STACY MICHAEL JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. BOSSARD IIP, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-437 / 05-1883
Filed November 16, 2006
STACY MICHAEL JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
BOSSARD IIP, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon Fister,
Judge.
Stacy Michael Jackson appeals the district court’s summary judgment
ruling dismissing his disability discrimination claim against Bossard IIP, Inc.
AFFIRMED.
John Rausch of Rausch Law Firm, Waterloo, for appellant.
Kevin Driscoll of Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig, Hilmes & Gaffney,
P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., Vogel, J., and Beeghly, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
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HUITINK, P.J.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
After receiving the requisite administrative release from the Iowa Civil
Rights Commission, Stacy Jackson sued Bossard IIP, Inc., claiming disability
discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). More specifically,
Jackson claimed he was fired from his employment at Bossard because of the
disabling effects of narcolepsy, a medical condition for which he had been
diagnosed and treated at the time he was fired.
Bossard admitted Jackson was fired for sleeping on the job. Bossard,
however, affirmatively alleged Jackson was not disabled and that his termination
was not the result of any discriminatory intent.
Bossard subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing Jackson
was not disabled within the meaning of ICRA.
The trial court determined
Jackson was, as a matter of law, unable to prove he was disabled and dismissed
Jackson’s lawsuit against Bossard.
On appeal Jackson raises the following issues:
I.
II.
District court erred in ruling plaintiff’s narcolepsy was not
covered under ADA as plaintiff’s narcolepsy substantially
limited him from performing both a class of jobs and a broad
range of jobs in various classes.
Was Mr. Jackson perceived as disabled?
II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling for the correction
of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
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III. Merits.
The ICRA generally prohibits an employer from discriminating against a
qualified person because of a disability.
Iowa Code § 216.6(1) (2003); see
Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Blackford, 661 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2003). Iowa
Code section 216.6(1)(a) (formerly section 601A.6) states:
It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any:
a. Person . . . to discharge any employee . . . because of the . . .
disability of such . . . employee, unless based upon the nature of
the occupation. If a person with a disability is qualified to perform a
particular occupation, by reason of training or experience, the
nature of that occupation shall not be the basis for exception to the
unfair or discriminating practices prohibited by this subsection.
“This statute, however, only pronounces a general proscription against
discrimination and we have looked to the corresponding federal statutes to help
establish the framework to analyze claims and otherwise apply our statute.”
Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 661 N.W.2d at 519.
The elements of a case of
disability discrimination under Iowa law require that “he or she (1) has a disability;
(2) was qualified for the position; and (3) was discharged because of his or her
disability.” Boelman v. Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Iowa 1994).
Accordingly, a prima facie case for establishing disability discrimination requires:
(1) that the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that the
employee was qualified to retain the job; (3) that the employee was
terminated; and (4) it is more likely than not that the termination
was based on impermissible considerations.
Schwarz v. Northwest Iowa Comty. Coll., 881 F. Supp. 1323, 1341-42 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
A disabled person is defined as “any person who has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has
a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.”
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Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-8.26(1) (2004); Probasco v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n,
420 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1988).
Although the impairment must significantly decrease the plaintiff’s
ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise, the plaintiff
need not be almost unemployable because of [the plaintiff’s]
impairment to be considered disabled.
Rather, the plaintiff’s
disability must limit one or more of the plaintiff’s “major life
activities” which has been defined in 161 Iowa Admin. Code §
8.26(3) as including “caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.”
Additionally, the impairment must “disqualif[y] [the
employee] from a wide range of other available jobs.”
Schwarz, 881 F. Supp. at 1342 (citations omitted).
The trial court’s summary judgment ruling states:
Because there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff’s
narcolepsy has not substantially limited him from performing either
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, he is
simply not a disabled person under the ADA. His meaningful
opportunities for employment have not been and are not limited.
His expertise, background, and relevant skills involve sales and
management and his narcolepsy has never limited his ability to
perform those jobs, substantially or otherwise. For these reasons
he may have an illness which causes him to occasionally doze off
when he is inactive, but this particular job was not a significant part
of his relevant job history given the jobs he has expertise in and
has performed both before and after this particular job. His
narcolepsy has never before nor since been a significant barrier to
his employment.
We agree. The summary judgment record indicates Jackson held several other
sales related positions with Bossard prior to his assignment as ISO coordinator.
All were “desk jobs” he successfully performed without any narcolepsy related
limitations. The record also indicates Jackson is able to perform his current job
duties as a department manager at Hometown Foods without any narcolepsy
related limitations. Moreover, Jackson concedes in his deposition that he can
perform a broad range of jobs that do not cause him to fall asleep.
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We also note deposition testimony by Dr. Kent Miller, Jackson’s treating
physician, that Jackson is not disabled. Dr. Miller also testified that Jackson’s
mild narcolepsy does not significantly restrict his ability to work in a broad range
of other jobs. We, like the trial court, conclude Jackson cannot, as a matter of
law, establish that his mild narcolepsy substantially limits his ability to work.
Lastly, for the same reasons cited by the trial court, we reject Jackson’s claim
that Bossard perceived him as disabled. The record indicates Jackson was fired
because he was sleeping on the job, not because of any established disability
related to mild narcolepsy.
The district court’s ruling granting summary judgment is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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