IN THE INTEREST OF K.A.K. and A.L.K., Minor Children, C.K., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-262 / 06-0334
Filed July 26, 2006
IN THE INTEREST OF K.A.K. and A.L.K.,
Minor Children,
C.K., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary L. Timko,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court order finding her children were in
need of assistance. AFFIRMED.
Patricia K. Wengert, Des Moines, and C.K., Sioux City, pro se, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Dewey Sloan, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Marchelle Denker, Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for
minor children.
Considered en banc.
2
PER CURIAM
I.
Background Facts & Proceedings
Christine is the mother of Angel, born in September 2001, and Kylie, born
in September 2005. The children were removed from Christine’s care shortly
after Kylie’s birth because Christine was homeless, and had apparently been
living a nomadic lifestyle for several years.
She had no means of financial
support. Christine gave conflicting stories about her circumstances. 1
Angel and Kylie were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance
(CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b) (2005) (parent is imminently
likely to neglect child), (c)(2) (child is likely to suffer harm due to parent’s failure
to supervise), and (g) (parent fails to provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter).
At the adjudication hearing, in December 2005, Christine stated her brother had
established a residence and a job for her in New Mexico, and she planned to
move there.
At the dispositional hearing, in January 2006, Christine stated she had
changed her mind about going to New Mexico, and was moving to Florida. She
testified she was staying with a friend while in Iowa, but would not give the
address to the court. The juvenile court found:
Unfortunately, it is difficult to return children to a parent who has no
home and who refuses to disclose any information that would be
helpful in that reunification effort.
The Court finds that this case continues to be one of deceit.
Christine continues to live a chaotic and nomadic lifestyle. She has
no plans for her future. Her plans change from day to day and can
best be characterized by “fly-by-night.”
1
Christine stated she had six other children, but gave various stories about where they
were and what they were doing. She eventually admitted her parental rights to three
children had been terminated. The other three lived with their fathers.
3
The court concluded the children should remain in foster care. Christine
has appealed the CINA orders.
II.
Standard of Review
Our scope of review in juvenile court proceedings is de novo. In re K.N.,
625 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 2001).
Although we give weight to the juvenile
court’s factual findings, we are not bound by them. Id. Our primary concern is
the best interests of the children. In re E.H., 578 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1998).
III.
Jurisdiction
Christine raises as an issue “jurisdiction as to residency,” and cites 28
U.S.C. section 1738A, the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).
The jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA present a question of subject matter
jurisdiction. In re Jorgensen, 627 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Iowa 2001). The question of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Id.
We note, however, that the PKPA does not apply to dependency or
neglect proceedings, such as CINA cases. See L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647,
661 (Colo. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 121, 116 S. Ct. 82, 133 L. Ed. 2d 40; In
re L.W., 486 N.W.2d 486, 500 (Neb. 1992); see also Williams v. Knott, 690
S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. App. 1985) (noting the PKPA does not apply to actions to
terminate parental rights). Thus, if Christine is claiming that Iowa does not have
jurisdiction under the PKPA, her argument is without merit because the PKPA
does not apply to this CINA proceeding. Also, no other state has exercised
jurisdiction, and in exercising initial jurisdiction, a state need not comply with the
PKPA. Jorgensen, 627 N.W.2d at 558.
4
In discussing the applicability of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
in CINA cases, our supreme court found that a juvenile court had jurisdiction
even though there was a pending dissolution proceeding regarding the same
children in another state. In re E.A., 552 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Iowa 1996). The
court stated, “Notwithstanding these factors, we are confident that the Iowa
juvenile court did have subject matter jurisdiction for the limited purpose of
protecting the children from risks of harm arising during their presence in this
state.” Id. We conclude the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction in this
case.
IV.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Christine also claims the State did not present sufficient evidence to show
the children were in need of assistance. We find the record shows the children
were clearly in need of assistance and were properly placed under juvenile court
jurisdiction. When the children were removed Christine was homeless and had
no plan for taking care of them. Although Christine now states she has a place to
live in Iowa, she would not reveal that address to the court. The children cannot
be returned to Christine if the court does not know where they would be living,
and the surrounding circumstances.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.
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