IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF VICKI LEA STEINBECK AND DAVID LEE STEINBECK Upon the Petition of VICKI LEA STEINBECK, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning DAVID LEE STEINBECK, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-585 / 06-0288
Filed November 16, 2006
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF VICKI LEA STEINBECK
AND DAVID LEE STEINBECK
Upon the Petition of
VICKI LEA STEINBECK,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
DAVID LEE STEINBECK,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Bobbi M. Alpers,
Judge.
David Lee Steinbeck appeals the district court’s order denying
modification of the decree. AFFIRMED.
John T. Flynn of Brubaker, Flynn & Darland, P.C., Davenport, for
appellant.
Catherine Alexander, Davenport, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.
David Steinbeck petitioned to modify a dissolution decree. He sought to
have the district court transfer physical care of his daughter, Jaime, from his exwife, Vicki Talbot, to him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
denied his petition.
On appeal, Steinbeck challenges the district court’s (1)
refusal to modify physical care, (2) treatment of excess Social Security disability
dependent benefits, and (3) refusal to award attorney fees.
I. Physical Care
The parties do not dispute that there was a substantial change of
circumstances since the time of the decree, that was not contemplated when the
decree was entered. In re Marriage of Malloy, 687 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2004). The fighting issue is whether Steinbeck established that he could
provide superior care. Id. On this question, the district court found that the
parties offered “very different testimony.”
After making detailed credibility
determinations, the court stated,
[T]he assertions made by David concerning Vicki’s failings in
providing for Jaime’s everyday needs, including nutrition,
cleanliness, activities, and education, are all credibly refuted by
Vicki in the evidence she presents. The evidence does not support
a finding that David can better provide for the care of Jaime than
Vicki can, and does, provide for the child.
We have reviewed the record de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. The district
court’s comprehensive fact findings are supported by the record and, indeed, are
taken almost verbatim from witness testimony.
We recognize that the question of whether Steinbeck could provide
superior care was a close one. In this type of close case, the district court’s
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unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess demeanor becomes
particularly important. See In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa
1992). The district court availed itself of this opportunity and, accordingly, its fact
findings are entitled to deference. Id. The court’s conclusion that Steinbeck did
not satisfy one of the modification standards flowed directly from its considered
fact findings. We affirm this conclusion.
II. Social Security Disability Benefits
Steinbeck was disabled. As a result, Jaime was entitled to Social Security
disability dependent benefits. The district court ordered the payment of these
benefits to Talbot, in lieu of child support. The court also determined that these
benefits exceeded Steinbeck’s child support obligation under the guidelines by
seventy-nine dollars per month. Talbot agreed to save the excess for Jaime’s
benefit. On appeal, Steinbeck argues,
[T]he court should impose a constructive trust on the amount of
these payments in excess of David’s child support obligation to be
set aside as David’s contribution to Jaime’s future college
expenses, and David should be given the right to approve
expenditure of these funds.
Excess benefits after proper expenditures for a child’s current needs “must
be conserved or invested on behalf of the child.” Jahnke v. Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d
159, 162 (Iowa 1994) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.2045(a)).
Talbot testified she
opened a savings account for Jaime, which required both her signature and
Jamie’s signature for withdrawals. She stated she placed the excess benefits in
this account.
Given the absence of any evidence that Talbot was misusing
Jaime’s benefits, we conclude her placement of the funds in this savings account
sufficiently ensured that they would be conserved for Jaime’s benefit.
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III. Attorney Fees
Steinbeck argues that the district court should have ordered Talbot to pay
his trial attorney fees. Our review of this ruling is for an abuse of discretion.
Bryant v. Schuster, 447 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
In his amended and substituted petition, Steinbeck specifically requested
an order requiring each party to pay his or her own fees. The district court
obliged. We discern no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
AFFIRMED.
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