STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO MATTHEW SALAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-786 / 06-0263
Filed November 16, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARIO MATTHEW SALAZAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, William L. Thomas,
Judge.
Mario Salazar appeals from the sentence imposed by the district court
upon his convictions for burglary in the second degree and willful injury causing
serious injury. AFFIRMED.
Chad R. Frese and Melissa A. Nine, of Kaplan & Frese, LLP,
Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, Brent D. Heeren, County Attorney, and , Richard Vander Mey, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Mario Salazar appeals from the sentence imposed by the district court
upon his convictions for burglary in the second degree and willful injury causing
serious injury. He contends the court erred in not giving him credit for the time
he spent on pretrial release under the supervision of the department of
correctional services. We affirm.
According to the minutes of evidence and guilty plea transcript, on
February 29, 2004, Salazar entered the home of Vicente Ruelas without
permission and while Ruelas was home. Salazar was armed with a pistol when
he entered the residence and intentionally shot Ruelas with no legal justification.
Salazar was originally charged with attempted murder and burglary in the first
degree.
At Salazar’s initial appearance on May 20, 2004, the district court
released him under the supervision of the department of correctional services.
The specific conditions of his release included “electronic home monitoring and
detention.”
On January 19, 2006, the State filed an amended trial information
charging Salazar with the additional crimes of willful injury causing serious injury
and assault while participating in a felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement Salazar
pled guilty to willful injury causing serious injury and burglary in the second
degree, a lesser included offense of first-degree burglary.
As part of the
agreement the State agreed to dismiss the other two counts.
The district court accepted the guilty plea. Salazar waived any delay in
sentencing and his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment. The court followed
3
the agreement of the parties and ordered Salazar to serve two consecutive tenyear terms of imprisonment. Salazar requested he be allowed credit against his
sentence for the time he spent subject to the electronic home monitoring and
detention from May 20, 2004, until January 19, 2006. He claimed he had not left
his house during that period other than to meet with his attorney and his
physician. The court allowed Salazar credit for time he had served in jail but did
not give him any credit for the time he spent on pretrial release under the
supervision of the department of correctional services.
Our review of sentencing decisions is for correction of errors at law. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 2000). The
general rule requiring error preservation is not ordinarily applicable to void,
illegal, or procedurally defective sentences. State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311,
313 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). A defendant is not required to raise a claim of an
improper or illegal sentence in the trial court in order to preserve a right of appeal
on that ground. Id. The issue raised by Salazar involves interpretation and
application of two statutory provisions. Accordingly, our review is for correction
of errors at law. State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 2000); State v.
Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000); State v. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d 527,
528 (Iowa 2000).
Salazar appeals his sentence, contending the district court erred in failing
to give him credit for the time he spent on pretrial release under the supervision
of the department of correctional services 1 while subject to electronic monitoring
1
Although Salazar at several points in his brief asserts that his pretrial release was
under the supervision of the Iowa “Department of Corrections,” we believe his release
4
and in-home detention. He relies on sections 903A.2(3) (2003) and 903A.5 in
support of the contention he is entitled to credit.
Section 903A.5 provides in relevant part:
An inmate shall not be discharged from the custody of the
director of the Iowa department of corrections until the inmate has
served the full term for which the inmate was sentenced, less
earned time and other credits earned and not forfeited. . . . If an
inmate was confined to a county jail or other correctional or mental
facility at any time prior to sentencing, or after sentencing but prior
to the case having been decided on appeal, because of failure to
furnish bail or because of being charged with a nonbailable offense,
the inmate shall be given credit for the days already served upon
the term of the sentence.
This section does provide for credit for time spent “confined to a county jail or
other correctional or mental facility.” However, it does not provide credit for time
spent subject to electronic monitoring and home detention while on pretrial
release. We do not believe the meaning of “county jail or other correctional or
mental facility” is ambiguous. Our supreme court has determined that the words
of section 903A.5 are unambiguous and “clearly and only allow credit for time
served in state correctional institutions or detention facilities.”
State v.
Rodenburg, 562 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Iowa 1997). Salazar’s home was not a state
correctional institution or a detention facility. Thus, the time Salazar spent on
was instead clearly under the supervision of the judicial district’s “Department of
Correctional Services.” See Iowa Code § 904.102 (establishing the Iowa Department of
Corrections); id. § 905.2 (establishing judicial district departments of correctional
services); id. § 904.111 (allowing chapter 28E agreements between the department of
corrections and district departments of correctional services); id. § 811.2(1)(a) providing
for pretrial release to an organization agreeing to supervise the defendant); see also
State v. Reitenbaugh, 392 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1986) (noting that the defendant’s
pretrial release was conditioned upon reporting to a pre-trial supervisor in the
department of correctional services); Wenman v. State, 327 N.W.2d 216, 216 (Iowa
1982) (noting that following arrest the defendant was released to the supervision of the
department of correctional services); State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Iowa 1981)
(noting that defendant’s pretrial release was subject to supervision of the department of
correctional services).
5
pretrial release “confined” to his home and subject to electronic monitoring does
not fit within the meaning of “county jail or other correctional or mental facility”
under section 903A.5.
Furthermore, Salazar was not “confined” in his home “because of failure to
furnish bail or because of being charged with a nonbailable offense.” Thus, it
would not serve the underlying purpose of this portion of the statute to give
Salazar credit on his sentence for the time he spent subject to in-home detention.
See, e.g., People v. Whiteside, 468 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Mich. 1991) (holding, in a
case involving a similar statute, that because the purpose of the statute “is to
equalize the position of one who cannot post bond with that of a person who is
financially able to do so, a showing that presentence confinement was the result
of inability to post pond is an essential prerequisite to the award of sentence
credit under the statute.”).
Section 903A.2(3) provides:
Time served in a jail or another facility prior to actual
placement in an institution under the control of the department of
corrections and credited against the sentence by the court shall
accrue for the purpose of reduction of sentence under this section.
Time which elapses during an escape shall not accrue for purposes
of reduction of sentence under this section.
Clearly Salazar’s home is not a “jail.” Furthermore, we look at the statute as a
whole, and not isolated words or phrases. State v. Young, 686 N.W.2d 182, 18485 (Iowa 2004). When we do so it seems apparent that the legislature intended
the term “another facility” to include places similar to a jail, places formally
designated as places of detention or confinement, and not the private residences
of individuals. We conclude the time Salazar was on pretrial release subject to
6
electronic monitoring and in-home detention is simply not the functional
equivalent of “[t]ime served in a jail or another facility” as set forth is section
903A.2(3).
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude neither section 903A.5 nor
section 903A.2(3) provides for credit for time spent on pretrial release under the
supervision of the department of correctional services and subject to electronic
monitoring and home detention. The district court was correct in not allowing
credit against Salazar’s sentence for that time.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
