DOUGLAS SCOTT POPEJOY, Applicant-Appellee, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-715 / 06-0102
Filed October 25, 2006
DOUGLAS SCOTT POPEJOY,
Applicant-Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, William Thomas,
Judge.
The State of Iowa appeals the district court’s grant of Douglas Scott
Popejoy’s application for postconviction relief. REVERSED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney
General, and Harold L. Denton, County Attorney, for appellant.
Patrick E. Ingram of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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MILLER, J.
The State of Iowa appeals the district court’s grant of Douglas Scott
Popejoy’s
application
for
postconviction
relief,
contending
the
court’s
interpretation of the language and intent of Iowa Code section 709.8 (2001) was
incorrect. We reverse.
Popejoy was sentenced on April 25, 2001, to an indeterminate prison term
of no more than ten years for neglect of a dependent person, in violation of Iowa
Code section 726.3, and two terms of no more than five years for lascivious acts
with a child, in violation of section 709.8(1). The sentencing order did not make
the sentences consecutive, so they were concurrent.
The sentencing court
added language required by section 709.8, which provides in part, “A person who
violates a provision of this section and who is sentenced to a term of confinement
shall also be sentenced to an additional term of parole or work release not to
exceed two years.”
Popejoy discharged the two lascivious act sentences on July 6, 2003, and
then he discharged the ten-year sentence for neglect of a dependent person on
October 13, 2005.
At the expiration of that ten-year sentence Popejoy was
transferred to a work release facility.
Popejoy filed an application for postconviction relief on September 23,
2005, contending he could not be kept in the work release facility because of
other parts of section 709.8. They provide, in part, that the additional term of
parole or work release “shall commence immediately upon the expiration of the
preceding sentence,” and “shall be consecutive to the original term of
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confinement.” Popejoy asserted in his postconviction application these phrases
mean that any such period of restraint or supervision must begin immediately
upon the expiration of the sentence for the crime which required imposition of the
additional term of supervision. He argued that was the lascivious acts sentences
which expired on July 6, 2003. He argued that because he was still confined in
prison for more than two years after the expiration of the lascivious acts
sentences he had met the requirements of section 709.8 while serving the
remainder of his sentence for neglect of a dependent person. He concluded he
thus could not be placed in a work release facility for an additional two years in
October 2005.
A hearing was held on Popejoy’s postconviction application. The district
court granted postconviction relief, finding the additional two-year period of
parole or work release supervision required by section 709.8 had expired while
Popejoy was serving the concurrent, longer sentence for neglect of a dependent
person. The court further found that Popejoy was in fact fully supervised for an
additional two years after the expiration of the sex-related crime, as he remained
in prison during that entire time.
The State appeals the district court’s grant of Popejoy’s postconviction
application, contending the court’s interpretation of the language and intent of
section 709.8 is incorrect. The fighting issue is whether an additional two-year
term of parole or work release pursuant to section 709.8, here stemming from
Popejoy’s convictions for lascivious acts with a child, can be discharged while the
4
defendant remains in prison on the longer portion of a sentence, here for neglect
of a dependent person.
We review the trial court’s construction of a statute for correction of errors
at law. State v. Booth, 670 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 2003); In re Detention of
Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 574-75 (Iowa 2003).
In interpreting . . . statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. That intent is gleaned from the language of
the statute as a whole, not from a particular part only. Because we
presume the legislature intends a just and reasonable result, we
interpret statutes to avoid impractical or absurd results.
In re Detention of Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 2006) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
The polestar of statutory interpretation is the intent of the
legislature. We seek to ascertain and effectuate the true legislative
intent. We must not only examine the language of the statute, but
also its underlying purpose and policies, as well as the
consequences stemming from different interpretations. In doing so,
we must construe the statute in its entirety.
State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted); see
also Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Iowa 2000) (“In interpreting the statute,
our ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
We look to both the language and the purpose behind the statute.” (Citations
omitted.)). In addition, “although criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in
favor of the accused, ‘they must be construed reasonably and in such a way as
to not defeat their plain purpose.’” State v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666, 669
(Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. Peck, 539 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 1995)).
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Our supreme court has frequently stated that we do not resort to the rules
of construction when the terms of the statute are unambiguous. Teamsters Local
Union No. 421 v. City of Dubuque, 706 N.W.2d 709, 714 n.2 (Iowa 2005). “We
do not search for meaning beyond the express terms of a statute when a statute
is plain and its meaning is clear.” Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d 777,
781-82 (Iowa 2004) (quoting In re Name Change of Reindl, 671 N.W.2d 466, 469
(Iowa 2003)). However, when statutory language is ambiguous, the manifest
intent of the legislature is sought and will prevail over the literal import of the
words used. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Court for Black Hawk County 633
N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 2001). “[T]he manifest intent of our legislature prevails
over the literal import of the words used.” State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 35
(Iowa 2001).
As relevant to Popejoy’s application for postconviction relief and to this
appeal, section 709.8 provides:
A person who violates a provision of this section and who is
sentenced to a term of confinement shall also be sentenced to an
additional term of parole or work release not to exceed two years.
The board of parole shall determine whether the person should be
released on parole or placed in a work release program. The
sentence of an additional term of parole or work release
supervision shall commence immediately upon the expiration of the
preceding sentence and shall be under the terms and conditions as
set out in chapter 906. Violations of parole or work release shall be
subject to the procedures set out in chapter 905 [“CommunityBased Correctional Program”] or 908 [“Violations of Parole or
Probation”] or rules adopted under those chapters. The sentence
of an additional term of parole or work release shall be consecutive
to the original term of confinement.
Iowa Code § 709.8. (Emphasis added). In ruling on Popejoy’s application the
district court concluded the language first emphasized above is unambiguous
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and requires that the additional term of parole or work release supervision
commence “immediately upon the expiration of the term to which it is attached,”
meaning the term for the lascivious acts convictions. We respectfully disagree
with the court’s conclusion and resulting judgment.
We find the statute in question to be not entirely free from ambiguity. It
not only requires that the additional two-year term “commence immediately upon
the expiration of the preceding sentence,” but also requires that the term “be
consecutive to the original term of confinement.” It does not expressly address
the situation of multiple, concurrent sentences.
confinement” is not defined.
The phrase “original term of
The statute does not make clear whether that
phrase is limited to and applies only to the term served for the crime or crimes
which required the additional term of parole or work release supervision, or
includes the full term served for concurrent sentences simultaneously imposed.
We therefore must attempt, utilizing the rules of construction discussed above, to
determine the legislature’s manifest intent in adopting the provision in question.
We agree with the State that the purpose of the statutory provision, and
thus the manifest intent of the legislature, is to provide a controlled, gradual,
supervised release into the community for persons who have been convicted of
and confined for lascivious acts with a child. See Iowa Code § 709.8 (providing
that the additional term “shall be under the terms and conditions as set out in
Chapter 906”); id. § 906.1 (providing that “parole . . . is subject to supervision by
the district department of correctional services,” and that “work release is . . .
pursuant to sections 904.901 through 904.909”); and see id. §§ 904.901-.909
7
(directing the establishment by the Iowa Department of Corrections of a work
release program and establishing terms and conditions for work release). This
intent and purpose cannot be achieved if the statute in question is construed to
allow a person convicted of and confined for lascivious acts with a child to serve
and discharge the two-year additional term while fully confined serving a prison
sentence.
We conclude that as applied to cases involving concurrent sentences the
phrase “the original term of confinement” means the entire term for which a
person is sentenced to prison, including not only any sentence(s) for lascivious
acts with a child but also any unrelated concurrent sentence(s).
We further
conclude the legislature’s intent and purpose in directing that the additional twoyear term “shall commence immediately upon the expiration of the preceding
sentence” is to preclude the additional term being served concurrently with a
term of confinement, and that the phrase “preceding sentence” must therefore be
construed to include any concurrent sentence(s).
We therefore conclude
Popejoy’s additional two-year term commenced upon expiration of his sentence
on October 13, 2005, and the district court erred in its conclusion to the contrary.
We reverse the judgment of the district court.
REVERSED.
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