STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JERRY WAYNE CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-750 / 06-0265
Filed October 11 ,2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JERRY WAYNE CUNNINGHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, Steve J. Oeth,
District Associate Judge.
Jerry Wayne Cunningham appeals from the district court’s restitution
order. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha Boesen, Assistant Attorney
General, and Patrick Chambers, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
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HUITINK, P.J.
On January 12, 2005, the trial court accepted Cunningham’s guilty plea to
one count of attempted burglary. Cunningham waived his right to file a motion in
arrest of judgment, and the court immediately sentenced him to a two-year term
of confinement and fined him $500 plus applicable surcharge and court costs.
The State filed a statement of the victim’s pecuniary damages on December 20,
2005.
On February 7, 2006, the trial court entered a ruling rejecting
Cunningham’s challenge to the amount of restitution claimed and ordered
Cunningham to pay $7175.50 restitution.
On appeal, Cunningham argues:
I. The trial court erred in imposing $7175.50 in restitution more
than one year following the criminal judgment based upon a
statement of pecuniary damages filed more than eleven months
following the judgment.
We review the trial court’s restitution order for errors of law. State v. Bradley,
637 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001).
Iowa Code section 910.3 provides:
The county attorney shall prepare a statement of pecuniary
damages to victims of the defendant . . . . If pecuniary damage
amounts are not available at the time of sentencing, the county
attorney shall provide a statement of pecuniary damages incurred
up to that time of the clerk of court. The statement shall be
provided no later than thirty days after sentencing.
“If the victim’s damages continue to accrue at the time of sentencing, the court
may defer the determination of a victim’s total entitlement until a later date.” Id.
“The main objective of the restitution statute is two-fold: to protect the public and
to rehabilitate the defendant.”
State v. Blakely, 534 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Iowa
1995). The State’s failure to comply with the thirty-day requirement does not bar
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restitution. See id.; State v. Blakely, 555 N.W.2d 221, 222 (Iowa 1996). The
State is nevertheless obliged “to promptly furnish the court, and the defendant, a
statement of pecuniary damages . . . .” Blakely, 555 N.W.2d at 222.
We must weigh the prejudice suffered by the defendant when the State
does not comply with the thirty-day deadline. Id. Cunningham makes no claim
that he was prejudiced by the State’s delayed filing of the statement of victim
damages.
In the absence of any proof Cunningham was prejudiced, his
challenge to the trial court’s restitution order fails.
Cunningham’s belated
challenge to the trial court’s authority to enter a restitution order after the
discharge of his sentence also fails, because that argument was not raised until
he filed a reply brief on appeal. See Sun Valley Iowa Lakes Ass’n v. Anderson,
551 N.W.2d 621, 642 (Iowa 1996).
AFFIRMED.
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