IN THE INTEREST OF D.M., M.W., W.F, and A.S., Minor Children, T.R., Father, Appellant, R.W., Mother, Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-885 / 06-1426
Filed November 30, 2006
IN THE INTEREST OF D.M., M.W., W.F, and A.S.,
Minor Children,
T.R., Father,
Appellant,
R.W., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John G. Mullen,
District Associate Judge.
A mother and a father each appeal from a juvenile court order terminating
their parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
James G. Sothmann, Davenport, for appellant-father.
Martha McCall Whitmer, Davenport, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Gerda Lane, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
John Molyneaux, Davenport, for father of A.S.
Dana Copell, Davenport, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Rachel is the mother of four-year-old Donovan, three-year-old Megan,
two-year-old Alayna, and one-year-old Warren.
Terrance is Warren’s father.
Rachel and Terrance appeal from an August 2006 juvenile court order
terminating Rachel’s parental rights to the four children and Terrance’s parental
rights to Warren. The order also terminated the parental rights of Donovan’s and
Megan’s father, and the parental rights of Alayna’s father, but they have not
appealed. We affirm on both appeals.
Services to Rachel began in September 2004 because her mother was
concerned the children were not receiving proper supervision and the Iowa
Department of Human Services (DHS) was aware of prior neglect and abuse of
Rachel’s children.
A subsequent investigation resulted in a February 2005
founded report of physical abuse of Donovan by an unknown person. Donovan
had been in the exclusive care of Rachel and her paramour, Terrance, at the
time of the abuse. In March 2005 Terrance, by whom Rachel later gave birth to
Warren, was found to have physically abused Donovan and Megan in an incident
separate from the one that had led to the February finding.
The State filed child in need of assistance (CINA) petitions regarding
Donovan, Megan, and Alayna. Rachel voluntarily placed the three children in
their maternal grandmother’s care. The three children were adjudicated CINA in
May 2005, and the juvenile court ordered them placed in the custody of their
maternal grandmother. Problems constituting grounds for the adjudication and
custody orders were physical abuse of the children; lack of supervision, as the
small children would wake up and remain unattended while Rachel continued to
3
sleep; Rachel being without a stable residence and housing; and Rachel’s failure
or refusal to regularly take medications prescribed for her depression.
In August 2005 the children were placed in foster care as their maternal
grandmother had difficulty in caring for them. Later in August Rachel gave birth
to Warren, who was initially placed in voluntary foster care, and in November
2005 was subsequently adjudicated a CINA and placed in the custody of the
DHS. He has thereafter remained in DHS custody and foster care placement. A
September 2005 dispositional order placed Donovan, Megan, and Alayna in the
custody of the DHS for placement in foster care, where they have thereafter
remained.
Shortly after Warren’s birth Terrance was sent to prison for his
physical abuse of Donovan and Megan. He was released from prison in midApril 2006.
In May 2006 the State filed petitions seeking termination of the parental
rights of all of the parents of all four children. Following hearing the juvenile court
terminated
Rachel’s
parental
rights
pursuant
to
Iowa
Code
sections
232.116(1)(d), (e), (f) (Donovan), and (h) (Megan, Alayna, and Warren) (2005),
and terminated Terrance’s parental rights to Warren pursuant to sections
232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), and (h). Rachel and Terrance appeal.
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we
are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court’s findings of
fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. The
primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of
the child. To support the termination of parental rights, the State
must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section
232.116 by clear and convincing evidence.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
4
On appeal Rachel seeks reversal of only that part of the termination order
that terminated her parental rights to Donovan and Megan, and Terrance seeks
reversal of the termination of his parental rights to Warren. Each claims the
State did not prove the statutory grounds for termination relied on by the juvenile
court. When the trial court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory
ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the statutory
provisions in order to affirm. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996).
Concerning Rachel’s appeal we choose to focus on sections
232.116(1)(f) (Donovan), and (h) (Megan). As to Terrance’s appeal, we choose
to focus on section 232.116(1)(h).
Concerning the provisions upon which we focus, Rachel claims the State
did not prove that Donovan and Megan could not be returned to her. As to this
issue Terrance merely “joins in the same arguments and supporting legal
authority . . . submitted in the mother’s brief . . . in support of his own appeal.”
The State asserts Terrance has thus not preserved error on this issue. Although
the absence of any statement of the issue, any argument, and any citation of
authority more correctly may constitute a waiver of the issue, see Iowa R. App. P.
6.14(1)(c), we choose to address Terrance’s claim as well as Rachel’s on this
issue.
These claims implicate the fourth and final element of sections
232.116(1)(f) and (h), which require the State to prove the children cannot be
returned to the parents because the children remain in need of assistance as
defined by section 232.2(6). In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995). The threat of probable harm will justify termination of parental rights, and
5
the perceived harm need not be the one that supported the child’s initial removal
from the home. In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992).
The juvenile court found, in part:
Mother has been unable to resolve the adjudicatory harm.
Her living situation is tenuous, unstable, and dependent upon
others. She has no income and has resisted all efforts to find
employment. While she says she has a job or access to the job,
the fact of the matter is that is not true, and she has not made any
serious effort to find employment. In her testimony, it is clear that
she is now dependent upon Terrance [ ] for his financial support.
She has mental health issues but has made no serious effort to
address these. She is not receiving any specific mental health
counseling or services. She says she is taking medications
provided by a general practitioner for her depression. This is not
true. They told the Department of Human Services that they gave
her a 30-day supply in March 2006 and have not seen her since.
Mother’s reliance on Terrance [ ] for support is tenuous and
inappropriate in terms of her reunification with her children. He was
the person who physically abused Donovan and Megan. He has
refused to complete the Batterer’s Education Program and he has
refused to participate in any alternative services to address the
anger. He has refused to address substance abuse issues and is
known to have been drinking since release from prison. In fact, he
admitted that he was drinking. Donovan, in particular, holds
extreme anger towards his mother and fear of Terrance [ ] because
of the abuse. Mother’s relationship before resuming a relationship
with Terrance [ ] was with Chad [ ]. This relationship was volatile
and violent. The mother insisted on Chad being involved in
services and participating in reunification effort with her. Donovan’s
reaction was anger and fearful.
This caused a rift in the
relationship between Donovan and the mother and he is not visiting
with the mother because of that rift. Mother had given consent to
termination of parental rights as to Warren and Alayna. She later
withdrew that, but she has not visited with either of those children
since December 2005. The only child that she visits now is Megan.
Megan is aggressive towards her mother and the mother has
difficulty providing appropriate structure, supervision, and safety for
Megan.
The court concluded that the children could not be safely returned to the custody
of Rachel or Terrance. It found that if placed in their custody the children would
6
be subject to a high risk of physical abuse, neglect, emotional abuse, failure of
supervision, and failure to provide necessities.
The juvenile court’s findings and conclusion are fully supported by the
record, and upon our de novo review we concur in them and adopt them as our
own. We affirm the juvenile court’s determination that the State proved by clear
and convincing evidence the grounds for termination of Rachel’s parental rights
to Donovan pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f) and Rachel’s and Terrance’s
parental rights to Megan pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h).
Rachel claims termination of her parental rights was improper because the
juvenile court “refused to fully evaluate the suitability of a prior relative placement
and rejected modification of disposition at the Permanency Hearing.” Terrance
appears to make the same claim. As part of her supporting legal authority for
this issue, Rachel cites Iowa Code sections 232.116(3)(a) and (c).
These
provisions respectively allow the juvenile court the discretion to decline otherwise
appropriate termination when (1) a relative has custody of the child, and (2)
termination would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parentchild relationship. However, no issue related to either of these two provisions
was addressed or passed upon by the juvenile court or pursued by way of postruling motion. We conclude no error was preserved regarding either of these two
provisions.
In March 2006 the children’s maternal grandmother was allowed to
intervene in the underlying CINA case to seek placement of the four children with
her when permanency was to be considered. She thereafter filed a motion to
modify the prior dispositional order and have the three oldest children placed in
7
her physical custody. 1
Following a permanency hearing, in May 2006 the
juvenile court found that for numerous reasons long-term placement with the
maternal grandmother would be inappropriate and that termination and the
intended adoption of the four children by the older children’s present foster
parents was in the best interest of the children. It adopted a permanency plan
calling for termination and for adoption by the foster parents; ordered that the
children remain in their current foster home consistent with the permanency plan,
thus rejecting the maternal grandmother’s request that the children be placed
with her; and discharged the maternal grandmother as an intervenor.
The State points out that the motion to modify the dispositional order was
the maternal grandmother’s motion, and that she did not appeal the denial of her
motion or her discharge from the case. The State asserts that because it was
the maternal grandmother who sought modification of the dispositional order to
place the children with her, Rachel and Terrance do not have standing to claim
the juvenile court erred in denying that motion. We agree, and do not further
consider this claim of error.
We conclude that statutory grounds for termination pursuant to sections
232.116(1)(f) and (h) were proved by clear and convincing evidence, termination
of parental rights is in the best interest of the children, and that other claims of
juvenile court error were not preserved, are without merit, or the appellants are
without standing to assert them. We therefore affirm the judgment of the juvenile
court.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
1
The DHS, which had legal custody of Warren, had earlier placed him in foster care
with her.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
