STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARLOS RAFAEL DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-540 / 05-1306
Filed November 16, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CARLOS RAFAEL DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchison,
Judge.
Carlos Davis appeals his judgment and sentence for second and thirddegree sexual abuse, and alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
AFFIRMED.
Alfredo Parrish and Andrew Dunn of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn,
Boles, Gribble & Cook, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Ann E. Brenden, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
Carlos Davis adopted M.D. when she was approximately eight years old.
Several years later, M.D. told her friend Cheri that Davis was having sex with her.
After authorities were notified, the Department of Human Services interviewed
M.D. Following the interview and investigation, Davis was arrested and charged
with one count of second-degree sexual abuse and one count of third-degree
sexual abuse. Iowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.3, 709.4(2)(b) (2003).
At trial, M.D. testified about the abuse, stating it probably began when she
was ten years old. Her testimony was corroborated by her half-sister, K.K., who
stated that M.D. told her about the abuse, and by M.D.’s friend, Cheri, who
testified about M.D.’s disclosure to her. The State also presented evidence from
which a jury could have inferred that Davis transmitted genital warts to M.D.
Additionally, the State elicited testimony from M.D.’s mother that Davis “was
pretty adamant” about having M.D. keep track of her menstrual period, once it
started. And, the State presented evidence that Davis received a stipend for his
adopted children. A jury found Davis guilty as charged.
On appeal, Davis takes issue with the district court’s admission of the
following evidence: (A) K.K.’s and Cheri’s testimony recounting conversations
with M.D. about the sexual abuse; (B) the genital warts testimony; (C) the
menstrual cycle testimony; and (D) the stipend testimony. He also challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings of guilt. Finally, Davis
contends trial counsel was ineffective in several respects.
3
I. Evidentiary Issues
A. K.K.’s and Cheri’s Testimony
Davis contends the testimony of K.K. and Cheri concerning statements
M.D. made to them was inadmissible hearsay evidence. We will address each
child’s testimony separately, reviewing the issue for prejudicial error. State v.
Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 751 (Iowa 2006).
1. K.K.’s Testimony About Sexual Abuse. K.K. testified that she was
“sharing secrets” with M.D. one day when M.D. said Davis abused her. K.K.
asked what kind of abuse took place. According to K.K., M.D. responded, “He
raped me.”
The State preliminarily argues that Davis “did not preserve the claimed
hearsay challenge” to M.D.’s testimony. We disagree. When the prosecutor
began questioning K.K. about the conversation, defense counsel intervened,
stating, “Objection, hearsay.” The district court summarily overruled the objection
and the prosecutor proceeded to question K.K. about the conversation. We are
convinced counsel’s objection was sufficient to preserve error.
See State v.
Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 162 n.2 (Iowa 1995) (noting counsel’s objection
“alerted the trial court to his contentions on appeal”); State v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d
860, 863 (Iowa 1976) (“Once a proper objection has been made and overruled,
an objector is not required to make further objections to preserve his right on
appeal when a subsequent question is asked raising the same issue. Repeated
objections need not be made to the same class of evidence.”).
Turning to the merits, the State argues K.K.’s recounting of the
conversation she had with M.D. was not hearsay. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c)
4
(defining “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted”).
The State cites a single ground for upholding the court’s
evidentiary ruling:
rule 5.801(d)(1)(B). 1
The rule states the following is not
hearsay:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive.
It is undisputed that the first several prerequisites of the rule are satisfied.
Specifically, the “declarant” (M.D.) testified at trial, was subject to crossexamination, and the prior statement attributed to her by K.K. (“[h]e raped me”)
was consistent with her trial testimony that Davis sexually abused her.
The
fighting issue is whether this prior consistent statement was “offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive.” Id.
In addressing this issue, the first question is whether the statement was
“offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant.” Id. Davis
1
This ground was not cited or discussed in the district court. While this omission
would normally preclude the State from using the ground as a basis for affirmance, that
error preservation rule does not apply to evidentiary rulings, which may be sustained on
any ground. DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Iowa 2002).
On a related note, our rules of appellate procedure do not require us to search
for grounds to uphold the ruling. Instead, we look to what the parties argued and the
authority they cited for those arguments. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14 (c), (f). See also State v.
Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507 (1999) (citing Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215
N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (stating “to reach the merits of this case would require us
to assume a partisan role and undertake the appellant’s research and advocacy,” which
the court was not willing to do)). For this reason, we need not address any other bases
that may exist for upholding the ruling.
5
argues the testimony was not admissible “because during the cross-examination
of [M.D.] the defense never implied that her testimony was false.” The State
responds that the statement was admissible to counter defense counsel’s
attempt “to portray [M.D.’s] complaints as untrue and based on improper
motives.” On this question, we agree with the State.
“Rebuttal evidence is that which explains, repels, controverts, or disproves
evidence produced by the opposing party.” Johnson, 539 N.W.2d at 162. After
M.D. testified for the State, defense counsel cross-examined her. He elicited
several admissions from M.D. that could have allowed the jury to infer she
fabricated her testimony or had an improper motive to testify as she did. In
particular, defense counsel asked M.D. about a note authored by her and found
by her mother, which stated someone was “messing with” her. M.D. admitted
that when her mother asked her about the note, she replied she was not referring
to Davis, but was referring to her biological father. M.D. also conceded that she
denied Davis was the perpetrator of the abuse when asked by a friend’s mother.
Finally, M.D. admitted she thought Davis was sometimes too strict with her,
raising the implication that she might have fabricated the story to have him
removed from the home. In the face of these admissions, we conclude K.K.’s
testimony was rebuttal evidence. Id. at 163 (concluding State was entitled to
rebut cross-examination testimony offered “to bolster [the defendant’s] claim that,
due to the faltering relationship between himself and his daughter, a motive
existed for her to lie”).
The second question under rule 5.801(d)(1)(B) relates to the timing of the
prior consistent statement, “[h]e raped me.” In Johnson, our highest court held
6
that “a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible as nonhearsay to rebut
a charge of recent improper motive under Iowa Rule of Evidence [5.801(d)(1)(B)]
only if the statement was made before the alleged improper motive to fabricate
arose.” Id. at 165 (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167, 115 S. Ct.
696, 705, 130 L. Ed. 2d. 574, 588 (1995) (reading this time limitation into
identical federal rule)) (emphasis in original). The Johnson court characterized
this holding as a “bright-line rule” based on “sound” rationale. Id. That rationale
was explicated in Tome as follows:
If the Rule were to permit the introduction of prior statements as
substantive evidence to rebut every implicit charge that a witness’
in-court testimony results from recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, the whole emphasis of the trial could shift to
the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones.
Tome, 513 U.S. at 165, 115 S. Ct. at 705, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 587. The Court in
Tome acknowledged that “in some cases it may be difficult to ascertain when a
particular fabrication, influence, or motive arose.” Id. at 165-66, 115 S. Ct. at
705, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 587. The Court noted, however, that courts had been
performing this task under the common law for “well over a century” and the
government presented no evidence that they were “unable to make the
determination.” Id. at 166, 115 S. Ct. at 705, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 587.
Applying Johnson, we must decide whether M.D.’s statement to K.K. that
“[h]e raped me” was made before M.D.’s claimed fabrication or improper
influence or motive arose. If it was, then the statement was admissible as nonhearsay evidence.
K.K. did not specify when M.D. discussed the sexual abuse with her, but
did indicate the statement was made after she moved in with Davis and her
7
mother. This move took place when K.K. was in fourth grade, which, we deduce,
was in the 2002-2003 academic year. Davis was arrested in September 2004.
Therefore, the most that we can discern from the record is that M.D.’s statement
to K.K. was made sometime between the fall of 2002 and the fall of 2004.
Turning to the evidence of M.D.’s fabrication or improper influence or
motive, M.D.’s mother testified she found M.D.’s note concerning sexual abuse in
2003. She confronted M.D. about the note, specifically asking her whether Davis
sexually abused her. According to the mother, M.D. responded, “No, no.” This
response is inconsistent with M.D.’s trial testimony and would constitute the first
instance of such an inconsistency. Under Johnson, M.D.’s consistent statement
to K.K. would be admissible as nonhearsay evidence only if the statement was
made before M.D.’s inconsistent statement. There is no indication that M.D.’s
consistent statement was made before this inconsistent statement.
M.D. also denied to a friend’s mother that Davis sexually abused her.
According to M.D., this second inconsistent statement was made approximately a
year before trial, which we calculate as being in June 2004. Again, there is no
indication that M.D.’s consistent statement to K.K. was made before June 2004.
We are left with Davis’s suggestion that M.D. accused him of sexual
abuse to remove him from the home. The State argues, “The time at which any
improper motive could arguably have manifested itself could only relate to the
time of the report to [the Department of Human Services], which was not even
initiated by [M.D.] but to which she responded.” The report referred to by the
State was made in August 2004. Assuming that an improper motive manifested
itself in this report, there is no indication that M.D.’s statement to K.K. was made
8
before this time-frame.
More importantly, there is scant evidence that M.D.
alluded to an improper motive during the Department interview. The interviewer
testified that M.D. confirmed she was abused by Davis, which is entirely
consistent with her trial testimony. While M.D. also said her relationship with
Davis “was not good,” there was nothing to indicate that the ill-will she felt
towards her adoptive father was based on anything but the abuse she claimed he
inflicted. The State concedes this fact, noting that M.D.
did not act on an improper motive to attempt an escape from a
family situation. She was trying to keep the family together. This
child wanted to stay with her mother; defendant threatened that if
she told anyone he was abusing her she would not get to see her
mother anymore, and [M.D.] did everything she could to keep her
family together.
Additionally, M.D. explicitly refuted the assertion that she concocted the abuse
story to retaliate against Davis. On redirect examination, she was asked, “Were
you making this up because you didn’t like that he was too strict or he punished
you too much?” M.D. answered, “No.” 2 Absent an improper motive asserted by
M.D. during the August 2004 interview, that time frame cannot serve as the basis
for the introduction of K.K.’s rebuttal evidence. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 157-58,
166, 115 S. Ct. at 701, 705, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 582, 588 (stating “[t]he Rule speaks
of a party rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story
told,” and stating “the thing to be rebutted must be identified”).
2
This testimony as well as M.D.’s explanation of why she denied the abuse when
questioned by her mother and her friend’s mother arguably raises doubts about the
necessity of introducing rebuttal evidence through K.K. However, given the broad
definition of rebuttal evidence set forth above, we are persuaded that the State’s attempt
to introduce M.D.’s prior consistent statement through K.K. was proper rebuttal
evidence, even if the timing of the statement foreclosed its admissibility.
9
In sum, we cannot conclude that M.D.’s prior consistent statement to K.K.
was made before her fabrication or improper influence or motive arose.
Therefore, the State did not establish that K.K.’s testimony was admissible under
rule 5.801(d)(1)(B). Cf. State v. Capper, 539 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 1995)
(finding no error in admission of prior consistent statements made prior to
inconsistent statements), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hawk, 616
N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 2000).
This brings us to the State’s fall-back position that the admission of the
evidence, even if erroneous, was harmless. A harmless error analysis in this
context requires us to presume prejudice and reverse unless the record
affirmatively establishes otherwise. State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 30 (Iowa
2004); see also Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 751 (“Inadmissible hearsay is considered
to be prejudicial to the nonoffering party unless otherwise established.”).
Notwithstanding this presumption of prejudice, we will not consider the evidence
prejudicial if “substantially the same evidence is properly in the record.” State v.
Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Iowa 2006) (citing State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167,
170 (Iowa 1998)).
In Hildreth, the Iowa Supreme Court was faced with a virtually identical
factual scenario as is presented here. There, the district court admitted parents’
testimony regarding their child’s statements of sexual abuse by the defendant.
Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d at 169. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded the ruling was
harmless error because the parents’ testimony was “repeated either by social
workers or in the testimony of [the child] herself.” Id. The same type of repetition
is present in this record.
10
M.D. offered detailed and descriptive testimony of sexual abuse by Davis.
She also stated that she told her half-sister K.K., her friend Cheri, and an abuse
investigator about the abuse. M.D. testified that she did not have sexual contact
with anyone other than Davis.
One of the investigators corroborated key aspects of M.D.’s testimony, as
did a physician who examined her for signs of sexual abuse. The physician
testified without objection that M.D. named Davis as “the person who engaged in
those sex acts with her.” The physician also found a tear in M.D.’s hymen and
opined that “these kinds of injuries are rarely self-inflicted.” While the physician
could not testify to a reasonable degree of certainty that the injuries were caused
by sexual intercourse, we cite her testimony simply to show that the Hildreth test
of cumulative evidence was satisfied.
We conclude it was harmless error to admit K.K.’s testimony regarding her
conversation with M.D. about the abuse.
2. K.K.’s Additional Testimony. Davis also challenges K.K.’s testimony
about M.D.’s decision not to disclose the abuse to her mother. K.K. stated M.D.
did not want to tell their mother “[b]ecause [Davis] said if I told anybody that I
wouldn’t be able to see Mom or something bad would happen to us or me.”
Assuming this was inadmissible hearsay evidence, the erroneous admission of
the evidence was harmless because there was similar admissible testimony from
M.D. about the reason she did not immediately disclose the abuse to her mother.
See Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d at 170.
3.
Cheri’s Testimony.
Davis next objects to Cheri’s testimony
concerning the conversation she had with M.D. According to Cheri, M.D. told her
11
“Carlos did it again” and M.D. said she thought she was pregnant. We again
conclude the admission of this evidence was harmless under the Hildreth
cumulative evidence standard. Id.
B. Genital Warts Testimony
Davis argues that testimony about genital warts elicited from M.D.’s
mother and a physician “was not relevant.” See Iowa R. Evid. 5.401 (defining
relevant evidence as evidence having “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). We disagree.
The central question at trial was whether Davis sexually abused M.D.
M.D.’s mother testified she had “vaginal warts” and had unprotected sex with
Davis. As noted, M.D. testified she also had sex with Davis. This evidence could
have led to the inference that Davis contracted vaginal warts from M.D.’s mother
and passed it on to M.D. The evidence, therefore, fell within the definition of
relevance.
The physician who examined M.D. testified M.D. had papules that were
consistent with the genital warts virus and opined that a person could transmit
the virus through sexual contact, even if the person had no visible genital warts.
While we agree with Davis that the physician “could not say to a reasonable
degree of certainty” whether Davis gave M.D. the virus, this fact does not
diminish the relevance of the testimony or render her testimony inadmissible.
See State v. Stribley, 532 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (stating
qualified expert should be allowed to state even equivocal opinion).
[We
conclude this testimony also satisfied the definition of relevance set forth above.]
12
This does not end our inquiry because relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. Davis argues “the existence of a venereal disease is highly
inflammatory and outweighs any probative value.” We agree with Davis that our
highest court has made this statement on several occasions.
See State v.
Williams, 574 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Iowa 1998); State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493,
499 (Iowa 1997); State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995). However,
the statement was made in the context of our rape shield rule, which restricts
evidence of “a victim’s past sexual behavior.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.412(b) (emphasis
added). Here, the evidence was proffered by the State to suggest that Davis
transmitted the genital warts virus to M.D. in the course of sexual contact with
her. While we acknowledge the inflammatory nature of the evidence even in this
context, we note that the probative value of the evidence is greater here than it
was in Williams, Mitchell, or Knox. Cf. Ceasar v. State, 521 S.E.2d 866, 867
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (stating evidence showing child and mother had a sexually
transmitted disease was sufficient to find defendant guilty of aggravated child
molestation, notwithstanding absence of evidence that defendant was infected
with disease). On balance, given the highly-charged nature of much of the trial
testimony, we believe that the probative value of this testimony was not
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Accordingly, we conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. See State v.
Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Iowa 2001) (reviewing evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of discretion).
13
C. Menstrual Cycle Testimony
Davis filed a motion in limine asking the district court to prohibit M.D.’s
mother from testifying about M.D.’s menstrual cycle. The district court overruled
the motion and M.D.’s mother testified as follows:
After M.D. started her period, Carlos was pretty adamant about her
keeping track of when her period was, when she started, when she
stopped. I could never understand why. I tried to tell him I don't
even keep track of my own period, you know. She’s 12, 13 years
old; and when you’re starting your period, it’s never regular anyway.
Davis argues that this testimony was subject to the statutory marital
privilege. See Iowa Code § 622.9. 3 While he acknowledges the existence of an
exception to this privilege, 4 he contends the evidence does not fall within this
exception.
In our view, the testimony falls squarely within the statutory exception set
forth in Iowa Code section 232.74. Cf. State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 32
(Iowa 2001) (holding exception limited to cases of child abuse that result from
acts or omissions of care provider). Specifically, there was evidence from a
physician who examined M.D. that her hymen was torn, the evidence was
presented in a criminal judicial proceeding, and the criminal proceeding resulted
3
This provision states:
Neither husband nor wife can be examined in any case as to any
communication made by the one to the other while married, nor shall
they, after the marriage relation ceases, be permitted to reveal in
testimony any such communication made while the marriage subsisted.
4
Iowa Code section 232.74 states:
Sections 622.9 and 622.10 and any other statute or rule of evidence
which excludes or makes privileged the testimony of a husband or wife
against the other or the testimony of a health practitioner or mental health
professional as to confidential communications, do not apply to evidence
regarding a child’s injuries or the cause of the injuries in any judicial
proceeding, civil or criminal, resulting from a report pursuant to this
chapter or relating to the subject matter of such a report.
14
from a report to the Department of Human Services. Id. Accordingly, we reject
this ground for reversal.
D. The Stipend Testimony
Davis contends the district court should not have admitted evidence that
he received a stipend for the care of his adopted children.
evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
He claims the
The State responds that the
evidence was relevant to rebut Davis’s suggestion that M.D. wanted him
removed from the home.
However, the prosecutor introduced the stipend
evidence on direct examination of the first witness for the State. At this juncture,
there was no evidence in the record for the State to rebut and nothing in defense
counsel’s opening statement that would have led the prosecution to believe
M.D.’s testimony would be impugned in this fashion. See Johnson, 539 N.W.2d
at 162 (stating rebuttal evidence explains, repels, controverts, or disproves
evidence produced by the opposing party). For this reason, we find the evidence
irrelevant. See Iowa R. of Evid. 5.401. In light of our conclusion, we need not
reach the question of whether the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Iowa R. Evid.
5.403. 5
We turn to whether the admission of this evidence was harmless error.
See Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 29-30.
One of the tests for whether a
nonconstitutional error is harmless is whether the remaining evidence was “so
overwhelming that the State would have prevailed even in the absence of the
5
We have doubts as to whether error was preserved on this question,
notwithstanding the State’s concession that there was no error preservation problem.
15
boost it received” from the erroneously admitted evidence. Id. at 31. In the face
of the evidence summarized above, we conclude this standard was satisfied and
the admission of the stipend testimony was harmless.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Davis next asserts the State “did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that [he] performed a ‘sex act’ with M.D.”
Our review of fact findings is for
substantial evidence. State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 134 (Iowa 2006).
“Sex act” was defined for the jury as any sexual contact:
1. By penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus.
2. Between the mouth of one person and the genitals of another.
3. Between the genitals of one person and the genitals or anus of
another.
4. Between the finger or hand of one person and the genitals or
anus of another person.
5. By a person’s use of an artificial sex organ or a substitute for a
sexual organ in contact with the genitals or anus of another.
A jury could have found from M.D.’s testimony that Davis performed some of the
sex acts defined above.
While defense counsel elicited prior inconsistent
statements from M.D. in an effort to impugn her credibility, a jury reasonably
could have accepted her explanation of those inconsistencies.
See State v.
Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Iowa 1999) (stating victim’s credibility is for the jury to
decide). In addition, as noted, there was testimony from several other witnesses
corroborating key aspects of M.D.’s testimony. We conclude the record contains
substantial evidence supporting the finding that Davis committed sex acts with
M.D.
16
III Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Davis claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) object to the
genital warts testimony; (2) object to prosecutorial misconduct; (3) properly object
to certain hearsay statements made by K.K.; and (4) object to the admission of
evidence on due process grounds.
With respect to the first claim, the State concedes that trial counsel
objected to this testimony on all the grounds raised on appeal except Davis’s
contention that the admission of this evidence violated Iowa Rule of Evidence
5.404(b). With respect to rule 5.404(b), the State argues trial counsel was under
no duty to raise it because it simply did not apply. We agree with the State.
Rule 5.404(b) relates to the admissibility of “prior bad acts” evidence. Id;
Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 23.
We cannot determine how evidence relating to
M.D.’s contraction of the genital warts virus falls within the purview of rule
5.404(b). Davis concedes the application of this rule is questionable, stating “the
evidence and inference that [M.D.] acquired genital warts from Davis may, or
may not, be considered other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence under Iowa Rule
of Evidence 5.404(b). . . .” Because this rule has no bearing on the challenged
evidence, we conclude trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise it.
Turning to the second claim, based on prosecutorial misconduct, our
highest court recently reaffirmed its preference for preserving ineffective
assistance of counsel claims rather than deciding them on direct appeal. See
State v. Ondayog, __ N.W.2d __, __ (Iowa 2006). We believe the second claim
must be preserved for postconviction relief proceedings to give trial counsel an
opportunity to address it.
17
The third claim relates to K.K.’s testimony regarding portions of her
conversation with M.D. The State conceded trial counsel timely objected to this
evidence and we, accordingly, have analyzed and rejected this evidentiary issue
on the merits. Therefore, we need not address it under an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel rubric.
The final claim relates to counsel’s failure to object to the admission of
evidence on due process grounds.
We have addressed and resolved the
evidentiary issues based on the objections trial counsel did make, rendering it
unnecessary to also address this ground. Additionally, we are not persuaded
that the authority cited by Davis supports his contention that trial counsel had a
duty to object to evidentiary issues on due process grounds.
See Clark v.
Groose, 16 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding defendant was not entitled
to habeas corpus relief on the ground that a state court’s evidentiary ruling
“infringed upon a specific constitutional protection or amounted to a denial of due
process”). Accordingly, we reject this ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
IV. Cumulative Error
Davis finally contends that “the cumulative effect of errors committed
during trial can deny a defendant a fair trial and a new trial must be granted.”
Having found no error that requires reversal, we reject this final contention.
V. Disposition
We affirm Davis’s judgment and sentence for second and third-degree
sexual abuse. We preserve for postconviction relief proceedings his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim alleging prosecutorial misconduct.
AFFIRMED.
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