STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAMES EDWARD WRIGHT, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-524 / 05-0679
Filed October 25, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES EDWARD WRIGHT, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Don C. Nickerson,
Judge.
James Wright, Jr. appeals from his conviction for first-degree murder.
AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Daniel Voogt and James Ward,
Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel, J., and Beeghly, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
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VOGEL, P.J.
James Wright, Jr. appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction
for first-degree murder. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
In December of 1999, Ollie Talton was arrested and charged with various
federal drug offenses. He later pled guilty to these charges, and in an effort to
reduce his sentence, Talton began cooperating with prosecutors, giving them
information regarding other drug dealers, specifically Ronald “Uzi” Buchanan.
After Talton was released from custody, an individual named David Hickman,
who was then Talton’s roommate, informed Buchanan and the defendant, James
“Big Valley” Wright, who was Buchanan’s associate in selling crack cocaine,
about Talton’s status as an informant.
On the evening of May 4, 2000, Wright, Buchanan, and Talton, along with
approximately sixty others, were present at a Des Moines bar called the Hickman
Pub. Also at the bar was Tommy Gowdy, who at one point entered the restroom
to find two or three other men standing there. As Gowdy was using the urinal, he
heard a gunshot followed by the sound of a body falling to the floor. Gowdy then
turned, put his hands over his face, and started to leave the restroom. As he was
leaving, he heard two more gunshots. Gowdy would later testify that the person
who was holding the gun was “probably” Wright. Talton was the man who was
shot and killed.
While later imprisoned at a federal facility in Memphis, Wright allegedly
made certain admissions to other inmates as to his involvement in the shooting
of Talton. Antonious Davis, who was serving a seventeen-year term on federal
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drug charges, served in the same housing unit as Wright. In return for favorable
treatment, he informed authorities that Wright had told him “he had to kill a hot
motherf***r.” The term “hot” was used to describe someone who had provided
information to authorities. Davis also claimed that a few months following that
conversation, Wright informed him that he had found out Talton was cooperating
with federal authorities and that Wright and Buchanan had discussed the
situation while at the Hickman Pub.
Also, another inmate, Carlos Wardlow,
claimed that Wright told him that “we” murdered Talton. However, he admitted
Wright did not tell him who actually shot Talton.
Based on this information, the State charged Wright with first-degree
murder, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.2(1) and (2) (1999). Following the
presentation of evidence at trial, the court instructed the jury it could find Wright
guilty if he either shot or aided and abetted in the shooting of Talton. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty. After the court denied Wright’s motion for new trial, it
sentenced him to life imprisonment. Wright appeals.
Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Wright first maintains there was insufficient evidence to prove him guilty of
first-degree murder. He claims he should not have been convicted as either a
principal or an aider and abettor in the crime.
We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of
errors at law. We uphold a verdict if substantial evidence supports
it. “Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational fact finder
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Substantial evidence must do more than raise suspicion or
speculation. We consider all record evidence not just the evidence
supporting guilt when we make sufficiency-of-the-evidence
determinations. However, in making such determinations, we also
view the “evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including
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legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and
reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.”
State v. Quinn, 691 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Iowa 2005) (citations omitted).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as we must,
we conclude substantial evidence supports Wright’s conviction for first-degree
murder.
First, according to Wright’s own admission, he was present in the
restroom when Talton was shot and killed. Both Buchanan and Wright were
aware that Talton had become an informant for federal authorities and they were
worried he was going to “set them up” or “snitch” on them. This supports a
possible motive for Wright, in conjunction with Buchanan, to murder Talton.
Furthemore, Tommy Gowdy testified that as he was hurrying out of the restroom
after hearing the shots, he observed that Wright was “probably” holding the gun.
In addition, the testimony of the two jailhouse informants implicated Wright
in Talton’s murder. Altonious Davis and Carlos Wardlow both separately claimed
that Wright had discussed the Talton murder with them, Davis reporting that
Wright had to kill an informant and Wardlow reporting that Wright told him “we”
murdered Talton.
Such evidence was clearly sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that Wright either killed or aided and abetted Buchanan in the killing of
Ollie Talton.
Weight of the Evidence.
As noted, the district court denied Wright’s motion for new trial. Wright
appeals from this ruling. A district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658-59
(Iowa 1998). The standard to be applied in ruling on a motion for a new trial is
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whether the jury’s verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, which
requires the court to make a determination of whether “a greater amount of
credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.” Id.
Credibility of witnesses is key in a weight-of-the-evidence determination. State v.
Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2003). Determinations of credibility are in
most instances left for the trier of fact, who is in a better position to evaluate
witnesses. State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797, 804 (Iowa 2000).
Our supreme court has admonished trial courts to exercise their discretion
in ruling on motions for new trial “carefully and sparingly.” Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at
659.
Trial courts should invoke their power to grant a new trial only in
exceptional cases where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict
so that they do not diminish the jury’s role as the principal trier of facts. Id.
When the evidence is nearly balanced, or is such that different minds could fairly
arrive at different conclusions, the district court should not disturb the jury’s
findings. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 203. Even if the district court might be inclined
to render a different verdict than the jury, it must uphold that verdict in the face of
mere doubts that it is correct. Id.
In arguing the court should have granted his motion for new trial, Wright
specifically attacks the credibility of Gowdy, Davis, and Wardlow. He points out,
among other things, that Gowdy was an alcoholic who had been drinking heavily
on the day in question, that he was equivocal in his identification of Wright as the
shooter, and that he only spoke with police for the first time one year after the
shooting. He also notes that both Wardlow and Davis were fellow inmates of
Wright and that they provided information on him to authorities in the expectation
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of receiving a reduction of their respective sentences. As noted above, however,
while credibility is central to the weight-of-the-evidence analysis, credibility calls
are generally left to the trier of fact.
When viewing the testimony of Gowdy, Davis, and Wardlow individually
and as isolated witnesses against Wright, certainly questions as to credibility
become apparent. However, even considering those individual shortcomings,
the wealth of incriminating evidence is sufficient to overcome any weakness in
the evidence. Gowdy’s testimony, at the very least, places Wright at the very
scene of the crime at the moment it occurred. At the most, he is an eyewitness
that places the murder weapon in Wright’s hand following the shot that killed
Talton. The two jailhouse informants, Wardlow and Davis, gave testimony that
must be viewed in the context of their desire for favorable treatment in their
sentences. However, both testified quite specifically as to Wright’s admissions,
including that Buchanan was involved and that Talton was a federal informant.
Other than the obvious inference that Wright told them these stories, there is no
indication in the record how either Davis or Wardlow could have received this
information about Talton’s killing and Wright’s apparent involvement.
As the State notes, this is not a case which rested on the individual
credibility of one or two witnesses. Rather, it was supported by such evidence as
Wright’s undisputed presence at the scene, his admissions to at least two
individuals, and his apparent motive to quiet Talton. Appropriately heeding our
supreme court’s caution to sparingly grant motions for new trial, the district court
denied Wright’s motion. While certain credibility issues clearly exist, and other
inconsistencies are apparent, we conclude this is not the “exceptional” case in
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which the “evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.”
Ellis, 578
N.W.2d at 659. We therefore affirm the court’s ruling denying Wright’s motion for
new trial.
Motion for Mistrial.
During a break in Tommy Gowdy’s testimony, he asked to use the
restroom. As he did, the court made an off-the-record comment to the jury about
the reason for having a deputy escort Gowdy. While the trial judge did not recall
phrasing his comment as such, or even that any members of the jury had heard
his comment, Wright’s attorney complained that the court informed the jury the
reason for the use of the deputy was so that Gowdy would not be “intimidated” or
“threatened.” Based on these comments, Wright moved for a mistrial, arguing
that a reasonable interpretation of the comment was that Wright had threatened
Gowdy.
The court denied the motion.
It thereafter admonished the jury to
disregard his statement to the extent it implied that somebody threatened Gowdy.
On appeal, Wright contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a mistrial.
We review the court’s ruling on this motion for an abuse of discretion. See
State v. Dixon, 534 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Iowa 1995) (“A trial judge has considerable
discretion to declare a mistrial after a procedural error has occurred during a trial
and we will not reverse the court’s decision absent a finding of abuse of
discretion.”).
A mistrial is appropriate when “an impartial verdict cannot be
reached” or the verdict “would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious
procedural error in the trial.” State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 902 (Iowa 2003).
When a criminal defendant asserts that a trial judge’s comments prevented a fair
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trial, we will engage in a balancing of the potential prejudice caused by the trial
judge’s comments and the overall fairness of the trial. Dixon, 524 N.W.2d at 441
(citing United States v. Scott, 36 F.3d 1458, 1464 (8th Cir. 1994)). Where the
judge appears to have lost his or her appearance of neutrality, or appears to
have accentuated and emphasized the prosecution’s position, we will find the
balance tipped adversely against the fairness of the trial. See id.
We conclude the trial court reasonably determined a mistrial was not
required.
First, immediately upon being informed of the possibly prejudicial
statement, the court admonished the jury to disregard the statement, specifically
informing the jury it was a misstatement to imply that any party or individual in the
courtroom had threatened Gowdy. This quick admonition served to dispel any
prejudice that may have occurred. State v. Brown, 397 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa
1986). Furthermore, the comment itself was rather vague. The court did not
express direct concern that anyone in particular had intimidated Gowdy.
As
such, the comment was insufficient to instill prejudice, the level of which would
have required a mistrial.
AFFIRMED.
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