STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN LAWRENCE BLOUSE, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-679 / 05-1584
Filed September 21, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN LAWRENCE BLOUSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Patrick J.
Madden, Judge.
John
Blouse
appeals
following
his
conviction
for
delivery
of
methamphetamine as a habitual offender. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Alan R. Ostergren, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran, J., and Robinson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
The State charged John Blouse with delivery of methamphetamine as a
habitual offender. Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(6), 902.8 (2005). Blouse waived
a jury trial. Following the State’s case, Blouse moved for a judgment of acquittal,
essentially asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements
of the crime. The district court denied the motion and Blouse proffered witnesses
on his behalf. At the close of the evidence, the court found the State’s evidence
more persuasive and, based on that evidence, found Blouse guilty as charged.
The court subsequently denied Blouse’s motion in arrest of judgment and for new
trial and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment.
On appeal, Blouse contends the district court: (1) erred in denying his
motions for judgment of acquittal and arrest of judgment and (2) used the wrong
standard in ruling on his motion for new trial.
I. Rulings on Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and Arrest of Judgment
Blouse argues the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment
of acquittal and arrest of judgment because, in his view, “the evidence was
insufficient to prove the elements of the offense . . . .” We review challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence for errors of law. State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d
426, 430 (Iowa 2005).
The district court set forth the elements of the charged crime as follows:
1. That on or about the 12th day of March, 2005, the defendant
delivered methamphetamine.
2.
The defendant knew the substance he delivered was
methamphetamine.
3
The court went on to make fact findings supporting these elements. The record
contains sufficient evidence to support these fact findings. See State v. Frake,
450 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Iowa 1990). Specifically, a confidential informant working
with the Muscatine Police Department agreed to make a controlled purchase of
methamphetamine from his friends, Angela Bermel and Galen Zabienski. Police
wired him for sound and gave him funds to purchase the drugs. The informant
arrived at the Bermel/Zabienski residence between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. Bermel
told him they were waiting for the drugs to arrive. Approximately a half-hour
later, Blouse arrived with his girlfriend, Bonnie West. According to the informant,
Blouse “pulled out the [methamphetamine] from his pocket.”
The informant
counted out $80 for .45 grams. He testified he tried to give the money to Bermel,
but she indicated the money should be given to Blouse.
The district court “accept[ed] as true” the informant’s testimony that Blouse
removed the methamphetamine from his pocket in response to an earlier phone
call from Bermel. The court further found that Blouse “[o]bviously” knew the drug
was methamphetamine.
The court, as fact-finder, was entitled to weigh the
evidence in this fashion. Id.
We recognize there was contradictory evidence in the record. Testifying
for the defense, Bermel stated she used Blouse and West “as a guise” because
she did not want the informant to believe she typically sold methamphetamine
from the house. She stated she, not Blouse, sold the drugs to the informant.
1
1
Prior to testifying, Bermel pled guilty to selling one-half gram of methamphetamine to
the informant.
4
West, she explained, simply stopped by to purchase a computer, and Blouse,
who was West’s boyfriend, came along.
West also testified for the defense. She denied any knowledge of a drug
deal and stated Blouse did not provide drugs or receive money.
She also
emphasized that she came to Bermel’s house to purchase a computer for $150.
The district court found that Bermel’s version of events did not “pass the
blush test.” The court reasoned,
There simply was no reason offered why the [confidential informant]
would indicate Blouse had the drugs in his pocket if Bermel is the
one who supplied the drugs. The [confidential informant] would
have been in the same cooperative position with law enforcement
had it been Bermel who supplied him with the drugs. He got
nothing out of identifying the wrong person as the one who
delivered the meth.
The [confidential informant] had no reason to implicate Blouse
falsely.
As for West, the court stated her testimony that “she and Blouse went to
Bermel’s house in the very early morning hours to purchase a computer is not
credible.” The court noted the absence of any evidence that West and Blouse
took the computer with them or, indeed, that they purchased the computer.
Just as the district court was free to weigh the evidence, the court was
free to assess credibility in this fashion and to reject testimony found to be not
credible. Id. at 819. For this reason, we reject Blouse’s present assertion that
the informant was “simply not a credible witness.” For the same reason, we
reject the other evidentiary discrepancies cited by Blouse, most of which were
thoroughly discussed by the district court.
5
We conclude the district court did not err in denying Blouse’s motions for
judgment of acquittal and arrest of judgment.
II. Denial of New Trial Motion
Blouse next contends the district court applied an incorrect standard in
ruling on his new trial motion. Although his motion did not cite a specific rulebased ground for reversal, he essentially argued that the verdict was contrary to
the evidence. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(6). All agree that the district court
was required to apply a “weight of the evidence” standard in assessing this
argument. See State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 657-59 (Iowa 1998). 2
Although the district court judge did not cite Ellis, it is apparent from his
on-the-record comments, that he weighed the evidence and considered the
credibility of witnesses, as prescribed. Id. The judge stated he did not believe
the defense witnesses and did believe the informant. He reiterated that there
was no reason for the informant to lie about who supplied the drugs and he again
credited the informant’s testimony that Blouse took the methamphetamine out of
his pocket. The court concluded,
You’re asking me as a matter of law as the judge to overturn my
decision as the fact finder, and I just don’t – I don’t have any reason
to do that based on what I believed happened at trial. I simply
believed the confidential information and I did not believe Mr.
Blouse’s witnesses.
We conclude the court did not apply the incorrect standard in ruling on Blouse’s
new trial motion.
AFFIRMED.
2
In arguments before the district court, the prosecutor mentioned Ellis.
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