NICOLE BOK, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellant, CITY OF IOWA CITY, IOWA, Intervenor-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-412 / 04-1588
Filed November 16, 2006
NICOLE BOK,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE
RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellant,
CITY OF IOWA CITY, IOWA,
Intervenor-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Glenn E. Pille, Judge.
Respondent and intervenor appeal from a district court ruling reversing the
denial of disability benefits to petitioner. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
DIRECTIONS.
Alice E. Helle and Douglas E. Gross of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross,
Baskerville and Schoenebaum, P.L.C., Des Moines, for respondent-appellant.
Sarah Holecek, First Assistant City Attorney, Iowa City, for intervenorappellant.
Robert Rush of Rush & Nicholson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
MAHAN, P.J.
The Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa (System),
respondent, and the City of Iowa City, intervenor, appeal from a district court
ruling reversing the System’s denial of disability benefits to former Iowa City
police office Nicole Bok, petitioner.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Bok began employment as a police officer for the City on April 14, 1997,
and thus became a member of the Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System
of Iowa on that date. See generally Iowa Code ch. 411 (2003). Prior to her
employment with the City, Bok worked as an officer for the University of Iowa
Department of Public Safety (UIDPS) from 1993 to 1996, and as a police officer
with the City of Coralville from 1996 until she joined the Iowa City police
department in 1997. Her positions prior to joining the Iowa City department were
not covered by chapter 411.
In March 1996 Bok experienced right shoulder pain while lifting weights.
Dr. Michael M. Durkee diagnosed “subluxation with secondary impingement, right
shoulder,” and recommended physical therapy. Bok had two physical therapy
sessions. The discharge summary listed her prognosis as “good,” but indicated
the goals of treatment “were not met.” Bok testified she stopped physical therapy
after two sessions because “my shoulder felt fine after two times.” She did not
return to see Dr. Durkee because the shoulder pain had resolved. A doctor
conducting a pre-employment medical examination in 1997 concluded Bok was
medically qualified to perform the essential job functions of a police officer.
3
Following commencement of her employment with the City, Bok suffered
injuries to her right shoulder on three occasions, in the course of specific work
activities. On October 14, 1998, she injured her right shoulder while shooting a
shotgun during range qualification training. On January 26, 1999, she injured her
right shoulder during defensive tactics training. On May 15, 2000, Bok again
injured her right shoulder while shooting a shotgun during range qualification
training.
On October 16, 2002, Bok’s treating surgeon, Dr. James Nepola,
performed a right shoulder “anterior capsulorraphy” for purposes of treating
instability of the shoulder. 1 Dr. Nepola released Bok to restricted duty a few
weeks later.
Bok was never able to return to full duty, and in April 2003
Dr. Nepola assigned permanent restrictions. It is undisputed that Bok is unable
to perform the duties of a police officer.
Bok filed an application for a disability pension on April 23, 2003. See
Iowa Code § 411.6. In a letter dated July 10, 2003, the executive director of the
System informed Bok her application was denied based on the pre-existing
condition limitation of section 411.6(5). 2 Bok filed a timely appeal of the denial.
An evidentiary hearing was held before the Disability Appeal Committee
(Committee) of the Board of Trustees of the Municipal Fire and Police Retirement
1
Dr. Nepola described the procedure as similar to darning a sock, or “tighten[ing] up” the
front of her shoulder, which “had stretched and frayed and was loose.”
2
Section 411.6(5) limits accidental disability benefits as follows:
However, if a person’s membership in the system first commenced on or
after July 1, 1992, the member shall not be eligible for benefits with
respect to a disability which would not exist, but for a medical condition
that was known to exist on the date that membership commenced.
Section 411.6(3) includes the same language to limit ordinary disability benefits.
4
System of Iowa (Board) in November 2003. The Committee affirmed the denial
of disability retirement benefits, concluding,
The record supports a finding that Bok’s disability would not exist
but for a medical condition that was known to exist on the date of
hire. Since she became a member of the retirement system after
July 1, 1992, she is therefore ineligible for a disability pension
under either section 411.6(3) or section 411.6(5).
The Board ratified the Committee’s decision on January 8, 2004. Bok timely filed
a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court on January 22, 2004, asserting
that the Board’s failure to grant her retirement disability benefits was “contrary to
the law including being arbitrary, capricious and/or unreasonable.” The district
court granted the City’s motion to intervene.
The district court filed its ruling on September 8, 2004. The court first
concluded substantial evidence supported a finding that Bok suffered from a preexisting condition at the time her membership in the System commenced. The
court went on to interpret the phrase “known to exist” in section 411.6(5) to mean
“the record must show petitioner had actual or constructive knowledge of a preexisting condition that is undeniable and objective.” Specifically, the court stated,
“The record must show that [Bok] actually or constructively knew of her condition
of unremitting subluxation with secondary impingement, and not simply show
facts that retrospectively indicate the possibility that her condition existed but are
not conclusive.”
Due to “overwhelming evidence” in the record, the court
concluded, “no reasonable person could find that [Bok] had actual or constructive
knowledge of a pre-existing condition at the time of her hire.” Therefore, the
court reversed the Board’s finding that Bok knew she had a pre-existing
condition. The district court remanded the case to the Board for a determination
5
of whether Bok was “totally and permanently incapacitated for duty as the natural
and proximate result of an injury incurred or aggravated by the actual
performance of duty at some definite time and place.”
See Iowa Code
§ 411.6(5).
The City and the System appeal, arguing the district court erred in
(1) reviewing Bok’s certiorari action as a judicial review of a final agency action
and applying the standards of Iowa Code chapter 17A; (2) concluding the
statutory exclusion for pre-existing conditions in sections 411.6(3) and (5)
requires actual or constructive knowledge of the medical condition at the time
membership commenced; and (3) finding the Board’s determination that Bok
suffered from a medical condition known to exist at the time membership
commenced is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
II. Standard of Review
Because Iowa Code chapter 411 provides no appeal procedure, “a
certiorari action is the appropriate vehicle for challenging the actions of a pension
board.” Chiafos v. Municipal Fire & Police Ret. Sys. of Iowa, 591 N.W.2d 199,
201 (Iowa 1999). For a writ of certiorari to be sustained,
the plaintiff must show that the board acted ‘illegally’ in that it failed
to act in accordance with a statute or that its decision was not
supported by substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial when a
reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same
findings. Evidence is still substantial even though it would have
supported contrary inferences.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401 (“A writ of certiorari shall
only be granted when specifically authorized by statute; or where an inferior . . .
6
board . . . exercising judicial functions, is alleged to have exceeded proper
jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.”).
The district court captioned its ruling a “ruling on petition for judicial
review” and set forth the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19 for review of
final agency action.
In its procedural history, the court indicated, “This is a
certiorari action challenging the decision of the [System] . . . .” To the extent the
district court applied the standard of review for chapter 17A judicial review of
agency action, the court clearly erred. On appeal, we will review the matter in
light of the appropriate certiorari principles. Our review is for correction of errors
at law. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1412; O’Malley v. Gundermann, 618 N.W.2d 286,
290 (Iowa 2000).
III. Discussion
The primary issue on appeal is the district court’s interpretation of the
statutory exclusion for pre-existing conditions found in sections 411.6(3) and (5).
Our rules for interpreting statutes are well established. The primary goal “is to
give effect to the legislature’s intent, as expressed by the language used in the
statute.” Lange v. Iowa Dep’t of Rev., 710 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006). “We
give words their usual and ordinary meaning, and we try to avoid impractical or
absurd results.” Id.
The statute precludes eligibility for disability benefits “with respect to a
disability which would not exist, but for a medical condition that was known to
exist on the date that membership commenced.” Iowa Code §§ 411.6(3), (5). As
mentioned, the district court concluded the statute requires proof of actual or
constructive knowledge of a specific pre-existing condition at the time
7
membership commenced. The City and the System argue the district court’s
interpretation of the statute is overly restrictive. We agree. By concluding a
retrospective analysis cannot satisfy the knowledge requirement, the district court
essentially forecloses any potential knowledge by the System, thereby creating a
standard wherein only the member’s knowledge is considered. The requirement
imposed by the district court that the member had actual or constructive
knowledge of a particular condition at a particular point in time renders the
statute unworkable, as proof of actual knowledge at a given point in time would
be difficult to establish. 3
We agree with the appellants that a plain and rational reading of the
statute requires an objective, informed analysis of all information available at the
time the member applies for disability benefits. Substantial evidence must show
a causal connection between a pre-hire medical condition and the eventual
disability to preclude eligibility. In other words, if during the disability application
process an objective review of medical documentation produces substantial
evidence that a medical condition causally related to an eventual disability was
known to be in existence at the time of hire, the member is not eligible for
disability pension benefits.
Our interpretation of the statute is supported by recent legislation. House
File 2245 added the following language to section 411.6(5)(a):
3
In fact, the district court noted this difficulty, stating that:
Where reasonable minds could disagree about whether a medical
condition existed at a particular time, such as in this case, it would take
extraordinary evidence within the record for [the System] to conclude that
the member knew of the existence of the medical condition at the time.
(Emphasis added.)
8
A medical condition shall be deemed to have been known to exist
on the date that membership commenced if the medical condition is
reflected in any record or document completed or obtained in
accordance with the system’s medical protocols pursuant to section
400.8, or in any other record or document obtained pursuant to an
application for disability benefits from the system, if such record or
document existed prior to the date membership commenced.
H.F. 2245 § 13 (2006 Iowa Acts ch. __, § 13). 4
Applying our interpretation of the statute to the facts in this case, we
conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that Bok had a
pre-existing medical condition that was known to exist at the time her
membership commenced, thereby rendering her ineligible for a disability pension
under sections 411.6(3) or (5).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the
district court for entry of an order annulling the writ.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
4
The amendment to section 411.6(5)(a) tracks closely with the System’s rule 9.6(5):
A medical condition shall be deemed to have been known on the date
that membership commenced if it is reflected in any record or document
completed or obtained pursuant to this rule 9.6, or in any other record or
document obtained pursuant to an application for disability benefits from
the System, if such document existed prior to the membership
commencement date.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
