complaining
party must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of
the contract; (3) that it has performed all the terms and conditions required under
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the contract; (4) the defendant’s breach of the contract in some particular way;
and (5) that plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the breach. Iowa-Illinois
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Iowa 1993).
Munson failed to present substantial evidence that Brueck breached the
contract. As noted above, there was no expert testimony that Brueck failed to act
in a manner consistent with industry standards. None of the witnesses could
identify the reason why the pipe froze and broke. They were only able to testify
about a variety of generic and theoretical reasons the pipe could have broken.
No evidence existed, other than the pipe and insulation were both properly
installed, and carried out in a good and workmanlike manner.
affirm the order of the trial court granting directed verdict.
AFFIRMED.
We therefore
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