STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAMES LLOYD HOUSTON, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-823 / 05-1805
Filed November 30, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES LLOYD HOUSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Michael R. Mullins,
Judge.
Defendant appeals from his convictions, following a jury trial, for thirddegree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and indecent contact with a
child. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney
General, and Rick L. Lynch, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., Vogel, J., and Brown, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
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HUITINK, P.J.
James Lloyd Houston appeals from his convictions, following a jury trial,
for third-degree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and indecent contact
with a child. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
S.L., the twelve-year-old step-granddaughter of Houston, told one of her
teachers that something bad had happened to her. She later spoke to a police
officer at the school. Further investigation led the police to ask Houston to come
to the law enforcement center for questioning, which he agreed to do. During the
interview, Houston admitted touching S.L.’s breasts and placing her hand on his
penis on one occasion. He also admitted to placing his hand on her breast and
inserting his finger into her vagina on a separate occasion. Houston wrote out
and signed a statement admitting to these acts.
The State filed a trial information charging Houston with third-degree
sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and indecent contact with a child. At
trial, S.L. identified Houston as the man who had molested her on two occasions
and described the two separate instances in detail.
Houston testified in his
defense that he had been “drinking quite a bit” on the dates in question and
therefore did not remember touching S.L. The jury found Houston guilty, he was
sentenced, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Houston argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a notice of defense of intoxication and for failing to request jury instructions
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regarding intoxication and corroboration. 1 We review his claims de novo. State
v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Iowa 2005).
II. Discussion
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the attorney failed to perform
an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied defendant a
fair trial. State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 2003); State v. Ceaser,
585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998).
Generally, we do not resolve claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d
191, 203 (Iowa 2002). We prefer to leave such claims for postconviction relief
proceedings, “where an adequate record of the claim can be developed and the
attorney charged with providing ineffective assistance may have an opportunity
to respond to defendant’s claims.” Id. Counsel’s failure to request certain jury
instructions and failure to give notice of an intoxication defense are typically
“matters more suited to postconviction relief.” State v. Slayton, 417 N.W.2d 432,
436 (Iowa 1987).
We conclude the record before us is inadequate to address the ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims Houston makes on direct appeal, with one
exception. Houston argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
a jury instruction on corroboration of his confession.
1
See Iowa R. Crim. P.
Houston also argues the district court erred in failing to give corroboration and
intoxication instructions to the jury. Houston, however, failed to preserve error by
requesting these instructions at trial. State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Iowa 1980),
superseded on other grounds by Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1988).
Therefore, we may consider his claims only under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
analysis.
4
2.21(4) (requiring an out-of-court confession be corroborated by other proof the
defendant committed the offense); State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa
2003). “Corroboration need not be strong nor need it go to the whole case so
long as it confirms some material fact connecting the defendant with the crime.”
Polly, 657 N.W.2d at 467 (citations omitted).
We conclude S.L.’s testimony
provided substantial “other proof” that Houston committed the offenses to which
he confessed.
Therefore, Houston cannot prove the prejudice prong of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim for his attorney’s failure to request a
corroboration instruction, and his claim must fail. Id. at 468.
We affirm Houston’s convictions. We preserve for possible postconviction
proceedings Houston’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
notice of defense of intoxication and for failing to request a jury instruction
regarding intoxication.
AFFIRMED.
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