SCOTT BAIRD and GREG BAIRD, d/b/a BAIRD PAINT CONTRACTING CO., and CHARLES BAIRD and DORIS BAIRD, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. DANIEL OLDFIELD, Defendant-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-693 /05-2043
Filed December 13, 2006
SCOTT BAIRD and GREG BAIRD, d/b/a
BAIRD PAINT CONTRACTING CO., and
CHARLES BAIRD and DORIS BAIRD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DANIEL OLDFIELD,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, James Q.
Blomgren, Judge.
Charles and Doris Baird appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for
summary judgment and subsequent dismissal of their claim alleging Daniel
Oldfield violated Iowa’s Door-to-Door Sales Act, Iowa Code chapter 555A.
AFFIRMED.
Richard C. Bauerle, Orsborn, Bauerle, Milani & Grothe L.L.P., Ottumwa,
for appellants.
William J. Cahill, Hirsch, Adams, Putnam, Cahill, Rashid & Wiley P.L.C.,
Burlington, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Charles and Doris Baird appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for
summary judgment and subsequent dismissal of their claim alleging Daniel
Oldfield violated Iowa’s Door-to-Door Sales Act, Iowa Code chapter 555A (2001).
We affirm.
In July 2001 Daniel Oldfield agreed to build a pond for Charles and Doris
Baird (the Bairds) on their property. No written contract was prepared regarding
the agreement.
Oldfield did not furnish the Bairds with a written “Notice of
Cancellation” form, and did not inform them in any other way that they had a right
to cancel the agreement. Oldfield proceeded to build the pond and the Bairds
paid Oldfield a total of $30,685 for the work. On August 5, 2003, the Bairds sent
a notice of cancellation to Oldfield requesting a refund of all payments made
under their agreement. Oldfield did not refund any of the payments.
On June 7, 2004, the Bairds filed a three count petition against Oldfield.
Count III, the only count at issue in this appeal, alleged the relationship between
the Bairds and Oldfield was such that Iowa Code chapter 555A applied to their
agreement and Oldfield had violated its provisions. On June 29, 2005, the Bairds
filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to Count III. The district court
denied the motion for summary judgment as to Count III, concluding chapter
555A does not provide a private civil remedy for its violation. Based on that
conclusion, the court determined it was not necessary for it to decide whether the
statute applies to the facts of this case.
3
Oldfield filed a motion to enlarge or amend the court’s ruling on the motion
for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss Count III based on its prior
ruling on the summary judgment motion. On September 12, 2005, the court
granted Oldfield’s motion and dismissed Count III of the Bairds’ petition.
Thereafter, the Bairds dismissed Counts I and II with prejudice but retained the
right to appeal what had been an interlocutory ruling denying their motion for
summary judgment as to Count III. They now appeal the court’s dismissal of
Count III of their petition, contending the court erred in concluding chapter 555A
does not provide for a private civil cause of action.
Our review of a district court's grant or denial of summary judgment is for
correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer,
574 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Iowa 1998). This case presents a purely legal question of
whether, assuming Chapter 555A applies to the facts, it provides a private cause
of action. There are thus no material facts in dispute. When, as here, there are
no material facts in dispute, “[o]ur role is simply to decide whether we agree with
the district court's application of the law to the undisputed facts before us.” Iowa
Tel. Ass'n v. City of Hawarden, 589 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1999) (citation
omitted).
A review of chapter 555A reveals nothing which expressly provides a
private cause of action for failure to comply with its terms. Therefore, a four
factor test must be applied to determine whether a private cause of action may
be implied for the benefit of a person who claims to be aggrieved by a violation of
4
the statute. Meinders v. Dunkerton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 645 N.W.2d 632, 635-36
(Iowa 2002). The four factors to be considered are:
1. Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted? 2. Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, to either create or deny such a remedy? 3. Would
allowing such a cause of action be consistent with the underlying
purpose of the legislation? 4. Would the private cause of action
intrude into an area over which the federal government or a state
administrative agency holds exclusive jurisdiction?
Id. at 636. “There is no implied cause of action if any one of these factors is not
satisfied.” Id. (emphasis in original). Because the fourth factor is not implicated
here, it plays no part in our analysis.
If the statute applies to the facts of this case, the Bairds clearly might be
able to show the first factor is satisfied. However, the district court determined it
need not decide whether the statute applies to the facts, because the legislative
history of the statute shows that the legislature has implicitly denied a private
cause of action for its violation. For the following reasons, we agree with the
district court that the language and legislative history of chapter 555A
demonstrate an intent to deny a private cause of action for a violation of this
statute. Thus we, like the district court, do not determine whether the statute
applies to the facts of this case or, in turn, whether the first factor is satisfied.
Our analysis begins and ends with the second factor.
Chapter 555A provides certain remedies for a buyer to whom the act
applies if there has been a violation of the statute. More specifically, section
555A.5 provides that a failure to provide a copy of the contract to the buyer “shall
void any contract, note, instrument, or other evidence of indebtedness executed
5
or entered into in connection with the contract and shall constitute a complete
defense in any action based on the contract . . . brought by the seller . . . .”
Section 555A.6 also provides that a seller who violates the chapter is guilty of
simple misdemeanor.
In State ex. rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales and Mktg., Inc., 475 N.W.2d
210, 218 (Iowa 1991) our supreme court determined that a violation of chapter
555A was not a violation of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Statute as set forth in
section 714.6(2)(a). Apparently in response to the Santa Rosa decision, the
legislature amended chapter 555A to specifically provide that a violation of that
chapter is a violation of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Statute.
In making this
amendment the legislature clearly could have provided for a private cause of
action at that time but apparently chose not to do so.
Legislative intent is
expressed by omission as well as by inclusion, and “[t]he express mention of
certain conditions of entitlement implies the exclusion of others.” Id.; Barns v.
Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 385 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1986).
We conclude the fact the legislature expressly provided for both a
potential criminal sanction as well as another remedy through enforcement by the
Iowa Attorney General’s Office for violations of this statute, while not including
any mention of a private cause of action for violations, reveals an intent by the
legislature to exclude a private remedy. See Meinders, 645 N.W.2d at 636-37
(holding that by providing specific remedies for violating a requirement of a
statue, and not including a money damage remedy based on tort, the legislature
intended not to provide a private cause of action); see also Santa Rosa, 475
6
N.W.2d
at
218
(holding
that
by
providing
self-contained
enforcement
mechanisms in the Door-to-Door Sales Act and Iowa’s lottery statute the
legislature impliedly intended not to provide for enforcement by the Iowa Attorney
General through the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, Iowa Code section 714.16).
Finally, the Bairds argue Iowa Code section 611.21 provides them with a
civil cause of action here because it “provides for a civil cause of action in all
cases where there has been a violation of a criminal statute.” Section 611.21
specifically provides, “The right of civil remedy is not merged in a public offense
and is not restricted for other violation of law, but may in all cases be enforced
independently of and in addition to the punishment of the former.” We disagree
with the Bairds’ interpretation of this statute. We believe the language of the
statute is clear. While it prevents merger of a civil remedy in a public offense and
thus avoids preclusion of a civil cause of action for a public offense, it does not
create a civil cause of action for violation of a criminal statute. Thus, section
611.21 does not itself provide the Bairds with a civil cause of action.
We conclude the district court was correct in concluding that chapter 555A
neither expressly nor impliedly provides a private cause of action for violation of
its provisions. We further conclude section 611.21 does not create a private
cause of action for a violation of chapter 555A. Thus, the district court did not err
in denying the Bairds’ motion for summary judgment and ultimately dismissing
their claim alleging a violation of chapter 555A.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
