STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. GREGORY HARDEN COLEMAN, JR., Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-690 / 05-1913
Filed October 25, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GREGORY HARDEN COLEMAN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen C.
Gerard II, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the district court order denying it restitution. REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney
General, J. Patrick White, Johnson County Attorney, and Michael D. Brennan,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa Wilson, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer, J., and Hendrickson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
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SACKETT, C.J.
The plaintiff-appellant, the City of Iowa City (City), appeals from the district
court’s order denying it restitution from the defendant-appellee, Gregory
Coleman, for medical and disability reimbursements the City made to an officer
who was injured by Coleman when resisting arrest. We reverse and remand.
On June 5, 2003, Coleman resisted the City officers’ attempt to arrest him
and assaulted them, hitting Officer Darin Zacharias with enough force to
dislocate his shoulder. He pled guilty to interference with official acts causing
injury and assault on a police officer causing bodily injury. On October 23, 2003,
the Johnson County Attorney filed an amended statement of pecuniary damages
on behalf of the City, including a claim for the medical expenses of and disability
payments made by the City to Officer Zacharias. On October 30, 2005, the
district court issued a ruling denying the City’s request for restitution finding it
was not a person and was rather an insurer pursuant to Iowa Code section 910
(2003). The City contends the district court erred in holding it is not “person”
under section 910.1(5) and that it is an “insurer” rather than a “victim” entitled to
restitution.
Coleman concedes the City can be considered a “person” under the
restitution statute.
However, he asserts the district court was correct in its
holding that the City is an “insurer” and not entitled to restitution. In making this
argument, Coleman asserts the City has assumed the position of an insurer and
is not the “direct victim” of Coleman’s actions.
We review the district court’s order denying restitution for correction of
errors at law. State v. Paxton, 674 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Iowa 2004). We determine
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whether the findings of the district court lack substantial evidentiary support or
whether the law was properly applied. State v. Bonsetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 165
(Iowa 2001).
We agree with Coleman and the City that the City is a “person,” and thus
may be a “victim” entitled to restitution. A victim is defined as “a person who has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the offender’s criminal activities.”
Iowa Code § 910.1(5).
While “person” is not defined in section 910.1, it is
defined elsewhere in the Code and we apply that definition. Section 4.1(20)
states: “unless otherwise provided by law ‘person’ means an individual,
corporation, limited liability company, government or governmental subdivision or
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association or other legal
entity.”
Given the fact that the City is a “person,” we must determine whether the
City is a “victim” or “insurer.” Generally, a defendant must pay restitution to the
victims of his crimes; however, an insurer is not entitled to subrogation. See id.
§§ 910.2 (setting forth when restitution is required) and 910.1(5) (defining
“victim”). The trial court found the City was, in effect, Officer Zacharias’ insurer
because it reimbursed his medical bills.
The City is required by statute to pay its officers’ medical bills.
411.15.
It is also required to pay disability benefits.
Id. § 411.1A(2).
Id. §
The
defendant contends these sections impose a duty on the City to assume the risk
of loss suffered by its officers, and though it could contract with an insurance
carrier, it chose to put itself in the position of insurer.
Nevertheless, these
provisions do not make the City an insurer. The definition of insurer should be
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interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the word. State v. Hennenfent, 490
N.W.2d 299, 300 (Iowa 1992).
An insurer is “[t]he underwriter or insurance
company with whom a contract of insurance is made; [t]he one who assumes the
risk or underwrites a policy, or the underwriter or company with who [a] contract
is made.” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 808 (6th ed. 1990). The City does
not write contracts for insurance on an ordinary basis.
Sections 411.15 and
411.1A(2) are not traditional contracts for insurance where “for a stipulated
consideration, one party undertakes to compensate the other for loss on a
specified subject by specified perils.” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 802. Just
as a statute requiring “a bank to make good the amount charged to a depositor’s
account because of forged checks,” these provisions merely place responsibility
on the City, “who is in the best position to avoid it,” to cover medical expenses
incurred by an officer in the line of duty. Id. at 300.
Furthermore, the City is a self-insurer, and “self-insurance, or internal risk
distribution,” is no insurance at all. State v. Schares, 548 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa
1996) (citing Iowa Contractors Workers’ Comp. Group v. Iowa Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
437 N.W.2d 909, 917 (Iowa 1989)).
The City’s medical costs and disability
benefits are paid through the operating budget of the police department. The
City estimates the cost of the benefits for city employees and determines the tax
levy to be applied to the property in the City to pay for the expenses. It is not
compensated for assuming the risk involved in providing medical attention for its
officers, nor does it earn or distribute a profit from the relationship. See id., at
896 (finding the Archdiocese of Dubuque was not compensated for risks even
where the participating parishes and schools paid premiums to the “fund”). In the
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City’s situation, “the policy reason for disallowing reimbursement to insurers, that
is because insurers derive a profit by assuming assigned risks, is not present.”
Id.
Contrary to the defendant’s claims that the City is an “indirect” rather than
“direct” victim of Coleman’s actions, the City is simply a “victim.” The definition of
“victim” in section 910.1(5) makes no distinction between an “indirect” or “direct”
victim for restitution purposes. Because the City had to expend money from its
budget to pay the medical bills and disability benefits of a City officer as a result
of an admitted assault by the defendant, the City is entitled to restitution. We
reverse the district court’s order denying the City restitution and remand for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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