IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOYCEL YN WOLFE AND DOUGLAS WOLFE Upon the Petition of JOYCELYN WOLFE, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. And Concerning DOUGLAS WOLFE, Respondent-Appellan t/Cross-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-712 / 05-1825
Filed December 13, 2006
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOYCELYN WOLFE AND DOUGLAS WOLFE
Upon the Petition of
JOYCELYN WOLFE,
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
And Concerning
DOUGLAS WOLFE,
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, David E.
Schoenthaler, Judge.
Douglas Wolfe appeals and Joycelyn Wolfe cross-appeals from the
provisions of the decree dissolving their marriage. AFFIRMED.
Karen Volz of Ackley, Kopecky & Kingery, Cedar Rapids, for
appellant.
Daniel Bray of Bray & Klockau, P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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EISENHAUER, J.
Douglas Wolfe appeals from the provisions of the decree dissolving
his marriage to Joycelyn (Joy) Wolfe. Douglas contends the district court
erred in distributing certain gifted and inherited assets. Joy cross-appeals,
alleging the court erred in (1) not awarding her traditional spousal support,
(2) valuing the farm, and (3) failing to order Douglas to pay $15,000 of her
trial attorney fees. Joy also requests appellate attorney fees.
We review the parties’ claims de novo.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
However, we accord the district court considerable latitude in making an
equitable distribution of property and will disturb the ruling only when there
has been a failure to do equity. In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309,
319 (Iowa 1996).
We give weight to the district court’s findings of fact,
especially when considering the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not
bound by those findings.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g); In re Marriage of
Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 2005).
Douglas and Joy were married on June 1, 1974, and three children
were born of the marriage. The children have all reached the age of majority
and there are no issues involving them in this appeal.
Following trial, the district court divided the parties’ assets and
liabilities and awarded property valued at $1,206,885 to Joy and $1,048,660
to Douglas. This resulted in Joy receiving fifty-four percent of the property
subject to division and Douglas receiving forty-six percent. Douglas also
retained inherited property consisting of three trusts valued at $816,010. The
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trusts were established by Douglas’s parents in 1993, 1997, and 1999, prior
to their deaths. Factoring in the inherited property, Douglas received sixtyone percent of the total property and Joy received thirty-nine percent. The
district court found this to be a fair and equitable division.
Property Division
Douglas asserts the district court erred in distributing the law office
($169,828), the AIG Sun-America life insurance policies ($11,176), 100
shares of Mount Vernon Bank stock ($17,400), and the farm ($476,490).
Douglas contends this property was either gifted to or inherited by him;
therefore, it should have been excluded from the property division.
The parties in a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of
the property accumulated through their joint efforts.
In re Marriage of
Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). The determining factor
is what is fair and equitable in each particular circumstance. Id.
Property inherited by either party or gifts received by either
party prior to or during the course of the marriage is the
property of that party and is not subject to a property division
under this section except upon a finding that refusal to divide
the property is inequitable to the other party or to the children of
the marriage.
Iowa Code § 598.21(6) (Supp. 2005). In determining whether it would be
equitable to divide inherited or gifted property, in addition to the length of the
marriage, we consider the following factors: (1) contributions of the parties
toward the property, its care, preservation or improvement; (2) the existence
of any independent close relationship between the donor or testator and the
spouse of the one to whom the property was given or devised; (3) separate
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contributions by the parties to their economic welfare to whatever extent
those contributions preserve the property for either of them; (4) special needs
of either party; (5) any other matter which would render it plainly unfair to a
spouse or child to have the property set aside for the exclusive enjoyment of
the donee or devisee. In re Marriage of Goodwin, 606 N.W.2d 315, 319
(Iowa 2000); In re Marriage of Oler, 451 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
Douglas contends the law office is not subject to equitable division
because he had no ownership in it until his father died in 2002 and the title
passed to him as the trust beneficiary. Douglas and his father, R.B. Wolfe,
who was also an attorney, practiced law together in the law office until R.B.’s
retirement. Douglas continues to use the law office for his practice. The
district court found that the law office was subject to distribution because “for
the past many years [the law office] has been treated by Doug as though [it]
were in his individual name rather than in the name of the R.B. Wolfe Trust.”
Prior to Douglas obtaining title, the law office was held in the Richard
B. Wolfe Trust, established in 1997. The trust provided the law office was to
be distributed to Douglas if he was living at the time of his father’s death. He
survived his father and gained title to the law office upon his father’s death.
However, the trust also provided the trust was “concluded” if the distribution
occurred when Douglas had obtained the age of forty, which he had.
Therefore, although the law office was inherited property, Douglas’s inherited
interest was present and enforceable and the property was subject to division
if refusal to divide the property was inequitable to Joy. See Iowa Code §
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598.21(6); In re Marriage of Hoffman, 493 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992).
The parties were married for thirty-one years. Although Joy did not
directly contribute to the law office’s care, preservation or improvement, she
ceased working outside the home in 1979 to raise the parties’ three children
while Douglas developed his law practice. At the time of trial, Joy, fifty-two,
was working for the Mount Vernon School District, earning an annual gross
salary of $15,825.60. On the other hand, Douglas, born June 27, 1950, had
a law degree and had been practicing since 1976. His average income for
his legal practice in the five years preceding trial was $71,461. He also
earned income from his position on the board of directors at Mount Vernon
Bank. In considering the district court’s entire division of property, we find it
would have been inequitable to exclude the law office from the division of
property.
The trial court awarded the three AIG Sun-America life insurance
policies with a total value of $11,176 to Douglas, but classified them as
“marital assets” “because of the length of time they have been in existence.”
Douglas’s father purchased the policies in 1953 and Douglas became the
owner of the policies in 1971. Douglas never paid any premiums on the
policies.
Thus, the policies were gifted to Douglas and may have been
subject to division only if refusal to divide the property was inequitable to Joy.
As with the law office, we find the district court’s division of the life insurance
policies was equitable.
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Douglas claims he purchased 100 shares of Mount Vernon bank stock
with funds given to him by R.B. and therefore the stock should not have been
subject to equitable division. The district court found the 100 shares “have
been in the family for a considerable period of time and will be considered as
marital assets to help with the division between the parties.” Even if the
stock was gifted to Douglas, we agree with the district court that the stock
was subject to division. The 100 shares at issue were purchased in 1986 as
part of a single transaction of 250 shares, 150 of which were undisputedly
paid for with marital assets. The Wolfes purchased the stock in order for
Douglas to be appointed to the bank’s board of directors, which he was in
1988.
The stock was subject to division because it would have been
inequitable to exclude it.
Douglas also asserts the appreciation of the stock should be excluded
from distribution.
When Douglas purchased the stock, it was valued at
$41.25 per share; its value at the time of trial was $174.00 per share. The
appreciated value of assets may be divided where the increase is due to the
talent, time, and effort of the marital partners. In re Marriage of Friedman,
466 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Iowa 1991).
Homemaking may be considered a
tangible contribution to a marriage. In re Marriage of Grady-Woods, 577
N.W.2d 851, 853 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
Douglas contributed to the
appreciation of the value of the stock through his position on the bank’s
board of directors. Joy contributed as a homemaker. The district court’s
division of the appreciated stock value was equitable.
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Douglas’s final argument is that the farm property, valued at $476,490,
should not have been subject to equitable distribution. Douglas acquired the
farm, which consists of 226.9 acres, as a result of several transactions. In
1982, after Douglas’s uncle died, Douglas received a portion of the property
because his father disclaimed his interest.
When R.B. disclaimed, the
property passed to Douglas and his sister Dorothy. Douglas then acquired
his sister’s share of the disclaimed property through a contract drafted by
R.B.
The contract provided Dorothy would receive $40,000 and, in
exchange, the property would be titled in Douglas’s name. Douglas testified
the $40,000 was paid either directly by R.B. to Dorothy, from R.B. to Douglas
to Dorothy, or by farm income. He stated no marital funds were used to pay
the contract. The remainder of the property still owned by Douglas’s parents
was deeded to Douglas after a series of transactions. A deed was prepared
prior to Douglas’s mother’s death conveying the property to Douglas and Joy.
There is some discrepancy whether Joy’s name was added after the deed
was prepared, but we need not resolve such discrepancy and we assume
Joy held title. On December 10, 1996, Joy conveyed her interest back to
Douglas, placing the property solely in his name.
The two deeds were
recorded in December 1996. Considering the length of the marriage, even if
the farm was a gift or inherited by Douglas, it would have been inequitable for
the court not to include it in the distribution of assets.
We find the district court’s division of property to be fair and equitable.
We affirm the property distribution as set forth by the district court.
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Fair Market Value
Joy asserts on cross-appeal that the district court erred in determining
the fair market value of the farm was $476,490, a value provided by
Douglas’s appraiser. Joy’s appraiser testified the highest and best use of the
farm was for residential lots and valued the property at $570,000. Douglas’s
appraiser appraised the farm as agricultural land and testified the property
was not eligible to be subdivided so he did not appraise it as residential lots.
The district court accepted Douglas’s appraiser’s valuation, finding Douglas’s
appraiser “to be more credible” and that the highest and best use of the
property was as farm land.
The district court’s valuation was within the
permissible range of the evidence, and we give weight to the district court’s
credibility determination. See In re Marriage of Vieth, 591 N.W.2d 639, 640
(Iowa Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage of Driscoll, 563 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1997). Consequently, we will not disturb the district court’s valuation
on appeal.
Alimony
Joy contends the district court erred in not awarding her traditional
alimony rather than transitional alimony, and the alimony award of $750 per
month for sixty months should have been for a greater amount and longer
duration.
An award of alimony depends on the circumstances of each
particular case. In re Marriage of Dieger, 584 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1998). When determining the appropriateness of alimony, the court
must consider the statutory factors enumerated in Iowa Code section
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598.21A. The court also considers each party’s earning capacity, as well as
the parties’ present standards of living and ability to pay balanced against the
relative needs of the other. In re Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d 920, 922
(Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Alimony awards are appropriate following a marriage
of long duration, especially where there is a great disparity in earning
capacity. Id.
In awarding Joy alimony, the district court reasoned:
[Joy] will accrue Social Security credits with her employment.
Based upon her earning capacity, the property settlement
which consists primarily of cash being awarded to Joy, and her
only debt being approximately $13,000 on the life insurance
policy, and recognizing that the parties did not enjoy a lavish
lifestyle, the Court finds that she should be awarded transitional
alimony of $750 per month for 60 months, until the death of
either party, or Joy’s remarriage, whichever first occurs.
We accept and approve this reasoning. In considering the entire division of
property, we find the alimony award was equitable. See In re Marriage of
Miller, 532 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (finding appellate court
considers property division and alimony together in evaluating their individual
sufficiency).
Attorney Fees
Joy asserts the district court erred in not awarding her $15,000 in trial
attorney fees. An award of attorney fees lies within the discretion of the trial
court. In re Marriage of Guyer, 522 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Iowa 1994). Whether
attorney fees should be awarded depends on the respective abilities of the
parties to pay. Id. The district court denied Joy’s request for additional
attorney fees. (A portion of Joy’s attorney fees were charged to a credit card
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which was paid from other proceeds.).
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
Joy also requests appellate attorney fees.
An award of appellate
attorney fees is not a matter of right but rests within our discretion. In re
Marriage of Scheppele, 524 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
In
determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs
of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and
whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the decision of
the trial court on appeal. Id. We decline to award Joy appellate attorney
fees.
AFFIRMED.
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