STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LINDA LEE KNUTSON, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-737 / 05-1802
Filed October 25, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LINDA LEE KNUTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, Alan L. Pearson
and Monica Ackley, Judges.
Linda Lee Knutson appeals from the sentence imposed following her guilty
pleas to theft in the third degree and fraudulent practices in the third degree.
AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, and John Bernau, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
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HUITINK, P.J.
Linda Lee Knutson appeals from the sentence imposed following her guilty
pleas to theft in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1 and
714.2(3) (2003) and fraudulent practices in the third degree in violation of section
714.8(4) and 714.11. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Knutson was originally charged with theft in the first degree, fraudulent
practice in the first degree, and money laundering. These charges were filed
after an independent audit of the activity and nutrition accounts at the Maquoketa
Community School concluded $105,956 was missing from those accounts. The
audit implicated Knutson because she was the employee responsible for the
receipt, deposit, and other bookkeeping details associated with the district’s
activity and nutrition accounts.
Knutson denied any wrongdoing and entered a not guilty plea to each
offense charged. On the day set for trial, Knutson reached a plea agreement
with the State. The terms of the plea agreement as recited by the prosecutor
were:
Your Honor, my understanding is that at this time the
defendant would be willing to enter an Alford plea of guilty to the
reduced charge or lesser included charge of Count I, Theft in the
Third Degree, an aggravated misdemeanor; that she would be
willing to enter an Alford plea to the lesser or reduced charge of
Fraudulent Practices in the Third Degree, an aggravated
misdemeanor, in which return for the State of Iowa would dismiss
Count III at defendant’s cost; that she would be required to make
restitution for the deductible paid out by the school.
....
She would be in a position to ask for a deferred judgment, I
understand, if she felt that was appropriate, and the State would be
in a position to ask for whatever sentence the State felt was
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appropriate
with
the
understanding
that
the
State’s
recommendation itself would not go beyond that in the presentence
investigation. Also, with the understanding that the school may
have an individual or individuals come over and make a
recommendation to the Court regarding what their position is on
this.
The trial court thereafter accepted Knutson’s Alford plea to the lesser offense of
theft in the third degree and fraudulent practice in the third degree. The court
also ordered completion of a presentence investigation (PSI) and set a date for
sentencing. The resulting PSI report recommended Knutson be sentenced to
two consecutive two-year terms of incarceration. Following an October 7, 2005,
sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Knutson to two concurrent two-year
terms of incarceration and ordered her to pay restitution as provided, as well as
related court costs. The trial court’s stated reasons for the sentence imposed
included the following:
The things that I have read with regard to how this incident
occurred, and what exactly happened, as your attorney indicated,
you’ve taken responsibility for the things that are within the plea
negotiation that you’ve entered into with the County Attorney, and I
have taken that fully into consideration.
....
REASONS FOR SENTENCE: In imposing sentence, the Court has
considered those factors set out in Section 907.5 of the Iowa Code.
Although all such factors are important in this case, the Court gives
special significance to: the negotiations of the parties, the nature of
the offenses, the PSI, the witnesses offered by both parties, the
impact the offense has in the educational setting and on the
families and children involved and the underlying nature of the
gambling that may have had a significant impact on the
Defendant’s rationalization and involvement in the crimes.
On appeal, Knutson argues:
I.
II.
The district court considered and relied upon an improper
factor in determining the defendant’s sentence.
Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
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II. Standard of Review.
A sentence imposed in accordance with applicable statutes will be
overturned only for an abuse of discretion or a defect in the sentencing
procedure, such as consideration of impermissible factors. State v. Loyd, 530
N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995). Sentencing decisions of the trial court are cloaked
with a strong presumption in their favor, and an abuse of discretion will not be
found unless the defendant shows that such discretion was exercised on grounds
or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. When
a challenge to the trial court’s sentencing decision implicates an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, our standard of review is de novo. State v. Tejeda,
677 N.W.2d 744, 754 (Iowa 2004).
III. Sentencing.
Knutson claims the foregoing statements from the sentencing record
indicate the trial court improperly considered the greater offenses originally
charged in arriving at the court’s sentencing decision. We disagree.
When exercising its discretion, “the district court is to weigh all pertinent
matters in determining a proper sentence including the nature of the offense, the
attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or
chances for reform.” State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994). “The
courts owe a duty to the public as much as to the defendant in determining a
proper sentence.” State v. Kendall, 167 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa 1969). “A court
may not consider any unproven or unprosecuted offense when sentencing a
defendant unless (1) the facts before the court show the accused committed the
offense, or (2) the defendant admits it.” State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678
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(Iowa 1998). If the defendant admits it or the facts before the court show the
accused committed the offense, “[a] sentencing court may, within statutory limits,
impose a severe sentence for a lower crime on the ground that the accused
actually committed a higher crime.” State v. Thompson, 275 N.W.2d 370, 372
(Iowa 1979).
“The controlling consideration is whether the accused in fact
commited the higher crime, not whether the prosecutor originally charged it.” Id.
“[A] sentencing court is not required to give its reason for rejecting a particular
sentencing option.” Loyd, 530 N.W.2d at 714. “We will set aside a sentence and
remand a case to the district court for resentencing if the sentencing court relied
upon charges of an unprosecuted offense that was neither admitted to by the
defendant nor otherwise proved.” State v. Black, 324 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Iowa
1982).
Contrary to Knutson’s claims, the court’s reference to having read all the
information regarding the incident does not establish an impermissible
consideration of other crimes unproven or admitted in the minutes of testimony.
The statement that the sentencing court considered the plea negotiations does
not indicate that higher offenses alleged in the trial information were considered.
The statement suggests that the sentencing court considered the parties’
agreement and that the State would not make a recommendation more severe
than that contained in the PSI report. “We will not draw an inference of improper
sentencing considerations which are not apparent from the record.” State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002).
Additionally, the sentencing court imposed a more lenient sentence than
that in the PSI report by making the terms for each charge concurrent, instead of
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consecutive, as recommended in the PSI report. “Our task on appeal is not to
second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.
The sentencing court considered the nature of the offense to which Knutson
pleaded guilty and the fact that Knutson admitted taking the money from an
institution established to educate the community’s youth. The sentencing court
acted well within its discretion when the court sentenced Knutson to a term not to
exceed two years for each charge to be served concurrently.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Knutson claims her counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an express
ruling on the following objections to the content of the PSI report made by her
counsel:
(1) the official version of the offense (2) the inaccurate amount of
money owed defense counsel (3) the reference to “lifestyle while
living in Iowa”; (4) the inaccurate statements that the friends listed
were all from Iowa; (5) the statement of the amount of money
spent, won, or lost at the casinos; and (6) the statement by Lori
Kramer regarding the amount of subsequent deposits.
Knutson also claims that because of the information in the PSI report the
following facts were implied: (1) Knutson stole the amount of money missing, not
the $1000 disclosed in her plea; (2) her plea encompassed a longer time period;
and (3) Knutson was responsible for a larger amount of restitution rather than the
$2000 insurance deductible she agreed to pay. Knutson maintains her counsel
was ineffective for not objecting to these implications in the PSI report.
For Knutson to prevail on her ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal,
she must establish as a matter of law that counsel failed to perform an essential
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duty and prejudice ensued. State v. Martinez, 679 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Iowa 2004).
We will not second guess reasonable trial strategy.
State v. Wissing, 528
N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995). The second prong is satisfied if a reasonable
probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Davis v. State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
Even if we assume counsel breached an essential duty, Knutson has
failed to establish the prejudice prong of her ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. The record indicates the court admitted Knutson’s exhibits identifying the
claimed inaccuracies included in the PSI.
We find nothing in the record
indicating the trial court’s sentencing decision was improperly influenced by the
cited inaccuracies.
We therefore reject Knutson’s claim that there was a
reasonable probability of a different sentencing result if the allegedly incorrect
information included in the PSI was deleted or corrected.
The judgment of conviction and resulting sentence imposed by the trial
court are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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