DAVID JOHN BEAURIVAGE, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-904 / 05-1849
Filed December 13, 2006
DAVID JOHN BEAURIVAGE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, L. Vern
Robinson, Judge.
David John Beaurivage appeals from a district court judicial review
decision affirming an administrative decision of the Iowa Department of
Transportation suspending his driving privileges. AFFIRMED.
John D. Jacobsen of Hallberg, Jacobsen, Johnson & Viner, P.L.C., Cedar
Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
David John Beaurivage appeals from a district court judicial review
decision affirming an administrative decision of the Iowa Department of
Transportation (IDOT) suspending his driving privileges pursuant to Iowa Code
section 321.205 (2003). We affirm.
The following facts are undisputed and are shown by substantial evidence
in the record before the agency when the record is considered as a whole.
Shortly before midnight on August 11, 2004, the petitioner-appellant David John
Beaurivage was stopped by an Illinois state trooper who had observed
Beaurivage fail to signal a lane change and fail to stop at a stop line. The trooper
smelled a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on Beaurivage’s breath and
observed his eyes to be bloodshot and glassy. Beaurivage failed a field sobriety
test, a preliminary breath test indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.133, and
chemical breath testing disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.112, more than
the Illinois statutory limit of 0.08.
The trooper reported the foregoing facts in a written, sworn report and in
the early morning hours of August 12, 2004, issued a notice of summary
suspension of Beaurivage’s driving privileges, to take effect on the forty-sixth day
thereafter. The notice informed Beaurivage of his right to a hearing to contest
the suspension, and that he must file the petition seeking rescission of the
suspension within ninety days. Beaurivage does not claim, and the record does
not show, that he ever contested the suspension.
As a result of the events of August 11-12, 2004, Illinois charged
Beaurivage with operating while intoxicated. He pled guilty to an amended or
3
substituted charge of reckless driving and received what appears to be the Illinois
equivalent of a deferred judgment. The IDOT received notice from Illinois that
Beaurivage had incurred a suspension of his driving privileges because of
chemical testing which disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.112. The IDOT
served notice on Beaurivage that his privileges to operate motor vehicles were
being revoked pursuant to Iowa Code section 321.205 for one year. Beaurivage
contested the revocation. In final agency action in a contested case the IDOT
found that Beaurivage’s Iowa operating privileges had previously been revoked in
1997 under Iowa Code chapter 321 for a test refusal in Illinois, a finding which
Beaurivage has not challenged, and ordered his driving privileges suspended for
one year pursuant to section 321.205.
Beaurivage sought judicial review, “request[ing] that [the district court]
make a legal determination whether the one-year motor vehicle license
revocation was appropriate.” The district court affirmed the final agency action.
Beaurivage appeals.
Judicial review of agency action is governed by Iowa Code chapter 17A.
State v. Vargason, 607 N.W.2d 691, 695 (Iowa 2000). The district court acts in
an appellate capacity to correct errors at law. Ludtke v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,
646 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Iowa 2002). In reviewing the district court’s decision this
court applied the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether our conclusions
are the same as those of the district court.
Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686
N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004). If they are the same, we affirm; otherwise we
reverse or grant other appropriate relief. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10).
4
On appeal Beaurivage states the issue presented as follows: “The district
court erred in the reading, interpretation and plain language of Iowa Code §
321.205.” On appeal, as in the district court, Beaurivage does not cite to or rely
on any one or more of the possible grounds of agency error cataloged in Iowa
Code section 17A.19(10). From the language of his stated issue he may intend
either section 17A.19(10)(c), agency action “Based upon an erroneous
interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has not clearly been
vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency,” or section
17A.19(10)(l), agency action “Based upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has clearly
been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.”
Section 321.205 provides:
The [Iowa Department of Transportation] is authorized to
suspend or revoke the driver’s license of a resident of this state
upon receiving notice of the conviction of the resident in another
state for an offense which, if committed in this state, would be
grounds for the suspension or revocation of the license or upon
receiving notice of a final administrative decision in another state
that the resident has acted in a manner which would be grounds for
suspension or revocation of the license in this state.
The IDOT has at no time claimed that Beaurivage was convicted of an offense
which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or
revocation of his license. Nor did the IDOT or the district court find any such
conviction. Rather, the IDOT suspended Beaurivage’s license on the basis of an
Illinois suspension for a chemical breath test disclosing an alcohol concentration
of 0.112. We thus focus on the second part of section 321.205, suspension or
revocation of Iowa driving privileges based upon a final administrative decision in
another state.
5
Concerning this second part of section 321.205, Beaurivage claims the
Illinois suspension of his driving privileges was not “final.” He acknowledges in
his brief that the Illinois suspension was an “administrative decision,” but asserts
that because it was a “summary suspension” it was not “final.” However, as
argued by the IDOT, finality may occur either by exhaustion of review remedies
or waiver of them. See, e.g., Schilling v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69,
73 (Iowa 2002) (discussing the requirement of finality for the purpose of another
license revocation statute, and noting that a conviction is final if the defendant
has “exhausted or waived any postorder challenge.”). Beaurivage had a right to
a hearing to contest the Illinois suspension, was given notice of his right to so
contest the suspension, and did not contest it. We agree with the IDOT and the
district court that the Illinois suspension of Beaurivage’s driving privileges
constituted a “final administrative decision” in Illinois.
We have considered all arguments made by Beaurivage and find them to
be without merit. We therefore affirm the district court’s affirmance of the IDOT’s
suspension of Beaurivage’s driving privileges.
AFFIRMED.
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