STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANIEL LAWRENCE MASON, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-617 / 05-1558
Filed November 30, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANIEL LAWRENCE MASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Bryan H.
McKinley, Judge.
Daniel Lawrence Mason appeals his conviction and sentence for assault
with intent to commit sexual abuse.
CONDITIONALLY AFFIRMED AND
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Michael G. Byrne of Winston & Byrne, P.C., Mason City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney
General, Patricia Houlihan, County Attorney, and Paul L. Martin, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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MAHAN, P.J.
Daniel L. Mason appeals his conviction and sentence for assault with
intent to commit sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11 (2003).
He argues the district court (1) erred in refusing to consider juror affidavits in
ruling on his motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment; (2) failed to
make factual findings showing the jury’s verdict was substantially supported by
the evidence; (3) improperly considered sentencing factors; and (4) incorrectly
excluded evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412. We conditionally affirm
and remand with directions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In September 2004 Mason and April Brummer met at a bar in Mason City.
Mason was a Mason City police officer with fourteen years’ experience. After
talking at the bar, Mason and Brummer went to his apartment. They drank beer
and played strip poker with friends.
Later, they had consensual sexual
intercourse.
Mason and Brummer engaged in a romantic relationship that lasted until
early November 2004. After the relationship ended, they continued to contact
each other via telephone and text messaging.
On the evening of December 9, 2004, Mason and his roommate, Bill
Halloran, arrived uninvited at Brummer’s apartment.
Brummer and her
roommate, Jenny Kloberdanz, watched a movie with the two men. Kloberdanz
then went upstairs to bed. Around 12:41 a.m. Kloberdanz called Brummer on her
cell phone to ask her to turn down the television. Brummer took the call in the
kitchen and, out of ear-shot of the men, asked Kloberdanz to come downstairs to
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help her ask the men to leave. Kloberdanz refused. When Brummer returned to
the living room, Mason took her phone away from her and called Kloberdanz
back. Mason teasingly and falsely told Holloran that Kloberdanz wanted him to
come up to her bedroom. When Holloran went upstairs to meet Kloberdanz,
Mason tried to kiss Brummer. Brummer resisted, but eventually Mason led her
upstairs to her bedroom. Once in the bedroom, Mason removed Brummer’s
pants and put her on the bed. Brummer tried to resist, but Mason got on top of
her, fully clothed, and tried to kiss her. Brummer moved her head away. Mason
got up, removed his clothes, and got back into bed. Mason then had intercourse
with Brummer. After he finished, he went downstairs, met Holloran and left the
apartment.
After the men left, Kloberdanz found Brummer crying on the floor in the
bathroom. Brummer told her that Mason had raped her. The next day, Brummer
had a black eye. She and Kloberdanz discussed going to police, but did not think
they would be believed.
A few days later, Kloberdanz told her cousin, Matt
Kloberdanz, about the incident. He in turn reported it to a friend, who told his
uncle who worked at the police department. The uncle reported the incident to
police Captain Dennis Bengston, who called Iowa Department of Criminal
Investigation Special Agent Larry Hedlund.
Hedlund interviewed Brummer and Kloberdanz. He also had Kloberdanz
and Brummer call Mason on a monitored and recorded telephone line to see how
he would react to the accusations. Mason stated that he and Brummer had had
consensual intercourse once. He claimed he stopped when Brummer refused to
have intercourse a second time.
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Mason was charged with third-degree sexual abuse on December 22,
2004.
At trial, he testified to the same set of facts he told Kloberdanz and
Brummer on the monitored line. The telephone call was also played for the jury.
Mason tried to introduce evidence indicating Brummer had had a sexual
relationship with Matt Kloberdanz. The court, however, excluded the evidence
under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412. The jury convicted Mason for the lesserincluded offense of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse without injury.
After the verdict, Mason’s attorney contacted jurors. Five jurors provided
affidavits concerning their interpretation of the jury instruction on assault with
intent to commit sexual abuse. Mason filed a motion for new trial and motion in
arrest of judgment, arguing that the jury incorrectly interpreted the law. He also
argued the verdict was not substantially supported by evidence.
The court
refused to consider the juror affidavits, and denied his motion.
Mason was sentenced to a maximum sentence of two years. He appeals
both the jury verdict and his sentence.
II. Standard of Review
We review a motion for new trial according to the grounds on which it is
based. Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John Deere Health Care, Inc.,
714 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 2006); State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 744, 781-82
(Iowa 2001); Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Iowa 2001). Because the
appropriateness of an inquiry into jury deliberations is a legal question, we review
the district court’s ruling regarding the jury members’ affidavits for errors at law.
See Weatherwax v. Koontz, 545 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Iowa 1996). Sufficiency of
the evidence to convict is also a legal question which we review for errors at law.
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State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006); State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d
199, 202 (Iowa 2003). However, we review a ruling on a motion for new trial
such as this for abuse of discretion. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 202. We also
review the district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under rule 5.412
for abuse of discretion. State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 407 (Iowa 2006); State
v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 1997).
III. Merits
A. Juror Affidavits
Mason argues the district court erred in failing to grant a new trial based
on juror misconduct. In support of his argument, he presented five affidavits from
jurors. Mason claims the affidavits show the jury misunderstood the instruction
on assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. He argues the affidavits are
objective evidence showing the jury misunderstood or misapplied the law. In
doing so, he urges us to apply a subjective/objective test to determine whether
the juror’s affidavits should be considered.
Under the subjective/objective test Mason argues, “objective reports of
statements made in the jury room [are] competent evidence, however, subjective
reports concerning the influence of those statements [are] not competent.” Ryan
v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Iowa 1988). Our supreme court, however,
replaced the subjective/objective test with the internal/external test in Ryan v.
Arneson. Id. at 495. Under that test,
[t]he internal workings include what parts of the record or
instructions were or were not considered, the jurors’ discussion,
their motivations, mental or emotional reactions, their votes, or
other evidence which seeks to show that the actual decision of the
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jury was, or should have been, something other than what the
verdict indicates.
State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Iowa 1980).
Such evidence is
inadmissible to show the jury’s thinking processes were incorrect. Weatherwax,
545 N.W.2d at 524. External matters improperly influencing a verdict may be
considered by the court.
Id. (“[I]t [is] clear that a juror’s testimony can be
received to show that (1) a verdict was not correctly recorded or (2) external
matters were improperly brought into deliberations.”); Rouse, 290 N.W.2d at 91617 (listing a juror’s experiment or a bailiff’s prejudicial comment as examples of
external matters). External matters, unlike the internal workings of the jury, do
not “inhere” in the verdict.
The internal/external test is codified in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.606(b).
Under that rule,
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as
influencing him to assent or to dissent from the verdict or indictment
or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except
that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention
or brought to bear upon any juror.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.606(b) (emphasis added).
In this case, Mason urges us to examine juror statements concerning the
jurors’ understanding of the law. He claims that the jurors’ understandings of the
instruction constituted “parameters [that] were objectively discussed and applied
by the jury.”
According to the internal/external test described in Rouse and
adopted in Ryan, this is precisely the type of evidence we cannot consider. See
Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 916 (“internal workings include what parts of the record or
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instructions were or were not considered, [and] the jurors’ discussion”) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, in Prendergast v. Smith Laboratories, Inc., 440 N.W.2d
880, 883 (Iowa 1989), our supreme court wrote:
If the issue were whether a verdict may be overturned because it
was induced by the jury’s misunderstanding of the court’s
instructions, rule 606(b) would render juror testimony inadmissible
for purposes of achieving that result. The situation to which that
rule of testimonial exclusion applies, however, presupposes that the
jury has in fact responded to the fact-finding process entrusted to it
and returned a finding on the issue which was submitted. Once
that finding has been solemnized in a formal verdict accepted by
the court it may not be impeached on the ground that it was
induced by juror misapprehension as to the controlling principles of
law.
Allowing such impeachment after the jury’s verdict would cause “[j]urors [to] be
harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them
evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a
verdict.”
Ryan, 422 N.W.2d at 493-94.
“[A]ll frankness and freedom of
discussion and conference” within the jury room would be destroyed. Id. at 494.
Mason’s claim must therefore fail.
B. Motion for New Trial and Motion in Arrest of Judgment
Mason argues the district court did not adequately address his motion for
new trial and motion in arrest of judgment. He also argues the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict and the verdict was internally inconsistent.
Our supreme court has previously stated the standards district courts must
employ when ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for new trial:
On a motion [in arrest of judgment], the court is required to
approach the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the
government, and to assume the truth of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. If on this basis there is substantial evidence justifying
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an inference of guilt, the motion [in arrest of judgment] must be
denied
On a motion for new trial, however, the power of the court is
much broader. It may weigh the evidence and consider the
credibility of witnesses. If the court reaches the conclusion that the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a
miscarriage of justice may have resulted, the verdict may be set
aside and a new trial granted.
Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 202 (quoting State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658-59
(Iowa 1998)).
In addressing Mason’s motions, the court wrote at length about the issue
of juror affidavits.
The court then stated, “[T]he remainder of defendant’s
arguments is found to be without merit.” We have reviewed the record in this
case and conclude there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.
Therefore, the court was correct in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment.
However, we are unable to tell what standard the district court used to arrive at
its conclusion for the motion for new trial. For that reason, we must remand to
the district court for a determination under the proper standard.
C. Improper Sentencing Factors
Third, Mason alleges the district court improperly considered sentencing
factors when it imposed the maximum sentence. However, he never states what
improper factors the court considered. Instead, he argues that the court should
have considered both the jurors’ affidavits and the weight of the evidence for the
purposes of imposing a sentence.
We find no evidence in the record indicating the court considered anything
improper in determining Mason’s sentence. Further, we have already concluded
the court properly excluded the juror affidavits. Finally, though the sentence is
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the maximum Mason could receive under his offense, it is nonetheless a
sentence that could legally be imposed under the jury’s verdict.
D. Rape Shield
Finally, Mason claims the district court erred when it refused to allow
evidence concerning a prior sexual relationship Mason alleged Brummer had
with Matt Kloberdanz, a prosecution witness. Mason argues the evidence was
necessary to show Brummer’s motive to fabricate the rape and prevent
Kloberdanz from discovering she had intercourse with Mason.
Evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual history is not admissible in a
criminal sex abuse case. Iowa R. Evid. 5.412. The evidence Mason urged the
court to consider does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to rule
5.412. See id. Furthermore, evidence of Brummer’s alleged relationship with
Kloberdanz would have been more prejudicial than probative. The jury already
knew Kloberdanz and Brummer were “emotionally close,” although not
“boyfriend/girlfriend.”
Mason’s theory is based on the premise that Brummer
herself believed sex with more than one individual was “bad.” Therefore, its sole
purpose is to portray Brummer as sexually promiscuous. See State v. Knox, 536
N.W.2d 735, 740 (Iowa 1995); State v. Smith, 522 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Iowa 1994).
This is precisely the type of evidence rule 5.412 excludes.
IV. Conclusion
Because the district court’s ruling on Mason’s motion for new trial did not
specifically address how it reviewed his motion, we conditionally affirm his
conviction and remand this matter for the district court to enter a ruling on this
issue. See State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 565-66 (Iowa 1999) (conditionally
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affirming convictions and remanding for hearing on Sixth Amendment issue);
State v. Bailey, 452 N.W.2d 181, 183-84 (Iowa 1990) (conditionally affirming
conviction and remanding for reopening of suppression hearing). The district
court shall rule on the basis of the existing record. If, having conducted a weightof-the-evidence test, it again denies the motion, our affirmation of Mason’s
conviction shall stand. If the district court grants the motion, Mason’s conviction
will be set aside and a new trial will be conducted. We do not retain jurisdiction.
CONDITIONALLY AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
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