IN THE INTEREST OF K.D.R., Minor Child, A.J.R., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-998 / 06-1806
Filed December 28, 2006
IN THE INTEREST OF K.D.R.,
Minor Child,
A.J.R., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Gary K.
Anderson, District Associate Judge.
A.J.R. appeals from the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Roberta Megal, Council Bluffs, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Matthew Wilbur, County Attorney, and Dawn Eimers, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Lori Falk-Goss, Council Bluffs, for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
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HUITINK, J.
A.J.R. appeals from the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She
contends the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with K.D.R.
We review A.J.R.’s claim de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
A.J.R.’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code sections
232.116(1)(d) (child CINA for physical or sexual abuse (or neglect),
circumstances continue despite receipt of services), 232.116(1)(e) (child CINA,
child removed for six months, parent has not maintained significant and
meaningful contact with the child), 232.116(1)(h) (child is three or younger, child
CINA, removed from home for six of last twelve months, and child cannot be
returned home), 232.116(1)(i) (child meets definition of CINA, child was in
imminent danger, services would not correct condition), and 232.116(1)(l) (child
CINA, parent has substance abuse problem, child cannot be returned within a
reasonable time). When the trial court terminates on more than one statutory
ground, we need only find termination is proper on one ground. In re S.R., 600
N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
A.J.R. argues “that she did not receive reasonable time to rehabilitate
herself” and the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with K.D.R.
We disagree.
The State is required to “make every reasonable effort to return the child
to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the
child.” Iowa Code § 232.102(7); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493. This requirement
involves providing “services to a parent before termination proceedings may be
instituted.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002). “Reasonable efforts
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are aimed at both preventing and eliminating the need for removal.” Id. “[W]hat
constitutes reasonable services varies based upon the requirements of each
individual case.”
Id.
“Generally, in making reasonable efforts to provide
services, the State’s focus is on services to improve parenting.” Id. “[I]t is the
parent’s responsibility to demand services if they are not offered prior to the
termination hearing.” In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
“[V]oicing complaints regarding the adequacy of services to a social worker is not
sufficient.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 148. “A parent must inform the juvenile
court of such challenge.” Id. When the parent alleging inadequate services fails
to demand services other than those provided, the issue of whether services
were adequate is not preserved for appellate review. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d at
65; In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
We assume without deciding that A.J.R. has preserved error on the issues
raised. The record indicates that A.J.R. was provided with the following services:
substance abuse evaluation; substance abuse treatment; drug screens; familycentered services, including supervised visits and parent skill training; bus
tickets; and rental deposit assistance. A.J.R.’s participation in these services has
been inconsistent.
employment.
She has not been able to maintain a stable home or
She has been living in several shelters and substance abuse
treatment facilities. A.J.R. recognizes that she needs help with her drug problem.
However, despite attending several residential drug treatment programs, A.J.R.
has not successfully completed any of them.
Like the trial court, we find clear and convincing evidence supporting
termination of A.J.R.’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h).
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K.D.R. is three years or younger, has been adjudicated CINA and has been
removed from the home for six of the last twelve months. The unfortunate fact of
the matter is that A.J.R. has not addressed her substance abuse issues, and her
prognosis for doing so is poor. “A parent does not have an unlimited amount of
time in which to correct his or her deficiencies.” In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d at
677. K.D.R. “should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of her parents.”
In re C.L.H., 500 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 1993) (citing In re T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d
738, 744 (Iowa 1983)).
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, we affirm the termination of A.J.R.’s
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