DENNIS L. CAWTHORN, Plaintiff-Appellan t/Cross-Appellee, vs. CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES IOWA CORP., d/b/a MERCY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, a corporation, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-520 / 04-1724
Filed November 16, 2006
DENNIS L. CAWTHORN,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES IOWA CORP.,
d/b/a MERCY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis I. Reis, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s order granting a new trial and
denying his claim for punitive damages. Defendant cross-appeals from various
evidentiary rulings. AFFIRMED.
Gary R. Fischer of Dreher, Simpson & Jensen, P.C., and Verle W. Norris,
Corydon, for appellant.
Roberta M. Anderson of Schroeder & Anderson, Mason City, and Thomas A.
Finley, Jack Hilmes, and Kami M. Lang of Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig,
Hilmes & Gaffney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
This appeal arises from plaintiff Dennis Cawthorn’s action seeking actual and
punitive damages from defendant Mercy Hospital Medical Center (Mercy Hospital)
as a result of the defendant hospital’s alleged (1) willful and wanton conduct and (2)
negligence. The district court found insufficient evidence of willful and wanton
conduct and dismissed that claim. The negligence claim was submitted to the jury
and a verdict was returned in plaintiff’s favor. The district court found the verdict
flagrantly excessive and not sustained by the evidence. The court ordered a
remittitur and conditionally provided for a new trial if plaintiff did not agree to the
remittitur. Plaintiff has appealed, contending the court erred in reducing the jury
verdict and granting a new trial. He also appeals from the court’s grant of a directed
verdict on his claim of negligent credentialing and refusal to submit punitive
damages to the jury. Defendant cross-appeals, contending the court abused its
discretion in allowing testimony regarding privileged and confidential information.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2000, Dr. Daniel Miulli performed a discectomy on plaintiff at
defendant, Mercy Hospital, to repair a work-related spinal injury.
Dr. Miulli
performed a second surgery on May 22 to remove a disc fragment. Plaintiff was
readmitted to the hospital on June 20 complaining of pain. Dr. Miulli consulted Dr.
Hlavin for a second opinion; she recommended testing plaintiff for infection. Relying
on week-old tests, Dr. Miulli treated plaintiff with steroids and pain medication.
In early July plaintiff went to the emergency room at the Mayo Clinic. A
biopsy revealed a bacterial infection. The infection was treated with antibiotics. As
a result of the deterioration of his spine, plaintiff underwent spinal fusion surgery in
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March of 2002. Plaintiff developed an incisional hernia, requiring surgery in April of
2004.
On May 22, 2002, plaintiff filed suit against Dr. Miulli, Dr. Koontz, 1 Dr. Hlavin,
and Mercy Hospital. Before trial, plaintiff dismissed his claims against Dr. Miulli, Dr.
Koontz, and Dr. Hlavin.
A jury trial was held in June and July of 2004. Prior to submitting the case to
the jury, the court granted Mercy Hospital’s motion for directed verdict on plaintiff’s
punitive damages claim.
The jury returned a verdict including the following
damages:
Past medical expenses
Future medical expenses
Past pain and suffering
Future pain and suffering
Past loss of full body
Future loss of full body
Total damages
$190,000
$400,000
$3,000,000
$4,000,000
$1,000,000
$2,000,000
$10,590,000
The jury allocated fault seventy percent to Dr. Miulli and thirty percent to Mercy
Hospital.
Defendant filed several posttrial motions including a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for new trial and remittitur of damage
award. Plaintiff filed a motion for partial new trial on punitive damages. The district
court, after a hearing on the motions, found “that a portion of the jury’s verdict was
flagrantly excessive and not sustained by sufficient evidence and should be
reduced.”
The court entered an order on October 19, 2004, providing for a
conditional new trial, which plaintiff could avoid by agreeing to remittitur of damages
as follows:
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Dr. Koontz was Dr. Miulli’s employer and, for a time, chairman of Mercy Hospital’s
department of neurosurgery.
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Past pain and suffering
Future pain and suffering
Past loss of full body
Future loss of full body
$200,000
$100,000
$200,000
$100,000
The court did not disturb the award for past or future medical expenses. The total
damages following the remittitur were $1,190,000. The court’s October 21, 2004
order denied plaintiff’s motion for partial new trial on punitive damages, concluding
“the evidence submitted did not rise to the level necessary for the submission of
punitive damages to the jury.”
II. Scope of review
A. Conditional new trial - remittitur. “‘The scope of our review of a district
court's ruling on a motion for new trial depends on the grounds raised in the
motion.’” Richards v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Co., 699 N.W.2d 676, 678 (Iowa
2005) (quoting Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 859 (Iowa
2001)). If the motion for a new trial was “‘based on a discretionary ground, we
review it for an abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Roling v. Daily, 596 N.W.2d 72, 76
(Iowa 1999)). In contrast, if the motion was “‘based on a legal question, our review
is on error.’” Id. (quoting Roling, 596 N.W.2d at 76). A court has “broad but not
unlimited discretion in determining whether the verdict effectuates substantial justice
between the parties.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(c). Our review of the court’s ruling
conditionally granting a new trial or remittitur, therefore, is for an abuse of discretion.
See id. We are “slower to interfere with the grant of a new trial than with its denial.”
Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(d).
In passing on the alleged excessiveness of damages, we need to
determine only whether there was substantial evidence to support the
verdict. We have noted that the trial court is generally in a better
position to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to justify an
award based on the observations of the trial court.
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Clarey v. K-Products, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Iowa 1994) (citations omitted).
B. Partial new trial.
Our review of the court’s ruling denying a partial new trial on punitive
damages and the earlier directed verdict on the issue is for correction of errors at
law. See Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 343 (Iowa 2006). In
determining there was not substantial evidence to support an element of plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages, the district court was required to view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702
N.W.2d 468, 473 (Iowa 2005).
Substantial evidence means evidence that a
“reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a conclusion.” Thompson v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 559 N.W.2d 288, 290-91 (Iowa 1997).
III. Discussion
A. Conditional new trial – remittitur. Plaintiff claims the trial court erred by
remitting approximately ninety-five percent of the non-economic damages award.
He argues the amount of damages awarded is “peculiarly a jury, not court, function.”
Riniker v. Wilson, 623 N.W.2d 220, 230 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). He correctly asserts
that a court may interfere with a jury’s award of damages “when the damage award
is ‘flagrantly excessive or inadequate, so out of reason so as to shock the
conscience, the result of passion or prejudice, or lacking in evidentiary support.’”
Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 869 (Iowa 1994)
(quoting Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 799 (Iowa 1984)). He argues
the district court’s order only makes conclusory statements that the awards were
flagrantly excessive and lacking in evidentiary support, but does not give any facts in
support of its conclusions.
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Defendant contends plaintiff “failed to file a bill of exceptions or otherwise ask
for a more specific trial court ruling on the motion for new trial” and has not
preserved for our review the claim the district court’s decision is not supported by
the evidence. Defendant argues the verdict (1) was flagrantly excessive and not
supported by the evidence and (2) was influenced by passion or prejudice because
of evidence improperly admitted.
The district court concluded the verdict was excessive and not supported by
the evidence. It did not conclude it was influenced by passion or prejudice. If the
jury's findings are not supported by the evidence, a new trial must be granted.
Cowan v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Iowa 1990). “The determinative question
for the district court was whether the verdict effected substantial justice between the
parties.” Blume v. Auer, 576 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
From our review of the record, we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion.
B. Partial new trial on punitive damages. The district court, both in its ruling
on Mercy Hospital’s motion for directed verdict and its ruling on plaintiff’s motion for
partial new trial on punitive damages, determined there was not substantial
evidence the hospital acted with willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety
of the plaintiff or others. See Iowa Code § 668A.1(1)(a) (2003) (requiring “a
preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence the conduct of the
defendant from which the claim arose constituted willful and wanton disregard for
the rights or safety of another”). Willful and wanton is defined as an intentional “act
of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so
great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” Fell v. Kewanee Farm
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Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 919 (Iowa 1990) (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts
§ 34, at 213 (1984)).
Plaintiff contends Mercy Hospital’s conduct in credentialing and retaining Dr.
Miulli was willful and wanton, justifying submitting a claim for punitive damages to
the jury. Plaintiff argues “complaints and concerns from within the Neurosurgery
Department and later other departments should have led to the termination of Dr.
Miulli’s privileges . . . long before” he performed the surgery on plaintiff. Mercy
Hospital responds that the only concerns raised by other doctors came in early
February 1999 and related to one surgery in January 1999. Limitations were placed
on Dr. Miulli for surgery involving lumbar surgery on more than two disc levels. The
surgery on plaintiff involved only one disc level. The damages claimed by plaintiff
did not occur from the surgery, but from an infection.
Punitive damages “are allowable upon a showing of legal malice.” Meyer v.
Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 922 (Iowa 1976). “Legal malice is shown by wrongful
conduct committed or continued with a willful or reckless disregard for another’s
rights.” McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Iowa 2000). “To receive
punitive damages, plaintiff must offer evidence of defendant's persistent course of
conduct to show that the defendant acted with no care and with disregard to the
consequences of those acts.” Wolf v. Wolf, 690 N.W.2d 887, 893 (Iowa 2005)
(quoting Hockenberg Equip. Co. v. Hockenberg's Equip. & Supply Co., 510 N.W.2d
153, 156 (Iowa 1993)). In granting the directed verdict and in denying plaintiff’s
motion for a partial new trial, the district court concluded there was insufficient
evidence on this element to submit the claim to the jury.
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We agree the evidence does not support the submission of punitive
damages.
C. Cross-appeal. Because we have affirmed the district court on plaintiff’s
appeal, we need not address defendant’s evidentiary claims raised on cross-appeal.
AFFIRMED.
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