IN RE THE DETENTION OF WINSTON C. HALSTEAD WINSTON C. HALSTEAD, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-685 / 05-1766
Filed November 30, 2006
IN RE THE DETENTION OF
WINSTON C. HALSTEAD
WINSTON C. HALSTEAD,
Respondent-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Patrick M. Carr,
Judge.
Winston C. Halstead appeals his civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator. AFFIRMED.
Mark Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Michael Adams,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
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MAHAN, J.
Winston C. Halstead appeals his civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator. He argues (1) the State failed to provide sufficient evidence showing
he meets the definition of a sexually violent predator as set forth in Iowa Code
section 229A.2(11) (2005) and (2) the district court erred in denying his motion
for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Halstead has either been convicted of or pleaded guilty to numerous
sexual offenses. In 1983 he was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse when
he forced his girlfriend’s six-year-old son to perform oral and anal sex. He was
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, but was paroled in 1990. In 1991 he
pleaded guilty to indecent contact with a child after he inappropriately touched
one of his then-girlfriend’s nieces. He admitted during his commitment trial to
having spent time grooming the girlfriend’s nieces and nephews so they would
trust him. His parole was revoked, and he was sentenced to two years in prison.
Halstead was released from prison again in 1993.
He was on supervised
probation in 1995 when he was charged with two counts of second-degree
sexual abuse. Again, his victims were children, two nieces of another girlfriend
on whom Halstead forced oral sex.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was
convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual abuse. He received two ten-year
sentences to be served consecutively.
On May 24, 2005, the State filed a petition to have Halstead committed as
a sexually violent predator pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A. At trial, two
experts testified. Both agreed that Halstead suffers from Klinefelter’s Syndrome,
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a genetic abnormality in which a male is born with an extra X chromosome.
Klinefelter’s reduces a man’s ability to produce testosterone.
As a result,
Halstead received testosterone treatments beginning in 1979. The treatments
ended sometime around 1993.
The experts differed, however, on whether
Halstead has an abnormality that predisposes him to commit sexually violent
offenses. The State’s expert diagnosed Halstead with pedophilia and anti-social
personality disorder. In his opinion, Halstead has serious difficulty controlling his
sexually violent behavior and is more likely than not to reoffend. Halstead’s
expert, however, testified that Halstead has characteristics of substance abuse
disorder, personality disorder, and paraphilia. His opinion was that none of the
disorders predisposed Halstead to commit sexually violent offenses and that he
was unlikely to reoffend.
The State, during closing arguments, argued as follows:
You know, these proceedings can seem a bit sterile. You
know, we both have doctors come up and they have all these
credentials and use a lot of big words and these scientific tests and
all of these numbers and things like that.
But don’t forget what we’re talking about. We are talking
about whether or not someone is going to sexually molest a child.
All right. These names that you’ve seen of these kids, that’s all
you’ve seen is these printed names. You didn’t see who they were;
you don’t know who they are today. They’re adults now. You don’t
know what’s happened to their lives. But that’s what we’re here
about, to try to prevent any more children like that—to try to prevent
any more children having to endure the pain, the humiliation, the
terror that they went through when this happened to them. That’s
why we’re here.
How many more kids does [sic] there have to be for people
to find that he is a high risk? We’ve got six right now. How many
more does there have to be? Eight? Ten? Fifteen? What do we
need?
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The jury found Halstead to be a sexually violent predator, and the court
entered an order of commitment. Halstead appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law.
State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006). We review the court’s ruling
on a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of
discretion. State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Iowa 2003). To the extent
Halstead alleges a violation of his due process rights, we review de novo. State
v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003) (noting that prosecutorial
misconduct that denies a defendant the right to a fair trial violates due process);
In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001) (reviewing a
constitutional challenge de novo).
III. Merits
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Halstead argues the State failed to show he possesses a mental
abnormality that makes him likely to engage in sexually violent predatory acts.
He also argues that, as a result of his Klinefelter’s Syndrome, his testosterone
level is so low it is further unlikely he will commit a sexually violent act. 1
This case essentially comes down to a battle of the experts. The State’s
expert testified that Halstead does suffer from a mental abnormality that
predisposes him to commit sexually violent acts. Halstead’s expert testified he
has no such abnormality. We leave witness credibility determinations up to the
1
We note that Halstead abused his last two victims after he stopped testosterone
treatments.
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jury. In re Detention of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 461 (Iowa 2004) (“Because the
issue essentially turned on a judgment of credibility of two experts with different
opinions, we give weight to the district court’s judgment.”); State v. Fetters, 562
N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (“When the psychiatric testimony is
conflicting, the reviewing court will ‘not determine anew the weight to be given
trial testimony.’” (citation omitted)).
The State’s expert tested Halstead and
presented sufficient evidence to believe he suffers from a mental abnormality that
predisposes him to commit sexually violent acts. For these reasons, we affirm
the district court’s ruling denying Halstead’s motion for directed verdict.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Halstead also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during
her closing argument.
He claims the prosecutor’s remarks appealed to the
passion and prejudice of the jury. In order to prevail on his claim, Halstead must
show not only that the misconduct occurred, but that it prejudiced him to the
extent he was denied a fair trial. 2 State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 755 (Iowa
2006).
The jury was advised that the statements, arguments, and questions by
the attorneys were not evidence and that they could not consider their own
emotions or prejudices in rendering their verdict. Though Halstead’s counsel
objected during the closing argument, he did not request a specific cautionary or
curative instruction. Further, the likelihood that Halstead would commit future
sex crimes was specifically at issue.
2
Counsel was responding to Halstead’s
There is no precedent applying prosecutorial misconduct standards in chapter 229A
proceedings. Our application of them here, however, does not require a new trial.
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challenge that all the State could show was past crime. Finally, as the district
court pointed out in its ruling,
In a Chapter 229A proceeding . . . the focus is on whether “The
Respondent [is] likely to engage in predatory acts constituting
sexually violent offences if Respondent is not confined in a secure
facility.” Community protection is the very purpose of a case under
Chapter 229[A]. In the context of the issue to be decided in this
case, reminding the jury of its purpose and asking rhetorically how
many victims it would take to prove the Respondent’s propensity to
engage in future such acts, is within the proof and law.”
(citations omitted).
Therefore, the district court’s ruling denying Halstead’s
motion for mistrial is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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