IN THE MATTER OF L.C.S.C., Minor Child, Alleged to be Seriously Mentally Impaired, L.C.S.C., Minor Child, Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-704 / 06-0525
Filed October 25, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF
L.C.S.C., Minor Child,
Alleged to be Seriously Mentally Impaired,
L.C.S.C., Minor Child,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Susan Flaherty,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A minor child appeals from the juvenile court order for involuntary mental
commitment. AFFIRMED.
Ryan Tang of Law Office of Ryan P. Tang, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for minor
child.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney
General, Harold L. Denton, County Attorney, and Jeff Clark, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer, J., and Hendrickson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
2
SACKETT, C.J.
L.C.S.C. (L.C.), a minor child born in July of 1988, appeals from the juvenile
court order for his involuntary commitment. He contends (1) the juvenile court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction once the commitment application and supporting
affidavit were withdrawn, and (2) the State failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that inpatient commitment was necessary.
I. Background facts and proceedings
Lyle, the father of L.C., filed an application for involuntary hospitalization in
October of 2005, alleging his son suffered from a serious mental impairment. See
Iowa Code § 229.6 (2005) (application for order of involuntary hospitalization).
Lynne, the mother of L.C., filed an affidavit in support of the application. Following a
hearing in late October, the court found clear and convincing evidence L.C. was
seriously mentally impaired and ordered L.C. to outpatient psychiatric evaluation
and treatment by order filed November 7, 2005. Based on the report of Dr. Wilharm,
L.C.’s psychiatrist, the court filed an order for transfer of commitment on November
14, hospitalizing L.C. for inpatient treatment. After review on November 18, the
court transferred L.C. to outpatient status for treatment and ordered him to comply
with the Life Program.
L.C. missed or cancelled most of his appointments with therapists after his
return to outpatient status.
He did not take his medication as ordered, was
increasingly violent toward family members, and was non-compliant with rules,
attending school, or curfew. His mother wrote his therapist on March 9, 2006, about
her concerns and noted, “I know in the past that we felt possibly we could help him
by not putting him in a treatment facility. But now we are forced to do this your way.”
3
Dr. Wilharm sent an urgent update to the court that same day recommending that
L.C. be picked up, evaluated, and placed out of the home. The March 14 report of
examination noted L.C. could not be evaluated on an outpatient basis or released to
the custody of a relative or friend during evaluation. The report indicated full-time
hospitalization was necessary for evaluation and recommended placement at the
Mental Health Institute (MHI).
At the March 14 hearing, Dr. Wilharm testified he recommended placing L.C.
at MHI, but that the family no longer supported inpatient commitment. The doctor
listed the options as inpatient commitment or dismissal with a discharge against
medical advice. The doctor testified L.C. continued to promise compliance, but was
unable to follow through. He described L.C. as violent, destructive, and dangerous.
The mother testified she now wanted outpatient treatment for L.C. because
an inpatient committal would prevent him from entering the military in July after
graduation from high school. She said the family was going to seek therapy at
home and wanted the whole matter dismissed. She testified she was withdrawing
her affidavit filed the previous October. Counsel for L.C. offered a letter from the
father, who was not present at the hearing, asserting that he wished “to cancel or
end this committal process, like my wife, who is also pulling this committal.”
L.C. testified he planned to graduate from high school and enter the military.
He admitted problems with anger management, school attendance, and compliance
with treatment and medication. L.C. acknowledged the police had been called to his
house twice since November. He testified he had learned anger management and
coping skills in prior treatment, but that he planned to seek anger management
therapy on his own if he were not committed. He asked the court to dismiss the
4
case and let him live with a friend so there would be no more problems with anger
and violence at home with his family.
The court reviewed the history of this committal process with L.C., noting the
repeated chances given and attempts to maintain him in outpatient status in order
not to impair his chance to enter the military. As it became clear to L.C. the court
was planning to order hospitalization, L.C. pleaded with the court to give him
another chance, swearing that this time he would follow the rules and comply with
outpatient treatment. The court asked him why he did not pursue treatment
seriously when given previous opportunities. The court stated:
That is a choice you could have made all the way along . . . .
The court orders treatment for you, and we’ve tried outpatient
treatment since October. We’ve been here again giving you the
additional chance. You had another warning in January. You have
continued not to be compliant with your treatment, and I can’t continue
you on outpatient treatment.
The court ordered L.C. to be placed in MHI for evaluation and treatment. L.C.
appeals, contending (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and (2) the State
did not adduce clear and convincing evidence that inpatient committal was
necessary.
II. Scope of review
An involuntary commitment proceeding is a special action triable to the court
as an ordinary action at law. In re Melodie L., 591 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1999).
Because an involuntary commitment proceeding is an ordinary action at law, we
review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. Iowa R. App.
P. 6.4; In re J.P., 574 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1998).
5
III.
Discussion
A. Subject matter jurisdiction. L.C. first contends the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to order his hospitalization because his father asked to withdraw
his application for order of involuntary hospitalization and his mother withdrew her
affidavit in support of the application. He argues that withdrawal of the application
and affidavit deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, and any order entered
without authorization is void. The State asserts (1) error was not preserved, (2)
there is no statutory authority to allow a party to terminate the court’s jurisdiction,
and (3) withdrawal of the application does not terminate the court’s jurisdiction.
In Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989), subject
matter jurisdiction was distinguished from a court’s “lack of authority to hear a
particular case,” also referred to as “lack of jurisdiction of the case.” Subject matter
jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to deal with a class of cases to which a
particular case belongs. Cargill, Inc. v. Conley, 620 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 2000).
A constitution or a legislative enactment confers subject matter jurisdiction on the
courts. Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co., 303 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Iowa 1981); see
Iowa Const. art. V, § 6 (conferring jurisdiction upon district courts over civil and
criminal matters); Iowa Code § 602.6101 (conferring all powers of a court of general
jurisdiction upon district courts).
Iowa Code section 229.6A expressly grants the juvenile court “exclusive
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a minor for whom an application for
involuntary admission is filed under section 229.6.” The juvenile court, therefore,
has subject matter jurisdiction over the class of cases to which this involuntary
hospitalization proceeding belongs.
Iowa Code § 229.6A.
Withdrawing an
6
application filed under section 229.6 does not deprive the juvenile court of its
statutory subject matter jurisdiction. See In re H.G., 601 N.W.2d 84, 86 (Iowa 1999)
(“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be ousted by the parties or by any procedures
employed by the parties during the course of the proceeding.”); State ex rel. Iowa
State Highway Comm’n v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 1975).
L.C.’s argument, although expressly challenging subject matter jurisdiction,
appears to be a challenge to the authority of the juvenile court to hear this particular
case. Although a court may have subject matter jurisdiction, it may lack the
authority to hear a particular case for one reason or another. Christie, 448 N.W.2d
at 450. Unlike a subject matter jurisdiction challenge, which can be raised at any
time, a challenge to the authority of a court to hear a particular case must be raised
in the district court. See Keokuk County v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1999)
(comparing subject matter jurisdiction and authority); see also Rants v. Vilsack, 684
N.W.2d 193, 199 (Iowa 2004) (citing In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003)
(noting that issues “must be presented to and ruled upon by the district court in
order to preserve error for appeal”)).
The record reveals counsel for L.C. made an oral motion to dismiss after the
letter from L.C.’s father, which stated his desire to withdraw the application, was
admitted as an exhibit. The court denied the motion. We find nothing in the record
raising a challenge to the authority of the court to hear the case or any ruling from
the court on this issue. Therefore, this claim was not preserved for our review. See
Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa 1995) (“Issues
must ordinarily be presented to and passed upon by the trial court before they may
be raised and adjudicated on appeal.”).
7
B. Sufficiency of the evidence. “[T]he elements of serious mental impairment
must be established by clear and convincing evidence and the district court’s
findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence.” In re J.P.,
574 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1998); In re Mohr, 383 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1986)
(noting the court’s “findings of fact have the effect of a special verdict and will be
upheld if there is substantial evidence to support them”). “We will not set aside the
trial court’s findings unless, as a matter of law, the findings are not supported by
clear and convincing evidence.” J.P., 574 N.W.2d at 342.
L.C. contends that, because the applicant was not present at the hearing and
the affiant withdrew her affidavit in support of the application, nothing could be
established by clear and convincing evidence. He asserts:
At this point, there was neither application nor supporting affidavit
upon which the court could rely in making its findings and entering a
ruling other than dismissal, and there was no application for the
county attorney to bolster with evidence.
Iowa Code section 229.1(2) defines seriously mentally impaired:
“Seriously mentally impaired” or “serious mental impairment”
describes the condition of a person who is afflicted with mental illness
and because of that illness lacks sufficient judgment to make
responsible decisions with respect to the person's hospitalization or
treatment, and who:
a. Is likely to physically injure the person's self or others if
allowed to remain at liberty without treatment; or
b. Is likely to inflict serious emotional injury on members of the
person's family or others who lack reasonable opportunity to avoid
contact with the afflicted person if the afflicted person is allowed to
remain at liberty without treatment.
This definition contains three express elements:
The respondent must be found to be (1) afflicted with a mental illness,
consequently (2) to lack sufficient judgment to make responsible
decisions with respect to his or her hospitalization or treatment, and
(3) to be likely, if allowed to remain at liberty, to inflict physical injury
8
on himself or others or to inflict emotional injury on the designated
class of persons.
Mohr, 383 N.W.2d at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence L.C. was seriously
mentally impaired, had poor insight and judgment, and was dangerous because of
his assaultive and aggressive behavior. It found outpatient treatment had not been
effective, but that discharge from treatment would be against medical advice.
L.C. does not dispute the first element. Concerning the second element, he
argues the standard for lacking sufficient judgment requires more than proof L.C. is
not compliant with treatment, and that the court must consider why he is not
compliant. See J.P., 574 N.W.2d at 343 (“In determining whether a decision is
responsible, the focus must be on whether the grounds for the decision are rational
or reasonable not what conclusion is reached.”). Concerning the third element, L.C.
argues the dangerousness must be manifested by a recent overt act, but that the
court relied primarily on distant past behaviors.
The State contends L.C. has not preserved error in that there is nothing in the
record “akin” to L.C.’s argument concerning recent overt acts. The State also
contends the juvenile court’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence.
The juvenile court had the testimony of L.C.’s treating psychiatrist that L.C.
acts out of control, terrorizes his younger brother, is destructive, and that “this is a
dangerous situation for [L.C.].” He testified to the mother’s “very concerning” calls
over the past couple of months that requested L.C.’s removal from the home and
hospitalization. The court had the letter from the psychiatrist, the e-mail from the
mother, and the psychiatrist’s report of examination. The report of examination
indicated L.C. was not capable of making responsible decisions with regard to his
9
hospitalization or treatment, was likely to injure himself or others physically or
emotionally, and recommended MHI. L.C. admitted staying at home was not the
best option for him at the time of the hearing, but said he wanted to stay with a
friend.
We conclude the juvenile court’s determination that L.C. is seriously mentally
impaired is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Given the court’s
previous attempts to maintain L.C. in outpatient status that were ineffective, we
agree with the court’s conclusion L.C. had to be committed for inpatient treatment.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
